The Dutch Whistleblowers Authority in an international perspective: a comparative study by Loyens, Kim & Vandekerckhove, Wim
The Dutch Whistleblowers Authority in an   
international perspective: a comparative study 
Kim Loyens
Wim Vandekerckhove September 2018
Final report
  
The Dutch Whistleblowers Authority in an international 
perspective: a comparative study 
 
COMMISSIONED BY 
THE DUTCH WHISTLEBLOWERS AUTHORITY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
SCHOOL OF GOVERNANCE (USG), UTRECHT UNIVERSITY  
DR. KIM LOYENS 
  
 
WORK AND EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS UNIT (WERU), UNIVERSITY OF GREENWICH 
DR. WIM VANDEKERCKHOVE 
 
 
 
 
 
SEPTEMBER 2018  
The Dutch Whistleblowers Authority in an international perspective 
 
 
 
2 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF FIGURES…………………………………………………………………………6 
LIST OF TABLES…………………………………………………………………………..7 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY………………………………………………………………….8 
PART I: CENTRAL QUESTIONS AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 13 
2. Research aims and questions ............................................................................................... 13 
3. research design: case selection and data collection ........................................................... 16 
3.1. Selection of countries ........................................................................................................ 16 
3.2. Data collection and analysis .............................................................................................. 17 
PART II. COMPARISON BETWEEN DUTCH WHISTLEBLOWERS AUTHORITY 
AND SELECTED COUNTRIES 
1. The Dutch Whistleblowers Authority (Act) ....................................................................... 20 
1.1. Cultural and legal context ................................................................................................. 21 
1.2. Definition of whistleblowing and target groups ................................................................ 21 
1.3. Tasks and institutional characteristics ............................................................................... 22 
1.4. Whistleblowing protection and incentives ........................................................................ 24 
2. Cultural and legal context ................................................................................................... 26 
3. Definition of whistleblowing and target groups ................................................................. 29 
3.1. Scope ................................................................................................................................. 29 
3.2. Target group ...................................................................................................................... 30 
4. Whistleblowing agencies: tasks and institutional characteristics .................................... 32 
4.1. (Rather) unique characteristics of the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority .......................... 32 
4.1.1. Combination of advice, psychosocial support, investigation, and/or prevention .......... 32 
4.1.2. Specific psychosocial care for whistleblowers ............................................................. 37 
4.2. Differences and similarities between Dutch Whistleblowers Authority and agencies in 
selected countries .............................................................................................................................. 38 
4.2.1. Investigation of alleged wrongdoing and retaliation ..................................................... 38 
4.2.2. Advice ........................................................................................................................... 42 
4.2.3. Prevention ..................................................................................................................... 43 
The Dutch Whistleblowers Authority in an international perspective 
 
 
 
3 
 
4.2.4. Staff and case load ........................................................................................................ 45 
5. Whistleblower protection and incentives ........................................................................... 48 
5.1. Scope of protection ........................................................................................................... 48 
5.2. Procedural aspects of protection ....................................................................................... 52 
5.3. Remedies and disciplinary measures in case of retaliation ............................................... 53 
5.4. Alternative ways of protection .......................................................................................... 54 
6. Dutch whistleblowing provisions and international legal frameworks ........................... 56 
PART III: WHISTLEBLOWING ARRANGEMENTS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 
1. Introduction and a note on infographics ............................................................................ 67 
2. Australia ................................................................................................................................ 69 
2.1. Cultural and legal context ................................................................................................. 70 
2.2. Definition of whistleblowing and target groups ................................................................ 71 
2.3. Whistleblowing agencies: tasks and institutional characteristics ...................................... 72 
2.3.1. Whistleblowing agencies for public sector employees .................................................. 72 
2.3.2. Whistleblowing agencies for private sector employees................................................. 74 
2.4. Whistleblower protection and incentives .......................................................................... 75 
2.4.1. Whistleblower protection in the public sector .............................................................. 75 
2.4.2. Whistleblower protection in the private sector ............................................................. 76 
3. Belgium .................................................................................................................................. 77 
3.1. Cultural and legal context ................................................................................................. 78 
3.2. Definition of whistleblowing and target groups ................................................................ 78 
3.3. Whistleblowing agencies: tasks and institutional characteristics ...................................... 79 
3.3.1. Whistleblowing agencies in the Flemish government ................................................... 79 
3.3.2. Whistleblowing agencies in the federal government ..................................................... 83 
3.4. Whistleblower protection and incentives .......................................................................... 85 
3.4.1. Flemish whistleblower protection ................................................................................. 85 
3.4.2. Federal whistleblower protection ................................................................................. 86 
4. France .................................................................................................................................... 87 
4.1. Cultural and legal context ................................................................................................. 88 
The Dutch Whistleblowers Authority in an international perspective 
 
 
 
4 
 
4.2. Definition of whistleblowing and target groups ................................................................ 88 
4.3. Whistleblowing agencies: tasks and institutional characteristics ...................................... 89 
4.4. Whistleblowing protection and incentives ........................................................................ 89 
5. Ireland ................................................................................................................................... 91 
5.1. Cultural and legal context ................................................................................................. 91 
5.2. Definition of whistleblowing and target groups ................................................................ 92 
5.3. Whistleblowing agencies: tasks and institutional characteristics ...................................... 92 
5.4. Whistleblowing protection and incentives ........................................................................ 93 
6. Israel ...................................................................................................................................... 95 
6.1. Cultural and legal context ................................................................................................. 96 
6.2. Definition of whistleblowing and target groups ................................................................ 96 
6.3. Whistleblowing agencies: tasks and institutional characteristics ...................................... 96 
6.3.1. Private sector ................................................................................................................ 96 
6.3.2. Public sector ................................................................................................................. 96 
6.4. Whistleblowing protection and incentives ........................................................................ 98 
7. Norway .................................................................................................................................. 99 
7.1. Cultural and legal context ................................................................................................. 99 
7.2. Definition of whistleblowing and target groups .............................................................. 101 
7.3. Whistleblowing agencies: tasks and institutional characteristics .................................... 102 
7.4. Whistleblower protection and incentives ........................................................................ 102 
8. Republic of Korea ............................................................................................................... 104 
8.1. Cultural and legal context ............................................................................................... 104 
8.2. Definition of whistleblowing and target groups .............................................................. 105 
8.3. Whistleblowing agencies: tasks and institutional characteristics .................................... 105 
8.3.1. ACRC .......................................................................................................................... 105 
8.3.2. NGOs ........................................................................................................................... 106 
8.4. Whistleblowing protection and incentives ...................................................................... 106 
9. Serbia ................................................................................................................................... 108 
9.1. Cultural and legal context ............................................................................................... 108 
9.2. Definition of whistleblowing and target groups .............................................................. 109 
The Dutch Whistleblowers Authority in an international perspective 
 
 
 
5 
 
9.3. Whistleblowing agencies: tasks and institutional characteristics .................................... 110 
9.3.1. Courts .......................................................................................................................... 110 
9.3.2. Pistaljka ...................................................................................................................... 110 
9.3.3. Other agencies involved in whistleblowing ................................................................. 111 
9.4. Whistleblower protection and incentives ........................................................................ 112 
10. United Kingdom ................................................................................................................. 114 
10.1. Cultural and legal context ............................................................................................... 115 
10.2. Definition of whistleblowing and target groups .............................................................. 115 
10.3. Whistleblowing agencies: tasks and institutional characteristics .................................... 116 
10.3.1. Employment Tribunals ................................................................................................ 116 
10.3.2. NGOs ........................................................................................................................... 116 
10.3.3. Whistleblowing agency for NHS ................................................................................. 117 
10.3.4. Regulators ................................................................................................................... 117 
10.4. Whistleblowing protection and incentives ...................................................................... 117 
11. United States of America ................................................................................................... 119 
11.1. Cultural and legal context ............................................................................................... 120 
11.2. Definition of whistleblowing and target groups .............................................................. 121 
11.3. Whistleblowing agencies: tasks and institutional characteristics .................................... 122 
11.3.1. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) ................................................................................. 122 
11.3.2. Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) ................................................................... 123 
11.3.3. Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) ..................................................................... 125 
11.3.4. Government Accountability Project (GAP) ................................................................ 126 
11.4. Whistleblower protection and incentives ........................................................................ 127 
REFERENCES 
1. Scientific articles ................................................................................................................. 129 
2. Documents ........................................................................................................................... 130 
3. Websites ............................................................................................................................... 134 
ADVISORY EXPERTS 
  
The Dutch Whistleblowers Authority in an international perspective 
 
 
 
6 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1: Infographics whistleblowing arrangements in the Netherlands............................................. 20 
Figure 2. Groups covered by whistleblowing legislation – broadest to narrowest ............................... 31 
Figure 3. Tasks of whistleblowing agency in Israel and the Netherlands ............................................. 33 
Figure 4. Tasks of agencies involved in whistleblowing cases in the USA .......................................... 36 
Figure 5. Tasks of agencies involved in whistleblowing cases in Serbia ............................................. 36 
Figure 6. Comparison of tasks of Ombudsmen and Dutch Whistleblowers Authority (in green) ........ 39 
Figure 7. Institutional landscape in Norway concerning whistleblowing ............................................. 41 
Figure 8. Institutional landscape in Ireland concerning whistleblowing .............................................. 43 
Figure 9: Infographics public sector whistleblowing arrangements in Australia  ................................. 69 
Figure 10. Infographics Belgian federal and Flemish public sector whistleblowing arrangements ..... 77 
Figure 11. Infographics whistleblowing arrangements in France ......................................................... 87 
Figure 12. Infographics whistleblowing arrangements in Ireland......................................................... 91 
Figure 13. Infographics whistleblowing arrangements in Israel ........................................................... 95 
Figure 14. Infographics whistleblowing arrangements in Norway ....................................................... 99 
Figure 15. Infographics whistleblowing arrangements in Republic of Korea .................................... 104 
Figure 16. Infographics whistleblowing arrangements in Serbia ........................................................ 108 
Figure 17. Infographics whistleblowing arrangements in United Kingdom ....................................... 114 
Figure 18. Infographics whistleblowing arrangements in USA .......................................................... 119 
 
  
The Dutch Whistleblowers Authority in an international perspective 
 
 
 
7 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1. Final sample of countries included in this study ..................................................................... 17 
Table 2. Staff (FTE) in whistleblowing agency in Netherlands and selected countries ....................... 46 
Table 3. Reports of wrongdoing received and investigations (yearly average or 2017) by whistleblowing 
agencies in the Netherlands and selected countries .............................................................................. 47 
Table 4. Type(s) of retaliation whistleblowers are protected from in the selected countries ............... 50 
Table 5. Remedies for whistleblowers and agencies where they can be claimed ................................. 54 
Table 6. Dutch whistleblowing provisions scores for Council of Europe criteria ................................ 58 
Table 7. Dutch whistleblowing provisions scores for Transparency International criteria ................... 60 
Table 8. Dutch whistleblowing provision scores for UNODC criteria ................................................. 62 
Table 9. Dutch whistleblowing provision scores for OECD criteria .................................................... 64 
Table 10. Dutch whistleblowing provision scores for Blueprint criteria .............................................. 65 
Table 11. Scoring the Dutch whistleblowing provisions against international frameworks ................. 66 
Table 12. Scope of wrongdoing that can be reported under three different laws.................................. 71 
 
  
The Dutch Whistleblowers Authority in an international perspective 
 
 
 
8 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Dutch Whistleblowers Authority (Huis voor klokkenluiders) was created in July 2016. After a year 
into its existence, it commissioned research into how its tasks and mandates compared to 
whistleblowing agencies in other countries. This report is the result of that research. The report presents 
an international comparison of institutions with advisory, psychosocial care, investigative and/or 
preventative tasks with regard to whistleblowing. The characteristics of the Dutch Whistleblowers 
Authority are the starting point of that comparison. 
The research involved a comparison of the above dimensions in the Netherlands with those in ten other 
countries. A purposeful sampling technique was used. We first selected countries with designated 
whistleblowing legislation that were member states of the Council of Europe or belonged to the G20, 
striving for a mix of early-movers with established institutional frameworks around whistleblowing and 
late-movers with newly established whistleblowing legislation and undergoing institutional 
arrangements (like the Netherlands). We also included Israel in our sample. Although this country is 
not a Council of Europe member state nor part of the G20, its whistleblowing arrangement has – at first 
sight – similar characteristics to those of the Netherlands. Countries included in the sample are 
Australia, Belgium, France, Ireland, Israel, Norway, Republic of Korea, Serbia, UK, and USA. 
For each of these countries, information was sought about reporting culture, legal context, and the 
institutional context. The legal context included how the whistleblowing legislation had emerged, the 
scope of wrongdoing in the whistleblowing legislation, and the scope of protected persons (target group) 
of the whistleblowing legislation. The institutional context included information about tasks and 
mandates of the agencies that implement the whistleblowing legislation, institutional characteristics of 
the agencies that perform any of the tasks similar to those of the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority, and 
mandates for the protection of whistleblowers. 
The findings in this report were arrived at through analysis of policy and legislative documents, analysis 
of existing research reports about selected institutions and implementation of whistleblowing 
legislation, and interviews with representatives of whistleblowing institutions or whistleblowing experts 
(academics) from the selected countries. In total 17 telephone interviews and four face-to-face 
interviews were conducted. These respondents also reviewed the respective country summaries we 
developed based on these three data sources. 
General Findings 
Although people in the countries included in this research tend to acknowledge that protecting 
whistleblowers is for the betterment of society, whistleblowing remains far from easy and negative 
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connotations persist. There are various ways in which whistleblowing legislation interacts with culture. 
Civil society organisations play an important role in leveraging cultural change. In France, Ireland, 
Serbia, UK and USA these organisations perform a well organised watchdog function vis-a-vis 
whistleblowing arrangements. Much less of that was found in the Netherlands and in Norway; in the 
Netherlands, the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority has the mandate to leverage cultural change and 
might also take up some watchdog functions. 
The Dutch whistleblowers legislation – that passed in 2016, and created the Dutch Whistleblowers 
Authority – combines two emerging trends in national whistleblowing arrangements: a) stand-alone 
whistleblowing legislation covering both public and private sector, and b) the installation of a 
government funded whistleblowing agency. The ‘cutting edge’ position is in the combination of these 
two trends. So far, the Netherlands and the Republic of Korea are the only countries where this exists. 
France is in the process of establishing this. 
From the countries included in this research, the Netherlands was the only country where a government 
funded agency covering both public and private sector whistleblowing, combined the tasks of advice, 
psychosocial care, investigation of alleged wrongdoing and retaliation, and prevention. In other 
countries civil society organisations often combine advice, investigation and prevention. The perceived 
independence of these civil society organisations is of course different than that of the Dutch 
Whistleblowers Authority. As a government agency, the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority might be 
perceived as part of the system, and hence in reality less independent than in theory. 
Scope Findings 
The Dutch whistleblowers law covers both public and private sectors. Whilst this is also the case in 
most of the countries included in this research (except Belgium), most of these have different laws for 
the different sectors, whereas in the Netherlands this is achieved by one and the same law. In our view, 
the discrepancy between public and private sector whistleblowing legislation is most pronounced in 
Australia, Belgium and Israel. The advantage of having one law that covers both public and private 
sector whistleblowing is that protection measures and specifications are the same for both public and 
private sector whistleblowers.  
The Dutch whistleblowers law uses a broad notion of worker, i.e., both contractual or other working 
relationship. In contrast to other countries (Serbia, Ireland, Norway, UK), these ‘other working 
relationships’ are not specified in the law. A number of countries have even refrained from making any 
restraints on who qualifies (France, Republic of Korea private sector, USA some laws). Serbia stands 
out in the sense that it provides protection also to persons associated with the whistleblower. 
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In four of the countries included in this research, the whistleblowing agency is part of the National 
Ombudsman. Like the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority, these report to Parliament. There are, however, 
important differences. In Australia, the Ombudsman only investigates wrongdoing; in France only 
retaliation. In Israel, different departments within the State Comptroller/Ombudsman investigate 
wrongdoing and retaliation respectively (and only in the public sector). Belgium and the Netherlands 
are the only countries in our study where investigation of both wrongdoing and retaliation is done by 
the same department (but in Belgium only in the public sector). 
Protection Findings 
It remains unclear how stringent the Dutch whistleblowing provisions understand the 3-tiered 
whistleblowing model (internal, regulator, wider): a) third tier whistleblowing (e.g., media) is not 
protected; b) there is no clear definition of or approach to ‘public interest’; c) it remains unclear what 
the consequences are for the whistleblower if they do not first raise concern internally or to a regulator 
before reporting to the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority. Also, in contrast to other countries included in 
this research, it remains unclear which types of retaliation whistleblowers are protected from. These 
create legal uncertainties. 
The Netherlands was one of the weakest in our sample with regard to the ‘burden of proof’ reversal. 
This is awkward, as there is a wide international consensus that this is a minimum requirement of 
whistleblower protection legislation. A reversal of burden of proof puts the onus on the employer to 
provide evidence that detriments suffered by the whistleblower were imposed for other reasons than 
their whistleblowing. 
Institutional Tasks Findings 
The Dutch Whistleblowers Authority provides a significantly more extensive advice function than the 
other government agencies included in this research. The Dutch Whistleblowers Authority provides 
some legal advice as well as assisting the whistleblower with the identification of suitable recipients 
with whom whistleblowers can raise their concern, either inside their organisations or regulators. In 
other countries the advice function of government agencies is restricted to merely providing information 
(Australia, Belgium, Israel); assistance and legal support are generally provided by civil society 
organisations. 
The Dutch Whistleblowers Authority has the means to provide psychosocial support for whistleblowers. 
Only two other countries included in this research provide government funded psychosocial support for 
whistleblowers. In Norway a programme at a psychosocial care clinic has been funded by the Ministry 
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of Health since 2012 but is now likely to be closed down. In Israel, on the other hand, psychosocial care 
for whistleblowers is becoming more important in an attempt to provide a more holistic approach. In 
other countries, such as Australia, UK and the Republic of Korea, civil society organisations have 
stepped in to fill that need. 
Prevention is a common task for governmental whistleblowing agencies and the Dutch Whistleblowers 
Authority also performs this function. However, the recently established National Guardian Office in 
the UK is perhaps at the forefront with its ‘speak-up culture audits’ of health care organisations. In other 
countries, such a watchdog-like approach is taken by civil society organisations. 
The legal competencies of the investigative agencies in the sample countries are comparable to those of 
the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority. In most countries, whistleblowers have to turn to court(s) to seek 
remedies against retaliation. This is also the case in the Netherlands. Agencies in France, Belgium, 
Israel and the Republic of Korea try to seek reconciliation between whistleblower and employer. 
However, mediation is currently not a formal task of the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority. 
Criteria in international guidelines and frameworks 
The report also presents findings from a screening of the Dutch Whistleblowers Act against the criteria 
set forth in the following guidelines and frameworks: Council of Europe Recommendation on the 
Protection of Whistleblowers (CM/Rec 2014/7) combined with Council of Europe Resolution 2171 
(2017), Transparency International 2013 International Principles for Whistleblowing Legislation, 
UNODC 2015 Resource guide on good practices in the protection of reporting persons, OECD 2011 
Study on whistleblower protection, BluePrint for Free Speech 2015 G20 whistleblower protection laws. 
These frameworks differ in the emphasis they put on different dimensions of whistleblowing 
arrangements. Nevertheless, the European Directive on whistleblower protection will develop along 
these frameworks, given the initial proposal (Com(2018)218/973471). Whilst the screening method is 
not without limitations (e.g., only the Dutch whistleblowing provisions were screened) there were some 
findings that resonate throughout the frameworks used. Whilst the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority has 
made its mark in terms of advice to whistleblowers, it is – due to its short existence – still unclear how 
its investigations will provide clarity and security for whistleblowers and other stakeholders of 
whistleblowing concerns. However, in light of the frameworks used in this report, the law seems to be 
weak to strengthen protection. The lack of clarity with regard to the reversal of burden of proof is an 
obvious missed opportunity. A further shortcoming is the absence of stipulations with regard to wider 
disclosures beyond regulators or the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority, e.g., to the media. 
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Reading Guidance 
Detailed research questions, research design and selection of countries are explained in Part I. 
Part II presents the findings of the comparative study, which compares the institutional landscape 
around whistleblowing in the Netherlands with that of ten other countries. It is organised around the 
following dimensions: cultural and legal context, scope of wrongdoing and whistleblower, tasks and 
institutional characteristics of whistleblowing agencies, whistleblower protections and remedies. Part 
II also presents the findings of the assessment of the Dutch arrangements against the international 
frameworks. 
Part III gives a summary for each country of our research. 
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PART I: CENTRAL QUESTIONS AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
1.  INTRODUCTION  
On July 1st 2016, the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority was established. Its tasks are 1) to advise, inform, 
and provide legal support (but not including representation in court) to individuals who want to report 
work-related wrongdoing that may harm the public interest, 2) to provide psychosocial support to 
whistleblowers, 3) to investigate alleged wrongdoing reported by whistleblowers, 4) to investigate 
alleged retaliation against the whistleblower, and 5) to inform employers about the necessity of 
whistleblowing in the first place and provide support to employers when implementing integrity 
management to prevent organisational wrongdoing. The Dutch Whistleblowers Authority wanted to 
know how it compared to foreign institutions that combine advisory, psychosocial care, investigative 
and/or preventive tasks concerning whistleblowing. Which institutions are comparable to the Dutch 
Whistleblowers Authority? What are their tasks and their legal mandate? How are they organised? And 
which lessons can be learned from these foreign institutions? 
The School of Governance (USG) of Utrecht University received the request to conduct an international 
comparative research to gain more insight on this topic. Given its relevance for practice and research, 
the USG agreed to draft a research proposal in cooperation with the Work and Employment Relations 
Unit (WERU) of the University of Greenwich. The following paragraphs in part I discuss the research 
aims and (sub) questions (section 2), and the research design, including case selection and methods 
(section 3). In part II, the central research question will be answered, focusing on one or more sub 
questions in each paragraph. Part III gives a more detailed overview of the whistleblowing legislation 
and institutional landscape in the selected foreign countries, organised in the various sub questions as 
well. 
2.  RESEARCH AIMS AND QUESTIONS  
The recently established Dutch Whistleblowers Authority wants to understand how it compares to 
foreign institutes with similar tasks. This research project will thus include an international comparison 
of institutions with advisory, psychosocial care, investigative and/or preventive tasks concerning 
whistleblowing. Characteristics of the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority will be the starting point of this 
comparison. In addition, this study aims to situate the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority Act within 
important international legal frameworks for whistleblower protection. 
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The central research question is: 
 
“How does the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority (Act) compare to foreign institutions with advisory, 
psychosocial care, investigative and/or preventive tasks concerning whistleblowing and to 
international frameworks for whistleblower protection?”   
 
In several discussions with representatives of the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority the following topics 
were selected for the international comparison: 
 Reporting culture, including the perceived social acceptability of whistleblowing, and the role 
of civil society (e.g., labour unions) and professional organisations (e.g., NGOs); 
 Legal context, including the extent to which whistleblowing legislation is implemented in 
practice and monitored; 
 Scope of whistleblowing legislation, including the definition of wrongdoing that can be 
reported by whistleblowers; 
 Target group of the whistleblowing legislation, including the definition of a whistleblower and 
sectors that are covered by the legislation; 
 Tasks of agencies that implement the whistleblowing legislation, focusing on the five central 
tasks of the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority (advice, psychosocial support, investigation of 
alleged wrongdoing, investigation of alleged retaliation against the whistleblower, and 
prevention), including the question whether and how these tasks are combined in one agency, 
the legal competences these agencies have, and their case load; 
 Institutional characteristics of the agencies that perform any of the tasks of the Dutch 
Whistleblowers Authority, including their financing and accountability mechanisms, staff, 
budget, unique characteristics of the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority and differences with 
selected institutions; 
 Protection for whistleblowers, including legal provisions, how these are implemented in 
practice, and (dis)incentives for blowing the whistle; 
 Extent to which the Dutch Whistleblowers Act meet the criteria of guidelines and 
recommendations formulated by important international organisations. 
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This list of topics results in the following sub questions, that will be answered in several sub paragraphs 
of part II. 
A. Foreign institutions 
1. Cultural and legal context 
i. How does the reporting culture in the Netherlands compare to that in the selected countries? 
ii. To what extent is, in the selected countries, whistleblower protection imposed by national regulation, 
and what are the stipulated conditions? 
iii. To what extent are, in the selected countries, whistleblowing regulations (including reporting and 
protection policies) implemented and monitored? 
iv. What is the role of civil society organisations and professional bodies in the institutional framework 
of the selected countries, in comparison with the Netherlands? 
2. Definition of whistleblowing and target group 
i. How does the definition of whistleblowing used by the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority compare 
to that of foreign institutions with advisory, psychosocial care, investigative and/or preventive 
tasks concerning whistleblowing? 
ii. How does the target group of the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority compare to that of foreign 
institutions with advisory, psychosocial care, investigative and/or preventive tasks concerning 
whistleblowing? 
3. Tasks 
i. How do the tasks (and the possible tensions between them) of the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority 
compare to those of foreign institutions with advisory, psychosocial care, investigative and/or 
preventive tasks? 
ii. How do the legal competences of the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority compare to those of foreign 
institutions with advisory, psychosocial care, investigative and/or preventive tasks? 
iii. How do the type and number of cases in the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority compare to those of 
foreign institutions with advisory, psychosocial care, investigative and/or preventive tasks 
concerning whistleblowing? 
4. Institutional arrangements 
i. How are foreign institutions with advisory, psychosocial care, investigative and/or preventive 
tasks concerning whistleblowing financed? 
ii. To what extent are foreign institutions with advisory, psychosocial care, investigative and/or 
preventive tasks concerning whistleblowing independent, and to whom are they accountable? 
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iii. How do staff occupation and budget of the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority compare to those of 
foreign institutions with advisory, psychosocial care, investigative and/or preventive tasks 
concerning whistleblowing? 
iv. What are unique characteristics of the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority, compared to foreign 
institutions with advisory, psychosocial care, investigative and/or preventive tasks concerning 
whistleblowing? 
v. What are the most important differences between the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority and foreign 
institutions with advisory, psychosocial care, investigative and/or preventive tasks concerning 
whistleblowing? 
5. Whistleblower protection and incentives 
i. How does whistleblower protection in the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority (Act) compare to (legal) 
protection in the selected countries? 
ii. To what extent do foreign institutions with advisory, psychosocial care, investigative and/or 
preventive tasks concerning whistleblowing offer (financial or other types of) (dis-)incentives to 
whistleblowers, and under which conditions? 
B. International frameworks 
6. To what extent does the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority Act meet the criteria of guidelines 
and recommendations formulated by important international organisations, such as the Council 
of Europe, the OECD, the EU, Transparency International, and the UN? 
3.  RESEARCH DESIGN:  CASE SELECTIO N AND DATA COLLECTION  
3.1. Selection of countries 
The sampling of foreign institutions to be compared to the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority was at the 
country level. We used a purposeful sampling technique (Patton 1990), selecting countries that have 
designated whistleblowing legislation within the Council of Europe and G20 countries. We strived for 
a mix of early-movers with established institutional frameworks around whistleblowing, and late-
movers with newly established whistleblowing legislation that are thus (like the Netherlands) 
undergoing institutional rearrangements. During the study, we decided to not include two Council of 
Europe countries that were in the initial sample – Slovakia and Sweden – respectively because of non-
cooperation with key stakeholders and the perception of key stakeholders that implementation of the 
law is problematic. Australia and Israel were added, because of their promising legal framework, and 
in the case of Israel also the high level of comparability with the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority. This 
resulted in the final sample shown in Table 1 below.  
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Table 1. Final sample of countries included in this study 
Country Whistleblowing legislation dates 
Council of Europe countries 
UK 
Belgium 
France 
Norway 
Serbia 
Ireland 
Slovakia 
Sweden 
 
1998 (2013) 
2004; 2013 
2004; 2016 
2007 
2014 
2014 
2014 
2017 
G20, but not CoE countries 
USA** 
Republic of Korea** 
Australia 
 
1978 (2012); 2010 
2001 (2014); 2011 (2015) 
2004; 2009; 2013 
Other countries 
Israel 
 
1997; 2008 
** The USA and the Republic of Korea score highest in the TI report on the G20, and are the only ones with oversight bodies for the 
whistleblowing legislation in both private and public sector. 
3.2. Data collection and analysis 
Data collection in this study was conducted in the period of June 2017 to February 2018, and done in a 
fourfold way: 
(1) Analysis of policy and legislative documents that describe the tasks and legal competences of 
the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority. To better understand how these tasks are performed in 
practice, interviews of 45-60 minutes each were conducted with four employees of the Agency, 
one of each department (i.e., Advice, Investigation, Prevention, Legal Department). 
(2) Analysis of policy and legislative documents in the selected countries, and (if available) of 
existing research reports about the selected institutions and implementation of whistleblowing 
legislation. In part III, for each country an overview of the most relevant documents is shown 
in footnote. 
(3) Telephone interviews with whistleblowing professionals, being high ranking officers working 
in the selected agencies, and academic experts who study whistleblowing in their country and 
who have been involved in recent legislative or institutional rearrangements. In total 17 
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telephone interviews were conducted of 30-60 minutes each. An interview protocol was used 
during the interviews consisting of topics linked to the research questions – like tasks, 
institutional arrangements, and whistleblower protection – while remaining open for additional 
topics that interviewees considered relevant to discuss. During the interviews notes were made, 
which were written out in full detail shortly after the interview. To avoid social desirability bias 
and because of the sensitivity of the topic, confidentiality of the respondents’ identity was 
promised. 
(4) A comparative analysis was made between selected important international frameworks for 
whistleblowing protection and the Dutch whistleblowers legislation. The selected frameworks 
included: 
a. Council of Europe (2014). Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)7 of the Committee of 
Ministers to member States on the protection of whistleblowers; 
b. Council of Europe (2017). Resolution 2171 (2017) Parliamentary scrutiny over 
corruption: parliamentary cooperation with the investigative media; 
c. Transparency International (2013). International principles for whistleblowing 
legislation; 
d. UNODC (2015). Resource guide on good practices in the protection of reporting 
persons;  
e. OECD (2011). Study on whistleblower protection. Frameworks, compendium of best 
practices and guiding principles for legislation; 
f. BluePrint for free speech (2015). Breaking the silence. Strengths & weaknesses in G20 
whistleblower protection laws; 
g. Initial proposal of the forthcoming EU Directive on whistleblower protection 
(Com(2018)218/973471). 
The data were first summarized in Excel tables to structure the available information for each research 
question per country. The findings were regularly discussed by the two researchers to increase 
comparability of data collection and analysis. Then, the key elements of whistleblowing arrangements 
for each country were identified and visualized in infographics, and a preliminary comparison between 
agencies in the selected countries and the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority was made. Both the 
infographics and the preliminary comparative analysis were presented during a meeting with the 
commissioner. To increase the validity of the findings, member-checking was done by allowing the 
interviewees to comment on relevant parts of the draft report, after which a few revisions were made 
(e.g., providing further detail, and correcting omissions on our part). The draft report was thereafter 
discussed with three advisory experts and the commissioner, and finalized.  
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PART II. COMPARISON BETWEEN DUTCH WHISTLEBLOWERS AUTHORITY 
AND SELECTED COUNTRIES 
This part answers the central research question of this study. It describes, on the one hand, how the 
Dutch Whistleblowers Authority relates to foreign institutions with advisory, psychosocial care, 
investigative and/or preventive tasks concerning whistleblowing and, on the other, how the Dutch 
Whistleblowers Act relates to international frameworks for whistleblower protection. The various 
sections each focus on one or two sub questions that were introduced in part I. The first section, 
however, describes the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority (Act) in light of these sub questions: 1) cultural 
and legal context, 2) definition of whistleblowing in and target groups of legislation, 3) tasks and 
institutional characteristics, and 4) whistleblower protection and incentives. The second section 
analyzes the cultural and legal context of whistleblowing in the Netherlands in comparison to the ten 
selected countries (sub question A1). The third section focuses on the scope of the whistleblowing 
legislation (focusing on the type of wrongdoing that can be reported) and the target group of the 
whistleblower protection legislation (sub question A2). The fourth section compares the Dutch 
Whistleblowers Authority with institutions in the ten selected countries in terms of tasks, competences, 
accountability mechanisms, and if information was available also staff, type of reports and annual 
budget. It also describes the unique characteristics of the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority and most 
important differences with selected agencies (sub questions A3 and A4). In section five, available 
whistleblowing protection mechanisms are discussed, as well as incentives for or barriers against 
whistleblowing. Finally, section six compares the Dutch Whistleblowers Act with important 
international whistleblowing protection frameworks. 
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1.  THE DUTCH WHISTLEBLO WERS AUTHORITY (ACT)  
Figure 11 below summarizes the main characteristics of the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority (Act), 
which will be described in this part. Part III contains similar infographics for the selected countries, 
some of which will be shown in part II when comparing these countries to the Netherlands. 
Figure 1: Infographics whistleblowing arrangements in the Netherlands2 
                                                     
1 We relied on 4 local respondents (one of each department), conversations during meetings with the 
commissioner, and the following documents: 
Wet van 14 april 2016, houdende de oprichting van een Huis voor klokkenluiders (Wet Huis voor klokkenluiders). 
Huis voor Klokkenluiders (2016a). Integriteit in de praktijk. De meldregeling. 
Huis voor klokkenluiders (2016b). Jaarverslag 2016. 
Huis voor klokkenluiders (2017a). Jaarverslag 2017. 
Huis voor klokkenluiders (2017b). Resultaten en activiteiten Kennis & Preventie 1 juli 2016 – 31 oktober 2017. 
2 The remedies shown in the infographics are not stipulated in the whistleblowing legislation. Rather, they already 
exist in labour law. The whistleblowing legislation amends labour law by adding reprisal related to whistleblowing 
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1.1. Cultural and legal context 
The Dutch Whistleblowers Authority Act was enacted on July 1st 2016. With this new law the Dutch 
Whistleblowers Authority was established and all employers in the public and private sector with 50 
employees or more have the obligation to install an internal reporting procedure concerning wrongdoing 
within the organisation that may harm the public interest. Given the cultural sensitivity concerning 
whistleblowing in the Netherlands – not unlike other West-European counties – this obligation is not 
obvious and implementation of reporting procedures is considered a difficult process. Some state that 
the law does not go far enough, because not only the reporting procedure, but an integrity management 
policy should have been made compulsory. One can indeed argue that a reporting procedure can be 
counterproductive if it is not embedded in an integrated integrity management policy.3 Moreover, the 
obligation to install a reporting procedure is very difficult to enforce in practice. 
Since the enactment of the law in 2016, whistleblowers can claim protection from retaliation on the 
condition that they followed the appropriate procedure. First they have to raise the concern internally, 
and only if the report is not dealt with properly within the organisation, they can report it externally to 
inspectorates or other supervisory bodies. If a proper response by the external channel also lacks or in 
the absence of an appropriate external channel, whistleblowers can report to the Dutch Whistleblowers 
Authority. In some cases, internal whistleblowing is not considered a reasonable option – for example 
in the case of immediate danger or when top management is involved in the wrongdoing – and 
whistleblowers can immediately report to an external channel. The law and explanatory documents are, 
however, not very clear about these exceptions, which leads to uncertainties for whistleblowers about 
whether they can skip internal reporting, for example in cases where middle management but not 
necessarily top management is involved in the wrongdoing. 
1.2. Definition of whistleblowing and target groups 
The Dutch Whistleblowers Act offers protection for ‘employees’ (werknemers) in the public and private 
sector who report presumed wrongdoing that may harm the public interest, and includes either 1) 
breaches of law, 2) danger to health, safety of people or the environment, or 3) improper acts or 
                                                     
as a ground to claim these remedies. The case load shown is the number of contacts the department Advice had 
with whistleblowers in the first six months (532 in 2016), and the number of investigations that were started in 
that period (12 in 2016) (Huis voor Klokkenluiders, 2016b). In the infographic about tasks and institutions 
concerning whistleblowing, the police, public prosecutor and courts are not mentioned as actors involved in the 
investigation of wrongdoing, because their role (although obviously relevant in all countries) is not explicitly 
linked to the whistleblowing arrangements in the studied countries. 
3 The Confidential Integrity Adviser: Current Status and Future Prospects in the Netherlands 
https://huisvoorklokkenluiders.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/HvK-broch.vertrouwensp.-ENG-DEF.pdf 
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omissions that endanger the functioning of a public agency or firm. Hence, only public concerns can be 
raised to the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority. While this raises the threshold for whistleblowers, it 
prevents the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority being confronted with a substantial case load consisting 
of reports of minor issues. Problematic in practice is, however, that the law nor explanatory documents 
provide a clear definition of ‘public interest’, which results in legal uncertainty for whistleblowers. 
Therefore the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority will develop a definition based on how they operate, 
which is a more inductive approach. While the Dutch law speaks of ‘employees’ (werknemers), this 
term is defined in a broad sense, including both a contractual and other working relationship. However, 
it does not specify or give examples of what this ‘other working relationship’ refers to precisely. The 
Dutch Whistleblowers Authority understands it to include persons who work for or have worked for an 
organisation/company, as well as freelancers, interns, volunteers, subcontracted employees and 
suppliers’ employees (Huis voor Klokkenluiders, 2016a). 
1.3. Tasks and institutional characteristics 
The Dutch Whistleblowers Authority is an independent governing body that, according to the law, 
advises whistleblowers and investigates both wrongdoing that may harm public interest, as well as 
retaliation against those who have reported it. The advisory and investigatory tasks are performed in 
two departments respectively, between which at case level a ‘Chinese wall’ has been established. 
Whereas the law only mentions these tasks, the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority also has a prevention 
department and offers whistleblowers psychosocial support. These tasks were considered crucial for 
important stakeholders in the preparatory phase of the law. The agency is accountable to Parliament 
(through an annual report), and for its budget also to the Ministry of The Interior and Kingdom 
Relations. It has an annual budget of approximately 3 million euro. The combination of both 
investigative tasks (independent and objective investigation of wrongdoing and of retaliation claims) 
and advising and supporting whistleblowers at the same time certainly is a complicated issue. In the 
following, each of the tasks of the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority (including those not mentioned 
explicitly in the law), are described. 
The advisory department consists of five advisors. They advise and inform individuals who want to 
report wrongdoing in their organisation, and provide legal advice in every step of the reporting 
procedure, while not representing whistleblowers in court. Their task may include providing 
information about the reporting procedure, inform whistleblowers about the possible consequences and 
risks of reporting, giving them advice with the decision whether or not to report, and offering practical 
help in writing letters to the employer. The advisors also assist those who are not genuine 
whistleblowers according to the law (e.g., because the wrongdoing they report does not harm the public 
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interest) by referring them to proper reporting channels. Whistleblowers who do meet the definition of 
the law are also offered psychosocial assistance by advisors of the agency, and by a psychologist paid 
by the Whistleblowers Authority. During the entire advisory process, the best interest of the 
whistleblower is at the centre and the whistleblower is in the lead; he can thus at any time decide to end 
the advisory trajectory. In the first six months, 532 individuals have contacted the Whistleblowers 
Authority for advice (70 genuine whistleblowers, and 183 reporters of whom at the end of the year was 
not sure yet if the reported was in the public interest) (Huis voor Klokkenluiders, 2016b), and in 2017 
the agency received 471 requests for advice (39 genuine whistleblowers and 178 reporters of whom at 
the end of the year was not sure yet if the reported was in the public interest (Huis voor Klokkenluiders, 
2017a). 
The Investigative department consists of four investigators, and is responsible for two types of 
investigation. First, this department investigates the alleged wrongdoing if the investigator has 
determined that the public interest is indeed at stake. On the basis of the investigation, the 
Whistleblowers Authority can formulate recommendations, which can be followed-up. Second, they 
investigate retaliation claims. If the investigation indeed shows that retaliation has taken place as a result 
of the reporting act, whistleblowers can initiate a procedure to request compensating measures (as will 
discussed in part 1.4 below). In performing these tasks, the investigators of the Whistleblowers 
Authority can use any of the following competences: investigate in the public domain, request police 
assistance, request information, request presence of employer, request employer to answer and hear 
witnesses. The department can also hire individuals with specific investigative expertise (for example 
in accountancy). In the second half of 2016, 12 investigation requests were made, of which 8 about 
alleged retaliation (Huis voor klokkenluiders, 2016b). In 2017, 19 investigation requests were received 
(Huis voor klokkenluiders, 2017a). 
The prevention department consists of three employees. Their tasks include 1) direct contact with 
employers and professionals to inform them about integrity management to prevent organisational 
wrongdoing and the necessity of (a) whistleblowing (procedure) (e.g., in 2017 1430 questions of 
employers were answered, 36 presentations were given in the Netherlands and abroad, and 2 meetings 
were organised with trusted persons), 2) writing brochures and articles about integrity management and 
whistleblowing procedures, 3) developing instruments to measure organisational culture and integrity 
management efforts, and 4) conduct or issue research on various aspects of integrity management, and 
whistleblowing (e.g., 4 research projects in 2017). In all these tasks, the prevention department tries to 
emphasize the importance of a broad and coherent ethics management approach in which reporting 
procedures are embedded. The very specific name with the literal translation ‘House for 
Whistleblowers’, however, seems to imply that the agency only focuses on reporting procedures in the 
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strict sense. Therefore staff of this department constantly have to explain to employers that they can 
assist and inform them in more than only whistleblowing policy. The Dutch Whistleblowers Authority 
also employs a director and support staff, namely one legal advisor, one communication officer, one 
board secretary, and one general secretary. 
1.4. Whistleblowing protection and incentives 
The Dutch law provides that whistleblowers can request for an investigation of alleged retaliation. 
Moreover, whistleblower protection is guaranteed in the provision that the whistleblower’s identity will 
not be made known to the employer without the whistleblower’s agreement. What, however, weakens 
the position of whistleblowers in the Netherlands, is that the Dutch law did not introduce a reversal of 
burden of proof – although this is considered best practice by international organisations4 – and in 
addition suffers from a lack of conceptual clarity. The latter results in legal uncertainty in at least three 
ways. First, a clear definition of ‘public interest’ is lacking, which results in whistleblowers being 
uncertain whether the wrongdoing they want to report is indeed considered a ‘public interest’ issue, and 
whether they are still protected if the decision is made that the issue does not harm the public interest. 
Second, for many whistleblowers it is unclear what the consequences are in terms of protection if 
whistleblowers do not follow procedure (e.g., because they thought there was an imminent danger while 
it was not the case, or not top management but only middle management was involved in the 
wrongdoing). Third, the law does not clearly stipulate what retaliation against whistleblowers means. 
For some it is unclear whether it only refers to formal labour aspects, such as dismissal and denial of 
promotion, or also to informal types of retaliation, such as lack of respect, unfair treatment or threat of 
reprisal. In practice, the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority focuses on both aspects. 
Furthermore, the Dutch law, on the one hand, provides that the Whistleblowers Authority can formulate 
recommendations on the basis of an alleged retaliation investigation, but on the other hand does not 
specify what these may include. The remedies shown in the infographics above (see Figure 1) are not 
stipulated in the whistleblowing legislation, but already existed in labour law. These include damage 
compensation, reinstatement and interim relief. The Dutch whistleblowers law amends labour law by 
adding whistleblowing as one of the grounds on which these protections may be claimed. A different 
type of protection that advisors of the Whistleblowers Authority offer is trying to seek reconciliation 
between employee and employer, although this is not a formal task of the Agency. In those cases, the 
                                                     
4 OECD (2011). Study on whistleblower protection. Frameworks, compendium of best practices and guiding 
principles for legislation; UNODC (2015). Resource guide on good practices in the protection of reporting 
persons. 
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identity of the whistleblower is obviously known to the employer. Although this may hamper 
whistleblower protection, it could also result in finding a win-win solution for both parties, something 
a long judicial procedure often fails to do. 
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2.  CULTURAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT  
In none of the countries examined in this report was whistleblowing seen as something easy or 
straightforward. Whistleblowing often continues to have connotations of the disloyal employee or ‘rat’. 
References to whistleblowing being opposed to a ‘national culture’ are also often-heard comments. 
Nevertheless, in countries where survey data exist on attitudes to whistleblowing, the vast majority of 
the population believes that protecting whistleblowers is for the betterment of society.5 
Our research suggests that, rather than merely depending on national culture, whistleblowing legislation 
may also influence attitudes and practices with regard to whistleblowing. Such legislation mandates 
new interventions from agencies and civil society (NGOs), triggers self-regulation, and generates new 
case law and jurisprudence with regard to employment disputes. However, adaptations also seem to 
occur; those with an interest in hiding wrongdoing find ways to either retaliate in more subtle ways than 
before, or in reacting quicker and harder.6 
We found various ways in which whistleblowing legislation and culture seem to interact. In Serbia the 
whistleblowing legislation and the work of a prominent NGO appears to aid in building citizens’ trust 
in the state and the judiciary.7 In Norway, however, whistleblowing might be getting even harder: 
research suggests an increase in retaliation and a decrease in effectiveness of whistleblowing to stop 
wrongdoing.8 This is despite whistleblowing legislation with broad coverage of types of wrongdoing 
and an institutional and legal context characterized by inclusiveness and social justice. In the UK a more 
gradual shift seems noticeable. Despite its longstanding legislation (implemented in a decentralized 
way), whistleblowing scandals continue to emerge and agencies mandated to investigate wrongdoing 
have not succeeded in changing the perception that they are ineffective in responding to whistleblowers. 
Nevertheless, the gradual shifts in attitudes to whistleblowing are mixed, with on the one hand more 
awareness and less retaliation, but on the other hand a lower preparedness to blow the whistle.9 
The implication is that in order to understand the interaction between culture and whistleblowing 
legislation we need to also consider the institutional landscape around whistleblowing. We present the 
                                                     
5 See country files of Australia, Ireland, Republic of Korea, and UK in Part III. 
6 Devine, T. (2016). International Best Practices for Whistleblower Policies. Government Accountability Project. 
PCAW (2013). Whistleblowing - The inside story. Public Concern at Work / University of Greenwich. 
PCAW (2015). Is the law protecting whistleblowers? Public Concern at Work. 
7 See Part III, country file for Serbia. 
8 See Part III, country file for Norway. 
9 See Part III, country file for UK. 
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specific role of institutions for different countries further on in this report but mention here a number 
of salient patterns. 
Norway’s culture has many similarities with that of the Netherlands. Both are deliberative and inclusive 
democracies. They also share consensus-driven politics and employment relations. Perhaps this is a 
reason why the Netherlands and Norway stand out from other countries in terms of the positive and 
supportive role labour unions have played with regard to whistleblowing legislation. This can lead to 
too much optimism with regard to particular legislative and institutional ‘solutions’. However, this also 
implies a general preparedness to review and amend arrangements. At least for the Netherlands, such a 
trial-and-error trajectory with regard to whistleblower protection can be documented.10 
Other countries, such as France, Ireland, UK and USA, can be characterized by more antagonistic 
politics and employment relations. In these countries we see stronger and better organised watchdog 
activities vis-a-vis whistleblowing arrangements.11 NGOs set up particular services for whistleblowers, 
construct business models to professionalize these, yet remain critical observers of government agencies 
investigating wrongdoing, and of the courts with regard to whistleblower protection. So far, we have 
seen much less of that in Norway12 or the Netherlands. 
The Dutch whistleblowers legislation passed in 2016 confirms two emerging trends in national 
whistleblowing arrangements: one relates to the sectoral scope of the legislation and the other to the 
institutional implementation. With regard to sectoral scope, whilst some countries have included 
whistleblowing provisions in legislation specific to sectors (public sector, corporations) or types of 
wrongdoing (e.g., fraud, environment), stand-alone whistleblowing legislation covering both public and 
private sectors is certainly the trend.13 The USA was the first country to have whistleblowing legislation 
but used a limited scope (public sector) and, possibly due to its federal structure, continued with a 
fragmented approach. This means that whistleblower protection is scattered across a patchwork of more 
than 60 laws in different states, at different levels, for different sectors (including the private sector), 
and for different purposes.14 Australia also has a federal structure, and several pieces of whistleblowing 
                                                     
10 Vandekerckhove, W. (2006). Whistleblowing and organizational social responsibility: A global assessment. 
Ashgate. 
11 See Part III, country files for France, Ireland, UK and USA. 
12 See Part III, country file for Norway. 
13 Cf. country files in Part III. 
See also Vandekerckhove, W., Phillips, A., Devine, T. & Myers, A. (2016). Checkmate to corruption: Making the 
case for a wide-ranging initiative on whistleblower protection. Public Services International. 
14 See Part III, country file for USA. 
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legislation exist there as well, even at the federal level covering public and private sector. However, 
discussions exploring a more unified stand-alone legislation with broad coverage are ongoing.15 Ireland 
and France started out on the path of fragmented whistleblower protection but recently made an 
overhaul towards a unified stand-alone legislation.16 
This brings us to the second emerging trend for which the Dutch legislation can be seen as cutting-edge, 
namely that of government funded whistleblowing agencies. We see this trend emanating from 
whistleblowing legislation with a scope limited to the public sector (e.g., Belgium and Israel)17. Public 
sector whistleblowing legislation tends to mandate the Ombudsman’s Office to carry out case 
management for whistleblowing within the public sector, which can involve carrying out or 
coordinating investigation of wrongdoing and retaliation, offering protection, and making 
recommendations for corrective action. However, transposing this model to also include the private 
sector is legally and practically not straightforward. We provide a more detailed comparison in section 
three, but note here the Netherlands and the Republic of Korea are so far the only countries where this 
is being done. In the Republic of Korea, what was initially an anti-corruption commission has seen its 
mandate grow over the past two decades to deal with a somewhat broader range of wrongdoing reported 
by whistleblowers, through two pieces of legislation covering the public sector and private sector 
respectively.18 Currently, the Netherlands is the only country that has a designated whistleblowing 
agency mandated through a single piece of stand-alone whistleblowing legislation covering both public 
and private sector. A similar scheme is about to be started in France.19 Discussions in Norway explore 
options to provide whistleblowing related mandates to specific agencies.20 In Australia the option of 
establishing a new agency is under consideration.21 In the UK, the country with the longest experience 
of having stand-alone whistleblowing legislation covering both public and private sector, no central 
whistleblowing agency exists linked to that legislation. However, in 2016 a whistleblowing agency was 
created for the National Health Service (NHS), and a ‘National Guardian’ whistleblowing agency with 
broad sector coverage is contemplated in Scotland.22  
                                                     
15 See Part III, country file for Australia. 
16 See Part III, country files for Ireland and France. 
17 See Part III, country files for Belgium and Israel. 
18 See Part III, country file for Republic of Korea. 
19 See Part III, country file for France. 
20 See Part III, country file for Norway. 
21 See Part III, country file for Australia. 
22 See Part III, country file for UK. 
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3.  DEFI NITION O F WHI STLEBLOWING AND TA RGET G ROUPS  
We looked at how whistleblowing legislation in the different countries delineated the types of 
wrongdoing that would qualify as whistleblowing (scope), as well as what restrictions are made in terms 
of working relationships with the organisation one blows the whistle on (target group). 
3.1. Scope 
The Dutch Whistleblowers Act offers protection for whistleblowers who report presumed wrongdoing 
that may harm the public interest, and includes either 1) breaches of law, 2) danger to health, safety of 
people or the environment, or 3) improper acts or omissions that endanger the functioning of a public 
agency or firm. With regard to scope, we find in the selected countries a huge variation in wording. 
This is not surprising given that terms in different language do not always translate easily into English. 
We can, however, observe some patterns. One is that most whistleblowing legislation covers all three 
of the following categories of wrongdoing: 1) breaches of law, 2) danger to health or safety of people 
and the environment, and 3) integrity violations. In most countries23 ‘breaches of law’ includes broader 
notions such as ‘miscarriage of justice’ (Ireland, UK), ‘perverting course of justice’ (Australia), ‘failure 
to comply with legal obligations’ (UK), or specific instances in addition to a general category, for 
example ‘corruption’ (Australia, Israel, Norway). The category ‘danger to health or safety of people, 
and the environment’ is a pretty standard notion. By far the greatest variation can be seen in the wording 
used to describe ‘integrity violations’. Some examples: ‘abuse of public trust’ (Australia), ‘shortcoming 
of public service duty’ (Belgium), ‘breaches of ethical codes’ (Norway), ‘gross mismanagement’ 
(Ireland, USA), ‘abuse of authority’ (Republic of Korea, USA), and ‘violation of administration’ 
(Israel). 
There do not appear to be references to integrity or ethics in the whistleblowing legislation in the UK 
and France. There are, however, interesting additions to the core list, which make a number of countries 
stand out. For example, in France the legislation also covers failures to comply with ratified treaties or 
measures adopted by international organisations. In Ireland and the UK, attempts to cover-up any other 
listed type of wrongdoing also qualifies as a protected disclosure. In Serbia, violations of human rights 
is explicitly mentioned. In the Republic of Korea this is worded as ‘rights of people’. Norway explicitly 
mentions ‘harassment, bullying, discrimination, and negative culture’. The Irish legislation possibly 
includes the same, albeit in different wording: ‘oppressive, discriminatory or negligent act’. 
                                                     
23 See respective country files in Part III for the named countries in this section. 
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In countries that have separate whistleblowing legislation for public and private sectors, the scope of 
wrongdoing covered in the private sector law tends to be more narrow than that in the public sector law. 
Examples are Australia and the USA. A possible exception is the Republic of Korea. 
Interesting is that in most countries no reference is made to the reported violation having to be ‘in the 
public interest’. Given the broad scope of wrongdoings, it is therefore noteworthy that the UK law 
includes a ‘public interest test’. This entails that at an Employment Tribunal hearing, the judge will 
have to consider whether the claimant had a ‘reasonable belief the disclosure was in the public interest’. 
This test was introduced in 2013 to avoid people using the whistleblowing legislation to claim unfair 
dismissal in relation to a personal grievance. The deliberation around delineating public interest from 
personal grievance resonates in a number of countries within Europe. Case law from the European Court 
of Human Rights has focused on process and motivation, whereas the recent case law in the UK tends 
to look at number of people affected by the wrongdoing, severeness of the wrongdoing, and deliberate 
intent of the wrongdoer. While such ‘public interest test’ is not included in the Dutch law, it does 
stipulate that only wrongdoing that may harm the public interest can be reported to the Dutch 
Whistleblowers Authority, which leaves the agency with the difficult task to assess whether or not 
reported wrongdoing meets this criterion and protection can be granted. 
3.2. Target group  
The Dutch whistleblowers law covers both public and private sector. This is similar to nearly all 
countries examined in this report (see Figure 2 below and respective country files in Part III), albeit that 
in some countries different laws exist for different sectors. Belgium is an exception, where there only 
exists whistleblowing legislation for the public sector. Israel shows a huge discrepancy between public 
and private sector whistleblowing legislation, so much so that in this report we have regarded the Israeli 
legislation to cover the public sector only. In the Republic of Korea, USA, and Australia there is separate 
legislation for public and private sectors respectively. In this sense the Netherlands is comparable to 
France, Serbia, Ireland, Norway, and the UK: one law covering all sectors. 
The Dutch whistleblowers law speaks of ‘employees’ (werknemers), which is defined in a broad sense, 
including both a contractual or other working relationship. While the Dutch law leaves open what this 
‘other working relationship’ refers to precisely, legislation in a number of other countries (Serbia, 
Ireland, Norway, and UK) specifies various types of working relationships: internships, agency 
workers, contractors, etc. A number of countries have even refrained from making any restraints on 
who qualifies, i.e., anyone can be a whistleblower. This is the case in France. It is also the case in the 
Republic of Korea and the USA, but only in their private sector whistleblowing legislation. The general 
picture in the USA is, however, much more complicated, because every state in the USA has a variety 
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of whistleblowing statutes, which often limit who can blow the whistle. Serbia is the one standing out 
here, with the law providing whistleblower protection also for persons associated with the 
whistleblower (such as family, business partners, clients, supporting colleagues, etc.). 
  
 
France Serbia Ireland 
  Netherlands  
  Norway 
  UK 
 
Korea Australia Israel 
USA  Belgium 
Figure 2. Groups covered by whistleblowing legislation – broadest to narrowest 
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4.  WHISTLEBLOWING AGENCIES:  TASKS AND INSTITUTIONAL 
CHARACTERISTICS  
4.1. (Rather) unique characteristics of the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority 
The comparative analysis between whistleblowing agencies in the selected countries and the Dutch 
Whistleblowers Authority shows that the Netherlands is the only country with 1) one single agency 
funded by the government, 2) which offers protection for whistleblowers in both the public and private 
sector, and that 3) combines the tasks of advice, psychosocial support, investigation of alleged 
wrongdoing, investigation of alleged retaliation, and prevention. While this combination of 
characteristics can be considered unique, some of the studied agencies are quite comparable to the Dutch 
Whistleblowers Authority because they are funded by government and combine four of the five tasks. 
Noteworthy is also that we only found two other countries in which government funds are available for 
specific psychosocial support for whistleblowers. 
4.1.1. Combination of advice, psychosocial support, investigation, and/or prevention  
Government agencies with various roles in whistleblowing protection 
In our study, we found only two countries with government agencies that combine four of the five tasks 
of the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority, namely the State Comptroller in Israel (and the Ombudsman 
which is part of this agency) (as shown in Figure 3 below) and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) in the USA. Agencies in both countries will be discussed separately below. 
Like in the Netherlands, the Israeli agencies 1) investigate wrongdoing reported by whistleblowers, 2) 
investigate alleged retaliation against whistleblowers, 3) provide psychosocial support to 
whistleblowers, and 4) perform prevention tasks in terms of awareness raising via information 
dissemination campaigns. As for the latter, the prevention tasks of the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority 
are broader, because these include assistance to employers in implementing policy and operating as a 
knowledge center for whistleblowing policy and integrity management. Although advice to 
whistleblowers is not a formal part of the tasks of the Ombudsman or the State Comptroller, they do 
respond to questions and give information on the risks of whistleblowing for the whistleblower and 
available reporting channels. This is, however, only one of the three main tasks that are done by the 
Advice department of the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority, being 1) informing (possible) 
whistleblowers about the procedure and potential risks of being a whistleblower, 2) giving assistance 
to whistleblowers before and during the investigation, and 3) providing legal advice during the entire 
reporting procedure while not representing whistleblowers in court. Recently the Ombudsman in Israel 
is developing a more holistic approach to deal with whistleblowers by focusing on psychosocial support 
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as well; specifically a psychologist has been appointed to give support to whistleblowers and their 
families, which is comparable to what the psychologist of the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority does.24 
Being only accountable to Parliament, the Israeli agencies can be considered independent, which is 
comparable to the position of the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority being an independent governing 
body that is accountable to Parliament, and for its budget also accountable to the Ministry of The Interior 
and Kingdom Relations. 
The most important differences between the Israeli and Dutch agencies are the target group and how 
investigations on wrongdoing and alleged retaliation are conducted. As for target group, the State 
Comptroller and Ombudsman in Israel are installed for public sector whistleblowers only. As for 
investigation, it is interesting that in Israel the decision was made to separate the investigation of the 
alleged wrongdoing (which is done by the State Comptroller) and the investigation of alleged retaliation 
(which is done by the Ombudsman), while in the Netherlands both types of investigation are done by 
the same Investigative department. Nevertheless, in practice there does not seem to be a huge difference 
between both countries, because in Israel the Ombudsman is part of the State Comptroller, and no 
‘Chinese walls’ are installed between these two investigative departments but there is far reaching and 
easy information sharing that is not regulated with protocols.25 
 
   Israel      Netherlands 
Figure 3. Tasks of whistleblowing agency in Israel and the Netherlands 
                                                     
24 See Part III, country file for Israel. 
25 See Part III, country file for Israel. 
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The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the USA also combines four of the five tasks of the 
Dutch Whistleblowers Authority, being 1) advice to whistleblowers, 2) investigation of alleged 
wrongdoing, 3) investigation of alleged retaliation, and 4) prevention.26 It does not provide psychosocial 
support like the Dutch and Israeli agencies discussed above. The SEC is the whistleblowing agency that 
implements the Dodd-Frank Act, which offers protection for all whistleblowers who report securities 
laws violations. Investigations of alleged wrongdoing are conducted by either one of the eleven regional 
offices or a speciality unit, sometimes in cooperation with enforcement agencies in the USA and abroad 
in criminal cases. For the investigation of alleged retaliation, advice and prevention, a specific 
department, the Office of the Whistleblower (OWB), has been established within the SEC. Interestingly, 
like in Israel, investigation of alleged wrongdoing and retaliation are done by separate departments 
within the SEC. The OWB monitors retaliation complaints and the SEC can take enforcement acts 
against agencies who violate the anti-retaliation provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, which has been done 
only three times.27 In addition, nine enforcement actions were taken, because employers prohibited 
employees to contact the SEC. As for the advisory task, the OWB has a hotline where whistleblowers 
or would-be whistleblowers, their attorneys and other citizens can ask information about the program, 
which covers like in Israel only one of the three main tasks of the Advice department of the Dutch 
Whistleblowers Authority. Most calls are about eligibility criteria for awards, confidentiality 
guarantees, investigative procedure(s) and the appropriateness of the SEC to handle a specific tip.28 
Prevention includes the promotion of public awareness concerning whistleblowing, by means of the 
OWB web page, media interviews, presentations, press releases and webinars, which is in the 
Netherlands done by the communication officers. 
Non-governmental organisations with various roles in whistleblowing protection 
In the other selected countries, the government agencies that are installed to deal with whistleblowing 
protection only perform one or two of the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority’s tasks, as will be explained 
in part 4.2. However, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in two of the selected countries, the 
USA and Serbia, have three of five tasks in common with the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority, being 
advice to whistleblowers, investigation (only of wrongdoing, and not of alleged retaliation) and 
prevention. As for NGOs, the (perceived) independence is of course different than that of the Dutch 
Whistleblowers Authority, and the government agencies in Israel and the USA discussed above. This 
                                                     
26 See Part III, country file for USA. 
27 SEC (2017). Annual report to Congress. Whistleblower Program. Securities and Exchange Commission. 
28 SEC (2017). Annual report to Congress. Whistleblower Program. Securities and Exchange Commission. 
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is particularly shown in the lack of independent investigation of wrongdoing. Notwithstanding the 
important difference in position, it is noteworthy to explain how these NGOs manage to combine their 
tasks. 
In the USA, the Government Accountability Project (GAP) has been established in 1977 at the Institute 
for Policy Studies as a non-profit, non-partisan public interest law firm. It has an annual budget of 
approximately 3.1 million dollar (which is comparable to the budget of 3 million euro of the Dutch 
Whistleblowers Authority), which mainly comes from 10.000 individual donors and foundations such 
as the CS Fund, the Open Society Foundations and Rockefeller Family Fund. GAP gives informal and 
legal advice to whistleblowers, and represents a few of them in court.29 The latter is not done by the 
Advice department of the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority. GAP tries to find an agreement between 
employee and employer, because that is considered to be in the best interest of the whistleblower. 
Although GAP aims to find win-win solutions for all parties, it is not always considered to be 
independent and fair by employers, being perceived as an institution for whistleblowers. GAP also 
employs investigative journalists who investigate the charges whistleblowers make. The results of these 
investigations are published in articles and reports that are published online. By doing so, the agency 
helps exposing wrongdoing by government agencies to the public. Unlike the Dutch Whistleblowers 
Authority, GAP does not investigate alleged retaliation against whistleblowers. The prevention tasks 
include actively promoting government and corporate accountability by keeping oversight on agencies 
to determine whether law on paper is implemented in practice. Their studies are presented to congress, 
and their findings often lead to revisions in whistleblowing protection laws. GAP also provides training 
for agencies involved in whistleblowing protection and policy advice to agencies about the 
implementation of the several whistleblowing protection laws. It thus operates as a knowledge centre 
for whistleblowing policy, like the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority. Figure 4 below shows the various 
tasks of the NGO GAP (in yellow) and also illustrates the fragmented institutional landscape in the 
United States, where there are different regulators (in blue) and specific whistleblowing agencies (in 
green) that play an important role in dealing with whistleblowing cases. 
 
                                                     
29 See Part III, country file for USA. 
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Figure 4. Tasks of agencies involved in whistleblowing cases in the USA 
The situation in Serbia is quite different. There is also a strong whistleblowing NGO, Pistaljka (which 
is Serbian for ‘The Whistle’), established 7 years ago, whose tasks are similar to GAP. But the role of 
this NGO seems to be even more crucial for the successful implementation of the whistleblowing 
protection law, given that no governmental whistleblowing agencies have been installed in Serbia (as 
shown in Figure 5). Hence, protection can only be claimed in court. 30 
 
Figure 5. Tasks of agencies involved in whistleblowing cases in Serbia 
                                                     
30 See Part III, country file for Serbia. 
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Pistaljka receives funding from several Western countries (including the Netherlands and the USA), the 
European Union, and to a smaller degree from Serbia. Hence, it is considered quite independent from 
the Serbian government. This perception may explain part of its success, given the lack of citizen trust 
in Serbian government agencies.31 The threefold task of Pistaljka is 1) advising whistleblowers by 
providing information, legal counselling and representation in court (which the Dutch Whistleblowers 
Authority does not), 2) investigation of wrongdoing (but, unlike the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority, 
not alleged retaliation) by investigative journalists who publish their findings in reports and newspaper 
articles, and 3) training lawyers and judges to deal with whistleblowing cases and giving ad hoc advice 
to employers who asked them questions about the WBPA. As for the latter, the agency is considering 
to increase its role in prevention by focusing more on advising employers in ethics management and 
being a knowledge center on whistleblowing. 
4.1.2. Specific psychosocial care for whistleblowers 
Only in two of the selected countries, government funds are available for specific psychosocial care for 
whistleblowers like in the Netherlands (where whistleblowers can receive free care from a 
psychologist). In Norway, there is a psychosocial care clinic, funded by the Ministry of Health, that 
since 2012 treats whistleblowers who have suffered retaliation.32 The clinic has already helped more 
than 200 whistleblowers in the past six years but it is likely the program will be closed down. While the 
official reason is money-related, an interviewee explains that another reason could be that the 
government may feel uncomfortable to have such a clinic, because it may be perceived as a symptom 
of a culture that is against whistleblowers and freedom of speech. Also in Israel psychosocial care for 
whistleblowers is becoming more important. As explained above, the Ombudsman is developing a more 
holistic approach to whistleblower protection. An appointed psychologist gives support to both 
whistleblowers and their families.33 
In most other countries, whistleblowers who need psychosocial support are referred to general employee 
assistance programs that are installed to help employees with various kinds of psychosocial needs, such 
as stress and the consequences of harassment or bullying, and which are thus not adapted to the 
particular needs of whistleblowers who have experienced retaliation. Therefore, in the UK and 
Australia, NGOs have stepped in to fill that need.34 In the UK, a relatively new NGO, 
                                                     
31 See Part III, country file for Serbia. 
32 See Part III, country file for Norway. 
33 See Part III, country file for Israel. 
34 See Part III, country files for UK and Australia. 
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WhistleblowersUK, provides psycho-social support to whistleblowers. While this NGO has 
professionalised over the past few years, it still runs mainly on volunteering. In Australia NGOs are in 
general quite weak, but there are self-help groups for whistleblowers, like for example Whistleblowers 
Australia, that provide psychosocial support. These organisations, however, often lack sufficient 
resources to assist whistleblowers in a professional way. 
4.2. Differences and similarities between Dutch Whistleblowers Authority and agencies in 
selected countries 
This section describes for each of the five general tasks of the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority, the 
main differences and similarities in the selected countries. Psychosocial support is not discussed, given 
that the few examples of specific psychosocial care for whistleblowers have already been described in 
4.1 above. This section concludes with an overview of staff and case load in the studied whistleblowing 
agencies. 
4.2.1. Investigation of alleged wrongdoing and retaliation 
In four of the selected countries35 (Australia36, Belgium, Israel and France) the whistleblowing agency 
is the Ombudsman. While these agencies are comparable to the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority in 
their independence, being only accountable to Parliament (albeit that the Dutch Whistleblowers 
Authority is in addition accountable to the Ministry of The Interior and Kingdom Relations for its 
budget), and investigatory competences (see below), they differ in target groups (only for public sector) 
(see also 2.2) and in whether they investigate alleged wrongdoing and/or retaliation against 
whistleblowers (see Figure 6). 
 
  
                                                     
35 See Part III, country files for Australia, Belgium, Israel and France. 
36 As for Australia, this study focused on the national level. Sometimes, state level institutions are mentioned as 
well, when they are considered good practices or significantly different than the national system. For Australia, 
the ombudsman is the whistleblowing agency at the national public sector level, and for three of the six state 
public sector schemes (Queensland, NSW and Tasmania); in one state (Victoria) it is the anti-corruption agency. 
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Australia     Belgium 
         
  Israel       France 
 
                  Netherlands 
Figure 6. Comparison of tasks of Ombudsmen and Dutch Whistleblowers Authority (in green) 
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In Australia37, the Ombudsman only investigates reported wrongdoing, and in France38, the 
Ombudsman only investigates alleged retaliation. Following that in Israel39, the investigation of 
reported wrongdoing and alleged retaliation are conducted by different departments (between which no 
‘Chinese walls’ are installed, as explained above) – as is the case in the SEC40 – Belgium41 is the only 
country in our study in which both the investigation of wrongdoing and retaliation are done within the 
same department, as in the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority. Based on their investigations, these 
Ombudsmen formulate recommendations to agencies, which the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority can 
do as well. These recommendations are often also sent to Ministers, which gives the recommendations 
authority. 
Specific investigative agencies for whistleblowing cases in other countries are the Anti-Corruption and 
Civil Rights Commission (ACRC) in the Republic of Korea and the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) 
in the USA (in addition to the SEC which has already been discussed in 4.1.1). The ACRC has been 
installed for public and private employees who report.42 Like the Australian Commonwealth 
Ombudsman it is mainly preoccupied with triaging the received whistleblower concerns and referring 
these to the appropriate regulators for investigation. It makes recommendations, based on these 
investigations, and does follow-ups, something the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority can do as well. 
Whistleblowers can request the ACRC to investigate retaliation. The investigative task of the OSC is 
limited to alleged retaliation against whistleblowers in the federal public sector.43 
Overall, the legal competences of the investigative agencies mentioned above are comparable to the 
competences of the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority, and include access to all information available in 
                                                     
37 The Australian Commonwealth Ombudsman can conduct alleged wrongdoing investigations itself, or (as it 
often does) refer it to the department where the alleged wrongdoing is taking place for investigation. On its own 
current interpretation of the legislation, the Ombudsman cannot investigate retaliation against whistleblowers, and 
will only investigate whether agencies applied the procedural requirements of the PID Act in dealing with the 
disclosure. Whistleblowers who are retaliated against can often only go to court to claim compensation or 
corrective action. 
38 In France, the recent whistleblowing law (2016) gives authority to the Ombudsman. However, the executive 
decree implementing these new tasks for the ombudsperson had not been signed when at the time of writing this 
report (July 2018). 
39 As explained above, the Ombudsman is in Israel part the State Comptroller, and both have tasks concerning 
whistleblowing. 
40 See Part III, country file for USA. 
41 In Belgium, there is an Ombudsman at the Federal, Walloon and the Flemish level. The federal and Flemish 
level are both analyzed in this study, because both of them have responsibilities in whistleblowing cases brought 
on by public employees in the respective governments. 
42 See Part III, country file for Republic of Korea. 
43 See Part III, country file for USA. 
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documents (and sometimes also electronic devices), inspection and interviewing witnesses who in most 
countries are obligated to pro-actively provide information they have or are aware of. Agencies in which 
these witnesses are employed are often also required to make witnesses available to be interviewed by 
investigators. Some USA agencies have additional competences, such as the OSC that has subpoena 
powers and the SEC that can use surveillance tactics. 
In Ireland and the UK no dedicated whistleblowing agency has been established.44 In both countries the 
law does provide a list of prescribed persons that receive reports and investigate alleged wrongdoing. 
A recent audit (in 2015) by the National Audit Office in the UK, however, showed that staff working 
for these ‘prescribed person’ bodies often were unaware they were mandated as a recipient of 
whistleblower concerns. In Ireland, there is no information available as to how pro-active these 
regulating bodies have become with regard to whistleblowing since 2014. In countries where there is 
no investigative agency (Ireland, Israel private sector, Norway, Serbia) or only a weak one (Australia), 
whistleblower protection is only accessible through court. In the absence of NGOs who provide advice 
or legal support, like in Norway (see Figure 7), undergoing a court procedure is considered very 
difficult. 
 
Figure 7. Institutional landscape in Norway concerning whistleblowing 
Also in the USA, federal whistleblowers who believe they have experienced Prohibited Personnel 
Practices (PPP) – in which retaliation against whistleblowers is explicitly mentioned – can appeal to the 
                                                     
44 See Part III, country files for Ireland and UK. 
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court-like government agency the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), which however received 
severe criticisms from GAP and our interviewees.45 
4.2.2. Advice 
The three main tasks of the Advice department of the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority are 1) informing 
(possible) whistleblowers about the procedure and potential risks of being a whistleblower, 2) giving 
assistance to whistleblowers before and during the investigation (including practical help like writing 
letters to employers), and 3) providing legal advice during the reporting procedure while not 
representing whistleblowers in court. In the selected countries where whistleblowing agencies have an 
advisory task, it is often limited to the first of these three tasks, in which whistleblowers can get 
information about the procedure (Australia, Belgium, Israel) and/or would-be whistleblowers are 
advised about their decision to report (Belgium, Israel).46 Hence, these services do not resemble the 
continuing support through the entire investigation provided by the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority. 
The comprehensive advice offered in the Netherlands can more easily be compared to the support and 
legal assistance by NGOs, although these organisations often also provide legal counseling and 
representation in court, which the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority does not. 
The roles of GAP (USA) and Pistaljka (Serbia) were already discussed in 4.1.1 above. In Ireland, the 
UK and the Republic of Korea, there are also NGOs that advise (would-be) whistleblowers in different 
ways.47 In Ireland, there are two ‘spin-off organisations’ of Transparency International (TI). First, the 
Transparency Legal Advice Centre (TLAC) provides advice about the whistleblowing legislation, as 
well as specific legal advice for whistleblowers who intend to take their case further, including 30 hours 
of free legal advice per whistleblower. TLAC has legal privilege. Second, Integrity@Work provides 
advice to whistleblowers on how best to raise concerns internally, as well as when and how to blow the 
whistle outside their organisation. Integrity@Work also takes up an advocacy role by monitoring 
whistleblower experiences. The role of these NGOs strengthens the judicial position of whistleblowers 
in Ireland (see Figure 8), which might make them less vulnerable than, for example, in Norway (see 
Figure 7). In the UK, the NGO ‘Public Concern at Work’ (since 1993) has legal privilege and gives free 
advice to whistleblowers with regard to raising concerns internally, when and how to blow the whistle 
externally, and PIDA. Also, the previously mentioned WhistleblowersUK provides advice to 
whistleblowers. Lastly, in the Republic of Korea, the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy 
                                                     
45 See Part III, country file for USA. 
46 See Part III, country files for Australia, Belgium and Israel. 
47 See Part III, country files for Ireland, UK and Republic of Korea. 
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and the Horuragi Foundation coordinate information sharing among whistleblowers, organise social 
events with whistleblowers and their families, provide financial aid (living expenses to ten 
whistleblowers), and legal aid (through lawyers who work on a voluntary basis). 
 
Figure 8. Institutional landscape in Ireland concerning whistleblowing 
4.2.3. Prevention 
The tasks of the Prevention department of the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority include 1) direct contact 
with employers and professionals to inform them about integrity management to prevent organisational 
wrongdoing and about internal reporting procedures, 2) writing brochures and manuals about integrity 
management and reporting procedures, 3) developing instruments to measure organisational culture and 
integrity management efforts, and 4) conduct or fund research on various aspects of integrity 
management, and internal reporting in particular. The Prevention department follows an integral 
strategy, emphasizing the need to incorporate reporting procedures in a broad integrity management 
framework.48 In four of the selected countries (UK, USA, Republic of Korea and Australia), 
governmental whistleblowing agencies have a somewhat comparable prevention task, in addition to 
their investigative and/or advisory tasks.49 The scope of this prevention task is different in the four 
countries. In 2016, a whistleblowing agency specifically for the National Health Service (NHS) – ‘the 
                                                     
48 See for instance (p.10): https://huisvoorklokkenluiders.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/HvK_Integrity-in-
practice_Culture.pdf 
49 See Part III, country files for Australia, Republic of Korea, UK, and USA. 
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National Guardian Office for the NHS’ – was established in the UK. This was in response to two 
subsequent review reports led by Sir Robert Francis about whistleblowing culture in the NHS. The main 
function of this agency is enhancing and monitoring whistleblowing culture (which they refer to as 
speak-up culture) in the NHS Trusts. It provides awareness raising and training, and supports inter-
vision between Guardians at Trust level. It analyzes speak-up culture in specific Trusts and publishes 
these evaluations in culture review reports, which include recommendations and requirements with a 
set deadline. The National Guardian is appointed by the health minister and publicly financed through 
the Care Quality Commission (CQC), which is a regulator for the health sector. Some see this as a 
reason to question its independence. There are huge expectations within the whistleblowing community 
with regard to the National Guardian for the NHS, and many have already expressed their 
disappointment. 
Government agencies in the other three countries also have prevention tasks, but these are not as 
comprehensive as those of the NHS Guardian. The Office of Special Counsel (OSC) in the USA trains 
agencies in implementing whistleblowing legislation and their responsibilities in it. The Australian 
Commonwealth Ombudsman organises programs to educate public officials in dealing with the PID 
Act, and to raise awareness among agencies and officials about the importance of whistleblowing 
protection. In the Republic of Korea, the ACRC organises initiatives to raise awareness and training 
with regard to anti-corruption and whistleblowing. 
While in other countries (such as Belgium), the governmental whistleblowing agencies are not involved 
in prevention, there often are other government agencies with a focus on ethics management (and thus 
not whistleblowing specifically) that perform comparable tasks. The Belgian federal government, for 
example, has a Bureau for Public Service Ethics and Deontology that 1) organises workshops, trainings 
(e.g., for trusted persons) and seminars on integrity management in federal departments, 2) functions as 
a knowledge center by collecting good practices of ethics management and informing departments 
about it, and 3) provides policy advice to the federal government based on developments abroad (e.g., 
OECD, UN, Council of Europe) and to specific departments (often in the Federal Service of Finances). 
In Flanders, the integrity coordinator and the Virtual Bureau (consisting of different stakeholders in the 
Flemish government) have comparable tasks.50 In the Netherlands, the Bureau of Integrity Promotion 
Public Sector (Bureau Integriteitsbevordering Openbare Sector or BIOS51) did some of these tasks in 
the past, but has in 2016 been integrated within the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority. 
                                                     
50 See Part III, country file for Belgium. 
51 See: http://www.integriteitoverheid.nl 
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Also NGOs often play an important role in such prevention tasks. The previously described NGOs GAP 
in the USA and Pistaljka in Serbia (see 3.1.1) consider training, providing advice to agencies and 
operating as a knowledge center an important part of their work. Integrity@Work in Ireland also 
provides training and advice to organisations on how to operate internal whistleblowing arrangements, 
as well as Public Concern at Work in the UK. 
4.2.4. Staff and case load 
While the comparison between the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority and selected foreign agencies in 
the previous paragraphs focused on tasks and their level of independence, this section looks at the 
number of people these agencies employ and the case load they deal with. It is important to analyze 
whether the studied agencies are comparable to the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority in personnel 
capacity to determine whether experiences in these agencies are useful for the Netherlands. 
Table 2 gives an overview of the staff members (in FTE) employed in specific whistleblowing agencies 
(either government or NGO) of which relevant information was available52, and does thus not include 
other actors that have a more general task in for example promoting ethics management. The table 
shows that in terms of FTE, the Netherlands is most comparable to the NGO Pistaljka in Serbia. In most 
other countries where the whistleblowing agency is a government agency (Belgium, France and Israel) 
less than half the amount of employees deal with whistleblowing cases. An important remark for 
countries where the whistleblowing agency is the Ombudsman (Belgium, France and Israel) is that it is 
reserved for public employees only, whereas the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority deals with public and 
private whistleblowing cases. 
  
                                                     
52 See Part III, country files for Belgium, France, Israel, Serbia and USA. 
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Table 2. Staff (FTE) in whistleblowing agencies in Netherlands and selected53 countries 
 Staff for advice, investigation, prevention and/or psychosocial support 
Belgium: Flemish Ombudsman < 1 FTE for advice and investigation54 
Belgium: federal Ombudsman 3 FTE for advice and investigation 
France: Ombudsman 4 FTE planned for advice and investigation 
Netherlands 5 FTE for advice; 4 FTE for investigation; 3 FTE for prevention; 1 FTE for 
psychosocial support 
Israel 6 FTE for advice and investigation (State Comptroller & Ombudsman); 1 
FTE for psychosocial support (Ombudsman) 
Serbia: NGO Pistaljka 7 FTE for advice and psychosocial support; 7 FTE for investigation and 
prevention 
USA: NGO GAP55 23 FTE for advice, investigation and prevention 
In addition to personnel capacity, it is important to compare the case load of the various agencies, which 
is shown in Table 3 below. Focus is on reports that were sent to an investigative department. The 
numbers do thus not include all the whistleblowers with whom the agency has been in contact, given 
the difficulty to compare such numbers that include both brief calls for information and long 
conversations with whistleblowers who ask advice about their decision to report. The table particularly 
shows how many reports are received, and how many investigations are started on average a year, or 
(for the Netherlands) in 2017. 
The table shows huge differences between countries like the USA, the UK and the Republic of Korea 
with a few thousands reports to investigative agencies, on the one hand, and other countries like 
Belgium and the Netherlands with less than 25 reports a year, and Israel and Australia with 60-65 reports 
a year. Taking into account that in Australia state governments deal with large areas of public 
administration like public health, it is striking that the Commonwealth Ombudsman only received 60 
reports, of which most are referred to other agencies for investigation. Most federal public sector 
whistleblowers in Australia report directly to their own agencies, which may also be true elsewhere, but 
                                                     
53 Only those countries are shown in which we have information about staff that is particularly available for 
whistleblowing cases. 
54 An important remark is that most wrongdoing investigations in the Flemish government are conducted by Audit 
Flanders. The case load of this agency is, however, not included in this table, because those who report to this 
Internal Audit Agency are not considered whistleblowers under the Flemish legislation. See part III, country file 
for Belgium. 
55 GAP: Government Accountability Project (NGO, available for all types of USA whistleblowers) 
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it is a concern that the outcomes of these are unknown. In the Republic of Korea, there is a clear 
difference between public and private sector reports that were referred to investigative agencies (namely 
4.7% versus 62%), for which we have no explanation. 
Table 3. Reports of wrongdoing received and investigations (yearly average or 2017) by 
whistleblowing agencies in the Netherlands and selected countries 
 Reports received Investigation (including unfinished) 
Australia 
 All Commonwealth agencies  
 Federal Ombudsman 
 
684 
60 
 
No information available 
17 (own investigation) 
23 (referred to reporter’s agency) 
Belgium (Flanders) 5 2 
Belgium (federal) 21 8 
Israel 65 29 
Netherlands56 19 7 
Republic of Korea 3.758 (public sector) 
2.611 (private sector) 
126 (referred to investigative agencies) 
1.592 (referred to investigative agencies) 
UK 
 Care Quality Commission 
 FCA57 
 
7.433 
900 
No information available 
US 
 SEC58 
 GAP59 
 
3.142 
258 
No information available 
 
  
                                                     
56 For the Netherlands, the (requests for) investigations in 2017 are shown, because the agency was established 
mid-2016. 
57 FCA: Financial Conduct Authority 
58 SEC: Securities Exchange Commission 
59 GAP: Government Accountability Project 
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5.  WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIO N AND INCENTI VES  
This section compares the protection provided by the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority and Act with the 
protection offered in the selected countries. Various aspects of protection will be discussed. First, the 
scope of protection is analyzed, both in terms of type(s) of reporting and type(s) of retaliation. Second, 
procedural aspects of protection are discussed, focusing on confidentiality of the whistleblower’s 
identity and burden of proof. The third paragraph describes the remedies that are available when 
retaliation has occurred, and possible disciplinary actions that can be taken against those who have 
retaliated against whistleblowers. Lastly, alternative ways of protection, such as mediation and financial 
rewards are discussed. 
5.1. Scope of protection  
The Dutch whistleblower protection law offers protection for whistleblowers who have reported 
wrongdoings in the public interest and followed the proper reporting procedure, which implies first 
internal reporting (first tier), then external reporting to the authorized agency (if there is any) (second 
tier), and only if no appropriate action has been taken can the whistleblower report to the Dutch 
Whistleblowers Authority. Only in situations in which internal reporting is not reasonable (e.g., 
imminent danger or management involved in wrongdoing), immediate external reporting is considered 
acceptable. This part of the law is considered unclear and therefore creates legal uncertainty for 
whistleblowers. As discussed above, the lack of clarity is shown in the absence of 1) a clear definition 
of ‘public interest’, and 2) consequences for protection if whistleblowers do not follow procedure (e.g., 
because they thought there was an imminent danger while it was not the case, or not top management 
but only middle management was involved in the wrongdoing). While the 3-tiered model of protected 
disclosures (internal, regulator, wider) is one of the crucial dimensions in the Council of Europe 
Recommendation from 2014, the Netherlands is the only country in our sample that has post-2014 
legislation that does not protect whistleblowing at the third tier (e.g., to the media). Whistleblowing to 
the media is – under certain conditions – a protected disclosure in Australia, France, Ireland, Norway, 
Serbia, the UK and the USA60, but not in the Netherlands. Only in Belgium, the scope of protection is 
smaller, because only external reporting to the Ombudsman is included in the law (and thus not internal 
reporting or external reporting to regulators). Moreover, protection can only be granted if the (federal 
or Flemish) Ombudsman finds the report admissible. In Ireland, on the other hand, a disclosure is 
assumed to be a protected disclosure until proven otherwise. The ‘good faith’ test in the Australian 
                                                     
60 Although whistleblowers are in the USA formally protected for whistleblowing to the media, in practice they 
are virtually unprotected according to one of our interviewees. 
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Corporations Act (private sector; as distinct from the public sector law being discussed above, which 
has no such test), and the French law – implying that disclosures have to be made in a disinterested 
manner – is considered to be an important barrier for whistleblowers. In Australia it is currently 
proposed to be removed. 
While the Dutch law – like the Norwegian law – does not give a clear definition of the type(s) of 
retaliation or other actions (e.g., disciplinary measure) from which whistleblowers are protected, the 
legislation in most of the selected countries does. There is, however, a huge difference in the scope and 
the level of precision in which both retaliation and other actions are described, as shown in Table 4 
below. Though the Australian Corporations Act (private sector) offers only protection for dismissal and 
legal liability, most other laws are broader (including also denial of bonus/promotion) and in some laws 
discrimination and harassment are explicitly mentioned (e.g., Public Interest Disclosure and Fair Work 
Acts in Australia; Ireland; Republic of Korea). The Serbian, Korean and federal law in Belgium stand 
out for being very specific about the areas in which damaging action may occur, which are in Belgium 
and Serbia indicative but not exhaustive. Probably to avoid using a list that is perceived as being 
exhaustive, legislation for public whistleblowers in the USA contains a more general definition of 
retaliation, as part of the Prohibited Personnel Practices. 
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Table 4. Type(s) of retaliation whistleblowers are protected from in the selected countries 
Country Types of retaliation from which whistleblowers are protected 
Australia PID Act: protection from legal liability, contractual remedies, privilege from defamation, reprisals (including dismissal, alteration of position, 
discrimination) 
Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act: protection from liability, contractual remedies, privilege from defamation, reprisals (including dismissal, 
injury, alteration of position, discrimination, harassment, harm like psychological harm, damage to property or reputation) 
Corporations Act: protection from legal liability, contract termination 
Belgium Flemish law: protection from disciplinary sanction linked to whistleblower, threat of dismissal or not receiving a bonus or promotion 
Federal law: protection from retaliatory actions, which include (threat of) dismissal, not extending a temporary contract or denying expected tenure; (not 
granting the permission for) translocation; disciplinary measure; measure of internal order; denying pay raise; denying chances of promotion; denying facilities 
other employees have; not granting leaf; negative evaluation 
Ireland Protection against dismissal, penalisation (including suspension, lay-off or dismissal; demotion or loss of opportunity for promotion; transfer of duties, 
change of location of place work, reduction in wages or change in working hours; the imposition or administering of any discipline, reprimand or other penalty 
(including a financial penalty); unfair treatment; coercion, intimidation or harassment; discrimination, disadvantage or unfair treatment; injury, damage or 
loss; threat of reprisal), provides immunity from civil liability 
Korea Private sector law: disadvantageous measures are measures falling under any of the following items: (a) Dismissal, release from office, discharge, or other 
disadvantageous measures against a person’s social position equivalent to the loss of social position; (b) Disciplinary punishment, suspension from office, 
curtailment of salary, demotion, restrictions on advancement, or other unfair personnel measures; (c) Transference of position, transference of office, 
withholding duties, reassignment of duties, or other personnel measures against the intention of the person himself/herself; (d) Discrimination in performance 
evaluation, colleague evaluation, etc., and discriminative payment of wages, bonuses, etc. attendant thereon; (e) Cancellation of opportunities for self-
development, such as education or training, restrictions on or removal of available resources, such as budgets or human resources, suspension of the use of or 
cancellation of qualifications for dealing with security information or classified information, or other discrimination or measures that have a negative effect 
on the working conditions, etc.; (f) Preparation of a list of persons subject to surveillance, or disclosure of such a list, bullying, violence or threatening 
language, or other acts that cause physical or mental harm; (g) An unjust inspection or investigation of duties, or disclosure of the result thereof; (h) 
Cancellation of approval or a permit, or other acts that give administrative disadvantage; (i) Cancellation of a commodity or service contract, or other measures 
that give economic disadvantage. 
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Country Types of retaliation from which whistleblowers are protected 
Serbia Damaging action is any action/omission in relation to whistleblowers which violates or infringes their rights or disadvantages them; this could occur in the 
following areas: hiring procedure: obtaining the status of an intern or volunteer; work outside of formal employment; education, training, or professional 
development; promotion at work, being evaluated, obtaining or losing a professional title; disciplinary measures and penalties; working conditions; termination 
of employment; salary and other forms of remuneration; share in the profits of the employer; disbursement of bonuses or incentivizing severance payments; 
allocation of duties or transfer to other positions; failing to take measures to provide protection from harassment by other persons; mandatory medical 
examinations or examinations to establish fitness for work 
UK PIDA is implemented through employment law, so the technical terms ‘unfair dismissal’ and ‘detriment short of dismissal’ are relevant. The latter is any 
negative treatment of an employee that has a significant negative physical or economic impact on them, and that results at least in part from them trying to 
exercise statutory employment rights, e.g., taking maternity leave, or making a protected disclosure. 
USA In the Prohibited Personnel Practices (PPP) retaliation against whistleblowers is defined as taking, failing to take, or threatening to take a personnel action 
because of an employee’s whistleblowing 
The Dutch Whistleblowers Authority in an international perspective 
 
 
 
52 
 
5.2. Procedural aspects of protection  
Two procedural aspects are very important in the protection of whistleblowers: confidentiality of the 
whistleblower’s identity and the reversed burden of proof in alleged retaliation investigations. While 
the Dutch law does include the provision that the whistleblower’s identity will not be made known to 
the employer without the whistleblower’s agreement, the burden of proof lies with the whistleblower 
and thus weakens their position. 
As for confidentiality, Belgium and the Republic of Korea have the same provision as the Dutch law, 
but some other laws have stronger guarantees for the confidentiality of the whistleblower, because 1) 
the confidentiality clause applies to any person working in an agency that receives reports (Norway), 
2) revealing the whistleblower’s identity is an offence (Australia, France) or 3) confidentiality even 
holds in court (Australian PID Act, Serbia). 
The reversed burden of proof in alleged retaliation investigations is considered a best practice by 
international organisations.61 It must be noted that the Dutch law is – like Israel and the UK – an 
exception in that it does not introduce a reversal of burden of proof. In Australia, the USA and Norway, 
the burden of proof lies (in USA and Norway partly) with the employee, but the position of 
whistleblowers in these countries is still stronger than in the Netherlands. 
 In Australia, the employee only has to prove that whistleblowing was any of the reasons for the 
reprisal, which is easier than proving it was the substantial reason for the reprisal. 
 In the USA, the whistleblower similarly needs to show that whistleblowing was a “contributing 
factor in the personnel action threatened, taken, or not taken” against him62, but the agency 
needs to demonstrate “by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same 
action in the absence of the whistleblowing”, which is more difficult to achieve than the 
former.63 
                                                     
61 OECD (2011). Study on whistleblower protection. Frameworks, compendium of best practices and guiding 
principles for legislation; UNODC (2015). Resource guide on good practices in the protection of reporting 
persons. 
62 “You [whistleblower] may demonstrate that whistleblowing was a contributing factor by showing that the 
official taking the action knew about the whistleblowing and that the action occurred within a time period such 
that a reasonable person would conclude that the whistleblowing was a contributing factor in the personnel action.” 
(https://www.mspb.gov) 
63 See: https://www.mspb.gov; Devine, T. (2017). Corrected testimony of Thomas Devine. Government 
Accountability Project before the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, Subcommittee on 
Federal Workforce, U.S. Postal Service and the Census on Whistleblower protection since passage of the 
whistleblower protection enhancement Act. 
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 In Norway, there is a divided burden of proof in which the employee needs to prove that there 
was an act of retaliation (which is easy in the case of dismissal, but not in the case of harassment 
or bullying because there may be no witnesses available), and the employer needs to prove that 
the action against the employee was not linked to whistleblowing. 
In Belgium, Ireland, France and the Republic of Korea burden of proof lies entirely with the employer, 
who must give proof that the actions were not linked to the act of whistleblowing. This means in practice 
that the employer needs to prove that there was a legitimate reason for the actions. While this is also 
the case in Serbia, the whistleblower has to make it probable that retaliation is the result of 
whistleblowing. Perhaps the Irish legislation tops the list. Under its legislation, a disclosure is assumed 
to qualify as a protected disclosure, unless it is proven not to be. This means that burden of proof is 
reversed on all qualifying dimensions. 
5.3. Remedies and disciplinary measures in case of retaliation 
While the Dutch law provides that the Whistleblowers Authority can formulate recommendations on 
the basis of an alleged retaliation investigation, it does not specify what these may include. Legislation 
in the selected countries does refer to specific remedies which are available for whistleblowers or 
disciplinary measures that can be taken against those who have retaliated against them. Table 5 shows 
the remedies available for whistleblowers and the agencies that can provide them. In most countries, 
reinstatement and compensation for damages are provided. Interestingly, the Flemish Ombudsman can 
provide the remedy of voluntary transfer, which is – according to an interviewee – often considered 
more preferable for the whistleblower than remaining in his previous job. Although it sounds promising, 
it is not always easy to implement in practice, given the specificity of task description and expertise of 
Flemish government employees. In most countries, whistleblowers need to go to court to claim these 
remedies, which often results in a long procedure that may take several years. For that reason, the option 
of interim relief, implying that the current situation will remain the same until a case is decided (e.g., 
the dismissed whistleblower can stay in his position), that is available in France, Ireland, Serbia, UK 
and the USA, offers a strong protection for whistleblowers who may otherwise remain unemployed 
during the entire court procedure; an interviewee states that “it stops the bleeding for whistleblowers”. 
As for compensation, the WPEA in the USA follows the principle to ‘make whole’ damages, because 
it includes both direct processing and attorney costs, and compensation for emotional distress, unfairly 
unassigned bonuses or raises, and in the Republic of Korea a relief fund is available to compensate 
whistleblowers for the costs that they made. In some countries, disciplinary actions can be taken against 
those who retaliated against whistleblowers (France, Belgium, Israel and USA), which has in the USA 
recently led to a paradigm shift among employers from ‘nothing to lose’ to ‘retaliation is risky’. 
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Table 5. Remedies for whistleblowers and agencies where they can be claimed 
 Remedies for whistleblowers Which agency? 
Australia Public sector: apologies, reinstatement, injunction & 
compensation 
Corporations Act: compensation for reprisals that are 
criminal offenses 
Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act: compensation, 
injunction, apologies and reinstatement 
Court or Fair Work 
Commission 
Court 
 
Court 
Belgium 
(Flanders) 
Reinstatement, annulation of disciplinary measures, 
voluntary transfer, mediation 
Whistleblowing agency 
(Ombudsman) 
France Mediation, damage compensation, reinstatement, interim 
relief 
Court & whistleblowing 
agency (Ombudsman) 
Ireland Damage compensation, reinstatement, interim relief Court 
Israel Reinstatement, corrective action, mediation Court 
Norway Damage compensation, right to remain in post Court 
Republic of Korea Reinstatement, damage compensation, annulation of 
disciplinary measures, financial rewards, mediation 
Court 
Serbia Interim relief, reinstatement, damage compensation Court 
UK Damage compensation, interim relief Court (Employment 
Appeals Tribunal) 
USA WPA: corrective action, ‘make whole damage’, mediation, 
interim relief 
Dodd-Frank Act: damage compensation, financial rewards 
reinstatement 
Whistleblowing agency, 
court & MSPB (only 
federal employees) 
5.4. Alternative ways of protection 
While the remedies and disciplinary actions that were discussed above can only offer protection for 
whistleblowers after alleged retaliation has been investigated and established, there are other ways in 
which whistleblowers can, at an earlier stage, find relief. Many interviewees in this study emphasized 
the importance of investing in such alternative ways of protection. Mediation and financial rewards are 
two examples that were often referred to. First, the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority sometimes try to 
seek reconciliation between employee and employer, although this is not a formal task of the Agency. 
Also in the Republic of Korea, Belgium (Flanders), Israel and France, either the ACRC (Republic of 
Korea) or the Ombudsman (other countries) mediate in employee-employer conflicts. Second, the 
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Dutch whistleblower protection law does not offer the possibility to grant awards to whistleblowers. 
Two interviewees explained that in their view rewards for whistleblowers offer an important protection 
after retaliation, and are particularly important for those whistleblowers who have been fired and are in 
a very vulnerable position during the long court procedures to claim whistleblower protection. In the 
selected countries, financial rewards are only provided in the USA64 (e.g., Dodd-Frank Act) and the 
Republic of Korea65. In most of the selected countries, giving financial rewards is not considered 
appropriate (e.g., no cultural acceptance of rewarding whistleblowers) or feasible (e.g., no additional 
funds). The Financial Conduct Authority in the UK has, however, announced a review of its position 
on this. In Australia, a parliamentary committee has recommended a reward scheme. 
  
                                                     
64 In the USA, monetary awards can be granted to whistleblowers who have voluntarily provided original 
information that has led to an enforcement action that exceeds 1 million dollar. The reward varies between 10-
30% of the monetary sanctions collected by the SEC, and whistleblowers need to contact the SEC to make a 
reward request. The SEC has discretion to decide whether or not the whistleblower is entitled to receive a reward. 
65 In the Republic of Korea, between 2012 and 2016 a total of 6.088 cases were managed: 614 were dismissed, 
1.479 were concluded without reward, and 3.995 cases with reward. The total amount paid in rewards was KWR 
2.63 billion. Estimated benefits incurred from these cases was KWR 13.9 billion. 
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6.  DUTCH WHISTLEBLOWING PRO VISIO NS AND INTE RNATIO NAL LEG AL 
FRAMEWO RKS  
In addition to comparing the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority with government agencies and NGOs in 
other countries, and comparing the Dutch legislation to that of other countries, we also looked at how 
the Dutch whistleblowing provisions (i.e., both legislation and institutions) would hold vis-a-vis 
international frameworks, irrespective of what happens in other countries. To that end, we scored the 
Dutch whistleblowing provisions against the criteria used in six different frameworks. In what follows 
we explain for each framework why the Dutch provisions failed to score particular criteria, after which 
we give an overall evaluation of its strengths and weaknesses with regard to the international 
frameworks. It is important to note the method used here has a number of limitations: 1) we only did 
the screening for the Dutch whistleblowing provisions, and not for those in the other countries, thus, 
our screening does not allow any evaluation of the Netherlands in relation to the other countries; 2) the 
scoring is internally consistent but not externally validated, which means that we used the same scoring 
rules across the frameworks but we relied on our own expertise and knowledge to give a scoring; 3) for 
a number of criteria in the frameworks there was no clear information yet (e.g., case law) – in these 
cases we gave a low score because there was no evidence yet that the provisions would uphold the 
principle. Hence it is useful to understand the scoring as ‘probably too pessimistic’, and furthermore it 
is expected that other countries also will have a far from perfect score. 
We nevertheless believe this screening exercise can be useful in light of the forthcoming EU Directive 
on whistleblower protection. The initial proposal of that Directive (Com(2018)218/973471) entails most 
of the principles on which the frameworks used for our screening are based. In addition, we expect the 
final wording of the EU Directive to remain within the principles of these frameworks. 
The set of 33 criteria in Table 6 are comprised of the principles set forth in the Council of Europe 
Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)7 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on the protection 
of whistleblowers66, and the point of attention stipulated in the Resolution 2171 (2017) Parliamentary 
scrutiny over corruption: parliamentary cooperation with the investigative media.67 
 We scored a criterion as 1 where the whistleblowing law included such provisions, or where 
this has proven to be the practice in the Netherlands (e.g., criterion 15). 
                                                     
66 Council of Europe (2014). Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)7 of the Committee of Ministers to member States 
on the protection of whistleblowers. 
67 Council of Europe (2017). Resolution 2171. Parliamentary scrutiny over corruption: parliamentary 
cooperation with the investigative media. 
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 We gave a score of 0 for criteria 20-25 and 31-32 because such protections are not explicitly 
in the whistleblowing law, and there is no case law yet that suggests how courts will use 
information from the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority (advice given to whistleblower, or 
findings from investigations) to determine protection. We scored criterion 13 as 0 because the 
law remains awkwardly silent on whistleblowing to the media, even as a last resort. 
 A score of .5 was given on criterion 3: Art 1.h provides this but not at pre-contract stage. A 
score of .5 was given on criterion 4 as in the case of national security whistleblowing, the Dutch 
Whistleblowers Authority can only provide advice to a whistleblower. The law does not 
stipulate who can investigate such concerns. 
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Table 6. Dutch whistleblowing provisions scores for Council of Europe criteria 
 Short criterion Score 
1 National framework should establish rules to protect rights and interest of whistleblowers 1 
2 Scope of ‘public interest’ 1 
 Wide understanding of working relationships 1 
3 Covers individuals whose work-based relationship has ended, or those during a pre-
contractual negotiation stage 
0.5 
4 Special scheme or rules applying to information relating to national security 0.5 
5 Without prejudice to rules for the protection of legal and other professional privilege 1 
6 Comprehensive and coherent approach to facilitating whistleblowing 1 
7 Restrictions and exceptions should be no more than necessary 1 
8 Ensure effective mechanisms for acting on public interest disclosures 1 
9 Protection and remedies under rules of general law for those prejudiced by whistleblowing are 
retained 
1 
10 Employers cannot call on legal or contractual obligations to prevent or penalise someone from 
making a public interest disclosure 
1 
11 Foster an environment that encourages disclosure in an open matter 1 
12 Clear channels are in place 1 
13 Three tiers for whistleblowing 0 
14 Encouragement for employers to put in place internal procedures 1 
15 Workers to be consulted on internal procedures 1 
16 Encouragement of internal whistleblowing or to regulatory bodies to be encouraged as general 
rule 
1 
17 Whistleblowers entitled to confidentiality  1 
18 Prompt investigation 1 
19 Whistleblower should be informed of action taken 1 
20 Protection against retaliation of any form 0 
21 Protection not to be lost on mistaken disclosures only 0 
22 Entitlement to raise the fact that disclosure was made in accordance with national framework 0 
23 Passing-by internal procedure may be taken into consideration when deciding on remedies 0 
24 Burden of proof in detriment considerations is on employer 0 
25 Interim relief should be available 0 
26 National framework should be promoted widely 1 
27 Confidential advice should be available (preferably free of charge) 1 
28 Periodic assessments of the effectiveness of the national framework 1 
29 Broad definition 1 
30 Right to blow the whistle 1 
31 Waive criminal liability 0 
32 Penalise retaliation 0 
33 Additional national channel with enquiry authority 1 
 73% 24 
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The set of criteria in Table 7 are those set forth by the 2013 Transparency International guidelines for 
whistleblowing legislation. 
 We scored a criterion as 1 where the whistleblowing law included such provisions, or where 
this has proven to be the practice in the Netherlands (e.g., for criterion 25 we took composition 
of the board of the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority in consideration; for criteria 10 and 11 we 
assumed this to be general practice under Dutch law). 
 Scores for 7, 16, 18, and 19 are consistent with reasons given for Table 7. With regard to 
criterion 23, we gave a scoring of .5 because although there is dedicated legislation, it mainly 
establishes the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority yet relies on existing labour law for protection 
measures. This is also the reason why we gave a score of 0 for criterion 5. 
 Criteria 20 and 28 scored 0 because there is no case law yet which shows how the work of the 
Dutch Whistleblowers Authority is interpreted by the courts. Criteria 8, 13, and 22 scored 0 
because there is no mention of either knowingly false reports, protection of family members, 
or rewards. Criterion 12 scored 0 because this does not seem possible within the Dutch 
provisions. 
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Table 7. Dutch whistleblowing provisions scores for Transparency International criteria 
 Short criterion Score 
1 Scope of policy (public and private; safe and effective) 1 
2 Broad definition of whistleblowing 1 
3 Broad definition of whistleblower 1 
4 Reasonable belief 1 
5 Broad notion of retaliation 0 
6 Confidentiality 1 
7 Burden of proof on employer 0 
8 Knowingly false not protected 0 
9 Waiver of liability 1 
10 Right to refuse participation in wrongdoing 1 
11 Overrides loyalty oaths and gagging orders 1 
12 Anonymity 0 
13 Personal protection +family 0 
14 Requirements for internal arrangements 1 
15 2nd tier recipients 1 
16 3rd tier recipients 0 
17 Range of channels and advice 1 
18 Special procedures for national security 0.5 
19 Full range of remedies 0 
20 Day in court 0 
21 Whistleblower participation 1 
22 Reward systems 0 
23 Dedicated legislation 0.5 
24 Publication of data 1 
25 Involving multiple actors in review 1 
26 Training 1 
27 Independent authority 1 
28 Penalty for retaliation and interference 0 
29 Follow-up and reforms 1 
 62% 18 
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The criteria in Table 8 are those set forth in the UNODC 2015 Recourse guide on good practices in the 
protection of reporting persons. 
 We gave criterion 2 a score of 0 because the Dutch whistleblowers law does not specify 
protection measures and it remains unclear how general labour law can provide for specific 
dynamics of whistleblowing. We also gave a score of 0 for criterion 10 as there is no case 
analysis available yet. 
 In line with this, yet acknowledging the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority’s potential to carry 
out investigations, and audit organisation’s internal speak-up arrangements, we scored criteria 
3 and 8 with a .5 score. We also gave criterion 12 a score of .5 because timely advice can turn 
out as a pro-active measure of protection. 
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Table 8. Dutch whistleblowing provision scores for UNODC criteria 
 Short criterion Score 
1 Broad definition of whistleblower 1 
2 Protective measures matching needs of whistleblower 0 
3 Safe in law and clear in practice 0.5 
4 Review of legal framework and institutional arrangements 1 
5 Stakeholder consultation 1 
6 Broad scope of protected disclosures 1 
7 Range of channels 1 
8 Protection of whistleblowers 0.5 
9 Consider new technology and traditional communication methods to facilitate reporting 1 
10 Protections include legal, procedural and organisational measures 0 
11 Provide access to advice 1 
12 Measures are both proactive and retrospective 0.5 
13 Seek innovative ways to encourage reporting and make it more acceptable (honouring, 
thanking, rewarding) 
1 
14 Ensure authorities have appropriate mandate to receive, investigate and protect 1 
15 Staff of competent authorities are trained 1 
16 Authorities are protected from undue influence 1 
17 Create an oversight authority 1 
18 Periodically review 1 
 80% 14.5 
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The criteria in Table 9 are those set forth in the OECD 2011 compendium of best practices and 
guidelines for whistleblowing legislation. 
 We scored criteria 1 and 4 as .5, consistent with previous scoring. 
 Criteria 3, 12, 13, 21 and 23 were scored 0, also consistent with previous scoring. Criteria 26 
and 27 received a score of 0 as there is no case law available yet interpreting the Dutch 
whistleblowers legislation or the work of the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority. Criteria 14 and 
15 are scored as 0 because the Dutch whistleblowers law remains silent on these, thereby 
creating legal uncertainty for those who raise a concern with reasonable belief that the 
information they have points to a wrongdoing but are mistaken, or for those who claim 
protection from retaliation against a whistleblower other than them, i.e., where the person 
retaliating makes a mistake in ‘guessing’ who the whistleblower is. These cases are not 
hypothetical. They happen. We scored criterion 19 as 0 because again, this is not mentioned in 
the Dutch whistleblowers law. 
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Table 9. Dutch whistleblowing provision scores for OECD criteria 
 Short criterion Score 
1 Dedicated legislation 0.5 
2 Requirement or strong encouragement for internal measures 1 
3 Clear definition of scope of protected disclosures  0 
4 National defense alternative channel 0.5 
5 Broad definition of whistleblowers 1 
6 Reasonable belief 1 
7 Due process (e.g., confidentiality) 1 
8 Protection from discriminatory or retaliatory personnel action 0.5 
9 Protection from failure to take personnel actions (e.g., reinstatement, promotion) 0.5 
10 Protection from harassment and threats 0.5 
11 Protection against criminal and civil liability for whistleblowing 1 
12 Availability of anonymous reporting 0 
13 Burden of proof 0 
14 Mistaken whistleblowing 0 
15 Protection against mistaken retaliation 0 
16 Internal + External disclosures 1 
17 Establishing internal channels in public sector 1 
18 Encouragement for companies to establish internal channels 1 
19 Protection for disclosures directly to law enforcement authorities 0.5 
20 Specific channels for national security or state secrets 1 
21 Allows whistleblowing to media and civil society 0 
22 Incentives to raise (through quick process, follow-up, etc.) 1 
23 Positive reinforcements (incl. financial) 0 
24 Info, advice and feedback to whistleblower 1 
25 Appointment of an accountable whistleblower complaints body (investig + prosecuting) 1 
26 Genuine day in court 0 
27 Penalties for retaliation 0 
28 Providing advice and monitor framework 1 
29 Raise awareness 1 
30 Training in public sector 1 
31 Requirement that employers inform employees of their rights 1 
 61% 19 
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The criteria in Table 10 are those set forth in an analysis of whistleblowing provisions in the G20 
countries, made and published by Blueprint in 2015. The scoring rationale is consistent with previous 
scorings. 
Table 10. Dutch whistleblowing provision scores for Blueprint criteria 
 Short criterion Score 
1 Broad coverage of organisations 1 
2 Broad definition of reportable wrongdoing 1 
3 Broad definition of whistleblowers 1 
4 Range of internal/ regulatory reporting channels 1 
5 External reporting channels (third party/ public) 0 
6 Thresholds for protection 0 
7 Provision and protection for anonymous reporting 0 
8 Confidentiality protected 1 
9 Internal disclosures procedures required 1 
10 Broad protections against retaliation 0 
11 Comprehensive remedies for retaliation 0 
12 Sanctions for retaliators 0 
13 Oversight authority 1 
14 Transparent use of legislation 1 
 57% 8 
What can we learn from this scoring exercise? The scorings presented in these tables depend on our 
own interpretations of the framework criteria and of the Dutch whistleblowing provisions. The scorings 
might be undervalued given that there are no indications yet of how the work of the Dutch 
Whistleblowers Authority might affect cases brought before the court or indeed the positive effect the 
Dutch Whistleblowers Authority might have before whistleblowers have to take their case to court. 
A number of these scores might be improved when cases become available. However, this will depend 
not only on what the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority does, but also on case law from courts. The Dutch 
whistleblowers legislation makes only a limited number of amendments to labour law, otherwise 
assuming labour law is strong enough to work for the specific dynamics of whistleblower retaliation. 
One can question the validity of that assumption. The international frameworks, for example, include 
the criterion of reversing the burden of proof with regard to retaliation. Yet Dutch law makers did not 
find it necessary to specify this in the whistleblowing legislation. 
However, it cannot be denied that the scorings are varied. Table 11 gives an overview of how the Dutch 
provision scores against these frameworks. On the one hand, the frameworks differ in the emphasis they 
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put on scope, strength and clarity of the protections. The Dutch law is mainly focused on advice and 
investigation rather than on protection. Whilst it has made its mark in terms of advice to whistleblowers, 
it is yet unclear how its investigations will provide clarity and security for whistleblowers and other 
stakeholders of whistleblowing concerns. In light of the frameworks used here, the weakness of the law 
remains its failure to strengthen protection. For most frameworks, the lack of clarity with regard to the 
reversal of burden of proof is an obvious missed opportunity. A further shortcoming is the absence of 
stipulations with regard to wider disclosures beyond regulators or the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority, 
e.g., to the media. In our opinion, the framework that carries the highest urgency is that of the OECD. 
This is the framework that – given OECD’s regular evaluation rounds – has some teeth, and on which 
the Dutch whistleblowing provisions score rather low.  
We are under the impression that Dutch policy makers assume the Dutch labour law is robust enough, 
and courts have sufficient expertise to offer whistleblowers protection. It remains to be seen whether 
these assumptions hold. Depending on forthcoming court rulings, a score of 79% might be reached on 
the OECD criteria, if court rulings would allow the maximum score for criteria 8-10 (protection criteria), 
13 (burden of proof), 14-15 (mistaken whistleblowing), and 26 (genuine day in court). This would also 
increase the scorings on the TI criteria to 72%, and on the Blueprint criteria to 78%. Although such an 
increase does not necessarily require a legislative amendment or a change to organisational mandates, 
it is worrying we have not seen these court cases yet, nor have we seen the Dutch Whistleblowers 
Authority play a significant role here. 
If in addition, the national framework in the Netherlands would provide for whistleblower protection at 
the third tier (wider society including media), and legislation would provide for sanctions to those who 
retaliate against whistleblowers, the OECD score would further climb to 85%, the TI to 79%, and the 
Blueprint score to 93%. These additional increases do, however, imply significant legislative changes. 
Table 11. Scoring the Dutch whistleblowing provisions against international frameworks 
Framework # criteria Score 
Council of Europe Recommendation 2014, expanded by the Parliamentary Resolution 
2171 
33 73% 
Transparency International principles for whistleblowing legislation 2013 29 62% 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, good practices in the protection of 
reporting persons (2015) 
18 80% 
OECD 2011, guiding principles for whistleblowing legislation 31 61% 
Blueprint 2015, G20 study on whistleblower protection 14 57% 
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PART III: WHISTLEBLOWING ARRANGEMENTS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 
1.  INTRODUCTION AND A NO TE ON INFOG RAPHICS  
This part describes the whistleblowing legislation and institutional landscape in the studied countries, 
focusing on several sub questions in each section. First, the cultural and legal context are described, 
after which the scope of the whistleblowing legislation is discussed with respect to type of wrongdoing 
that can be reported by whom (target group). The third part describes the relevant agencies and their 
tasks, and the final part focuses on whistleblowing protection mechanisms. For each of the countries 
infographics have been drawn. These infographics provide a visual aid to our discussion of the various 
dimensions of whistleblowing provisions. We readily acknowledge that these infographics imply a 
simplification of the uniqueness of provisions in each country. As such they offer a quick guide only. 
Some additional information is needed to understand these infographics: 
 The pointed star shows the groups covered by the whistleblowing legislation: public and private 
sectors, employees, all working relationships, associated persons, or anyone. 
 The circle diagram gives an indication of how services and tasks in relation to whistleblowing 
are institutionalized. Legal support, advice, training, psycho-social support are on the right hand 
side. Investigating wrongdoing, investigating retaliation, protection, and corrective action are 
on the left. Some of these services or tasks are performed by more than one type of organisation. 
Blue stands for regulator or enforcement agency. Red is where one needs to bring a case to 
court. Green stands for a whistleblowing agency, by which we mean an organisation especially 
created through legislation to provide services in relation to whistleblowing, or an existing 
government agency that is explicitly mandated through whistleblowing legislation to do so. 
Yellow stands for a non-governmental organisation (NGO). These are non-profit private 
initiatives. They may receive project-based or temporary partial funding from a government or 
from intergovernmental bodies. We have used grey for initiatives that do not fit either of the 
other categories. 
 The investigative powers in the green box are those of the whistleblowing agency. In countries 
without whistleblowing agency, this is indicated in a blue box, in reference to regulators and 
enforcement agencies. 
 The scope of wrongdoing covered by the whistleblowing legislation is provided in wording and 
represented by a black two-pointed arrow. The thickness of the arrow indicates our evaluation 
of the breadth of that scope. 
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 The black ‘remedies’ box presents some key remedies provided by the whistleblowing 
legislation, and whether these can be provided either by the whistleblowing agency (house) or 
through the court (hammer). 
 Where we had these data we also provide an infographic depicting the number of known 
whistleblowing cases per annum and their breakdown. 
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2.  AUSTRALIA68 
 
Figure 9: Infographics public sector whistleblowing arrangements in Australia 69  
                                                     
68 Given that for the private sector, no whistleblowing agency has been installed in Australia, the infographic 
showing the tasks of various institutions only applies to the Commonwealth Ombudsman, which is the 
whistleblowing agency for the Commonwealth public sector. 
69 We relied on 1 local respondent and the following documents: 
Commonwealth Ombudsman (2017). Annual Report 2016-2017. 
House of Representatives / The Senate (2017). Exposure draft: Treasury Laws Amendment (Whistleblowers) Bill 
2017. Accessed on 22-01-18: https://consult.treasury.gov.au/market-and-competition-policy-
division/whistleblowers-bill-2017/supporting_documents/Exposure%20Draft.pdf 
Moss (2016). Review of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013. An independent statutory review conducted by 
Mr. Philip Moss A.M. 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services (2017). Whistleblower Protections. 
Parliament of Australia (2017). Treasure Laws Amendment (Whistleblowers) Bill 2017. Accessed on 22-01-18: 
https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=s1120 
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2.1. Cultural and legal context 
Given the complexity of the Australian government system with different whistleblowing arrangements 
in various states, in this study we focus on the federal legislation, being the Public Interest Disclosure 
Act or PID Act (2013) for public employees, the Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act (2009) for 
employees or members of registered organisations (chiefly unions), and the Corporations Act (2004) 
for most private sector employees. An interviewee explains that while the legislation for public 
employees at the least looks good on paper, there is particularly no good protection for private sector 
employees. Therefore an expert advisory panel was appointed in October 2017 to assess the draft 
legislation ‘Treasury laws Amendment (Whistleblowers) Bill 2017’ against the recent report of the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services about whistleblower protection 
offered by the three laws mentioned above. This report criticizes the fragmented and inconsistent nature 
of the legal framework in Australia “not only between various pieces of Commonwealth public and 
private sector whistleblower legislation, but also across the various pieces of legislation that apply to 
different parts of the private sector”.70 Particularly for the PID Act, Philip Moss conducted a critical 
review showing that problems in the public sector are mostly linked to the machinery, the institutions 
that need to implement the law.71 
Comparative research in various countries shows that there is a lot of cultural acceptance of 
whistleblowing in Australia. Many people perceive whistleblowing as positive, which is according to 
an interviewee probably linked to egalitarian views in Australia in the sense of people who blow the 
whistle 1) should not suffer from it, 2) are doing the right thing, and 3) are in a position they themselves 
could also be in. While the Moss Review (in 2016) states that a pro-disclosure culture has yet to be 
established within many public agencies, it has already changed in a positive way since the installation 
of the PID Act. The role of Australian unions in whistleblowing varies. In the public sector, unions are 
considered to be alert to members’ needs and to represent whistleblowers who suffered retaliation. They 
also investigate allegations against people made by whistleblowers. These unions often work in a 
professional way with ‘Chinese walls’ between their advisory role to whistleblowers and their 
investigative role to people against whom allegations have been made by whistleblowers. Some other 
unions, however, are not very much involved in whistleblowing, but systematic research about this topic 
still needs to be conducted. 
                                                     
70 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services (2017). Whistleblower Protections: ix 
71 Moss (2016). Review of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013. An independent statutory review conducted 
by Mr. Philip Moss A.M. 
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2.2. Definition of whistleblowing and target groups 
The three whistleblowing protection laws provide protection to different target groups, and have 
different scopes in terms of the type of wrongdoing that can be reported as well as the type of 
whistleblowing that is covered in the legislation (e.g., internal or external reporting). The PID Act only 
protects public employees, both current or former, including employees of contractors and 
subcontractors. The Fair Work Act also protects current and former officers, but only those employees 
of registered organisations (chiefly trade unions, and only in relation to those organisations’ 
wrongdoing), as well as its contractors. As for the private sector in general, the protection (in the 
Corporations Act) is limited to current officers and employees of companies and their contractors. The 
scope of wrongdoing that can be reported is broadest in the PID Act, and the scope of the Fair Work 
Act is broader than that of the Corporations Act (see Table 12 below). 
Table 12. Scope of wrongdoing that can be reported under three different laws 
Whistleblowing law Scope of wrongdoing that can be reported 
PID Act (2013) Disclosures about the public sector, including: 
 contraventions of Commonwealth, state, territory or foreign 
laws; 
 corruption or perverting course of justice; 
 abuse of public trust; 
 fabrication or misconduct relation to scientific advice; 
 wastage of public resources; 
 danger to health, safety or environment. 
Fair Work Act (2009) Disclosures about registered companies: 
 Contraventions of FWRO Act, Fair Work Act or the 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010; 
 offence against a law of the Commonwealth. 
Corporations Act (2004) Disclosures about companies, about the contravention of a provision of 
the corporations legislation 
The PID Act has the highest coverage for the types of whistleblowing that are covered, including 
protection for both internal reporting (to supervisor etc.), regulatory reporting (regulators, ombudsman, 
IGIS) and public reporting (to any person other than foreign public official with exception of 
intelligence), as well as for anonymous reporting. The Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act only 
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covers protection for regulatory reporting, and for anonymous reporting. The Corporations Act only 
covers internal and regulatory reporting, and not anonymous reporting (although this is proposed to be 
reformed). 
2.3. Whistleblowing agencies: tasks and institutional characteristics 
For the various laws, different agencies are installed, which will be described below. The first part will 
focus on whistleblowing agencies for public sector employees, mainly at the federal level but some 
examples at the state level will be referred to as well. Given the fragmented institutional landscape, 
whistleblowers in the public sector are being repeatedly referred from one body to another because it is 
not always clear which agency is authorized.72 The second part focuses on institutions for private sector 
employees. 
2.3.1. Whistleblowing agencies for public sector employees 
Investigation of wrongdoing and retaliation 
The Commonwealth Ombudsman, which is only accountable to Parliament, is the oversight body in the 
implementation of the PID Act. The Ombudsman can investigate reported wrongdoing, by using 
investigative competences like requiring a person or an agency to provide documents or other written 
records relevant to an investigation, requiring a person to attend a specified place and answer questions, 
examining witnesses on oath or affirmation and visiting agency premises to inspect documents. 
Whistleblowers can, however, also report to other agencies, and the Ombudsman often refers 
investigations back to the agencies reported about. The Ombudsman must be informed by these 
agencies of decisions not to investigate and may extend time limits for such investigations.73 The 
Ombudsman can then investigate the administrative actions of these agencies, and if the conclusion is 
made that an agency has erred, the Ombudsman can make recommendations which are reported to the 
Prime Minister and to the Parliament if they are not implemented. Reports about fraud, criminal offenses 
or corruption are not within the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Ombudsman. In such cases, the 
Ombudsman helps people to find their way in the system and refer the report to other agencies that do 
investigate this type of wrongdoing. 
                                                     
72 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services (2017). Whistleblower Protections. 
73 In 2016-2017, 684 disclosures were made to all Commonwealth agencies of which only 60 directly to the 
Ombudsman. Of these 60 disclosures, only 40 PID’s were accepted and 23 of those were referred to the Agency 
concerned to be investigated. Furthermore, the Ombudsman received 34 complaints about how PID’s were dealt 
with in agencies, and finalized 44 complaint investigations (Annual report Ombudsman, 2017). 
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Given the lack of investigative power the Ombudsman has been given and the lack of experience in 
employer-employee disputes, the parliamentary report raises the concern that whistleblowing protection 
should be taken away from the Commonwealth Ombudsman, and be moved to a new Whistleblower 
Protection Authority.74 Moss (in 2016) suggests that other investigative agencies should be included in 
the PID Act, like the Merit Protection Commissioner and the Australian Public Service Commissioner. 
His review also criticizes the decentralized approach in the investigation of wrongdoing, implying that 
“the Principal Officer and Authorised Officer within each agency [are held] responsible for receiving, 
assessing, allocating, investigating and responding to each disclosure”, while some states have a 
centralized approach, which ensures consistent investigation of PID’s.75 Another investigative agency 
under the PID Act is the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, which receives PID’s and can 
allocate a disclosure investigation to the agency that is reported about or conduct it itself. 
The Ombudsman does not investigate retaliation against whistleblowers, but only investigates whether 
agencies applied the procedural requirements of the PID Act in dealing with the disclosure. Due to lack 
of legal clarity, there is a misconception about this among whistleblowers; most reporters falsely believe 
that an independent agency will investigate their retaliation complaint, while the Ombudsman in fact 
only returns it to the agency in which it took place.76 Whistleblowers who are retaliated against can 
often only go to court to claim compensation or corrective action. At state level, anti-corruption agencies 
(e.g., The NSW Independent Commission of Corruption) also deal with retaliation cases by 
investigating them as criminal cases. No such cases have ever been won by whistleblowers, because it 
is difficult to persuade a court that the act of whistleblowing really led to retaliation. 
Advisory tasks 
The Ombudsman has an advisory task that is primarily aimed at public sector agencies and 
governments; it includes advice on processes that can be implemented concerning whistleblowing. 
Individual whistleblowers are not given support or counsel, but can ask for information about where to 
report wrongdoing. In addition, the Ombudsman organises programs to educate public officials in 
dealing with the PID Act and to raise awareness on the importance of whistleblowing protection among 
agencies and officials.77 
                                                     
74 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services (2017). Whistleblower Protections. 
75 Moss (2016). Review of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013. An independent statutory review conducted 
by Mr. Philip Moss A.M: 26. 
76 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services (2017). Whistleblower Protections. 
77 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services (2017). Whistleblower Protections. 
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At the state level, some agencies give advice and provide legal counselling to whistleblowers. There 
are important differences between states in the level of expertise in dealing with whistleblowing cases. 
Especially in NSW and Queensland, useful expertise has been developed. The NSW Ombudsman, for 
example, provides support and some legal counsel to whistleblowers, unlike the federal Ombudsman. 
Psychosocial care 
There is no specific psychosocial care system for whistleblowers in Australia. Whistleblowers can get 
assistance from employer assistance services in the context of a workers’ compensation claim, which is 
a general system of rehabilitation and support, which is often used in the case of bullying and stress. It 
focuses on individual injured persons, and does not meet specific needs whistleblowers have. An 
interviewee explains that whistleblowers have to ‘play the victim’ if they want this kind of support. In 
addition, whistleblowers sometimes get support from unions. NGOs are generally quite weak in 
Australia, but there are a few self-help groups for whistleblowers (e.g., Whistleblowers Australia). 
These NGOs, however, often do not have sufficient resources for assisting whistleblowers in a 
professional way. 
2.3.2. Whistleblowing agencies for private sector employees 
Under the Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act, the Registered Organisations Commission can 
conduct wrongdoing and retaliation investigations. The Parliamentary Joint Committee states that for 
this commission “[i]t is unclear whether tribunal function is available or whether matters can only be 
pursued through the courts”.78 The Fair Work Commission is the national workplace relations tribunal 
in Australia, to which whistleblowers can also take their case of alleged reprisal. However, the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee (in 2017) found that no whistleblower who has done so, or who has 
taken the case to court, has been successful yet. This can, according to the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee, be explained by “a manifest and systemic power imbalance in the Fair Work Commission 
or court process between the resources available to an individual and the resources available to a 
taxpayer-funded public sector agency or department”.79 
Under the Corporations Act, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) also has 
investigative powers. Built on the SEC model (see below), it has established an Office of the 
Whistleblower to advise whistleblowers and improve ASIC’s relationship with them, but it has no 
powers to offer real protection. An interviewee states the agency has a bad reputation for not 
                                                     
78 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services (2017). Whistleblower Protections: 51. 
79 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services (2017). Whistleblower Protections: 155. 
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communicating properly with its own whistleblowers, and that it lacks additional resources to provide 
protection to whistleblowers. In 2015-2016, 146 disclosures were made to ASIC, of which 80% led to 
no further action, either because of insufficient evidence (36%) or other investigations being underway 
(35%). 
The Parliamentary Joint Committee concludes that there is a huge gap in whistleblower protection for 
the Australian private sector. The current discussion is whether an existing agency (e.g., Fair work 
agency) should be given powers to investigate and protect whistleblowers or a new independent agency 
should be installed which works closely with existing agencies. However, due to budgetary constraints, 
there is a lot of opposition against the idea of installing new institutions. 
2.4. Whistleblower protection and incentives 
2.4.1. Whistleblower protection in the public sector 
Under the PID Act, protection for the whistleblower includes protection from legal liability, contractual 
remedies, and privilege from defamation, as well as protection from reprisals, such as dismissal, 
alteration of position and discrimination. Retaliation against a whistleblower is an offense, for which 
there are no civil penalties but the retaliator can be held liable. Whistleblowers who have been retaliated 
are pushed back to the general grievance system of the agency concerned, which can conduct a code of 
conduct investigation. In theory, whistleblowers who were retaliated against can also go to court or to 
an employment appeal trial, but there is not much evidence that people actually do that. It is not clear 
why that is the case. The PID Act provides a broad set of remedies for whistleblowers who have been 
the victim of reprisals, including compensation (which a court can require from both individual reprisors 
and organisations), injunctions, apologies and reinstatement. This broad protection can, however, “have 
an adverse effect upon best practice conflict-management solutions that emphasise alternative dispute 
resolutions or merits review processes, rather than formal investigation”.80 Moreover, an interviewee 
explains that more emphasis should be put on employers’ responsibilities for proactive protection by 
for example the installation of procedures that encourage safe whistleblowing. 
An important downside of the legal protection is that the burden of proof lies with the employee. In the 
federal PID Act, and in civil compensation arrangements in some Australian states, the employee has 
to prove that whistleblowing was any of the reasons for the reprisal. However, in NSW the court has to 
be convinced by the employee that whistleblowing was the substantial reason for retaliation, which is 
                                                     
80 Moss (2016). Review of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013. An independent statutory review conducted 
by Mr. Philip Moss A.M: 30. 
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very hard. The Parliamentary Joint Committee (in 2017) even concludes that it is nearly impossible to 
protect whistleblowers from reprisals. Improving retaliation investigations (see above) and reversing 
the burden of proof to the employer, who would then have to prove that the reprisal was unrelated to 
the reporting act, would provide more protection for the whistleblower. This reversed onus of proof is 
considered a best practice by international organisations (OECD in 2011; UNODC in 2015). Positive 
in the PID Act is the guaranteed confidentiality of the whistleblower’s identity, even in courts. 
2.4.2. Whistleblower protection in the private sector 
For the private sector, legal protection for whistleblowers is weaker and unclear. The Corporations Act 
offers protection from legal liability and contract termination, and compensation is only granted for 
reprisals that are criminal offenses. The Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act provides broader 
protection for the whistleblower, including protection from liability, contractual remedies, and privilege 
from defamation, as well as protection from reprisals, such as dismissal, injury, alteration of position, 
discrimination, harassment, harm like psychological harm and damage to property or reputation. 
Remedies include compensation, injunction, apologies and reinstatement. Like in the public sector, 
burden of proof lies with the employee in both laws. 
A serious problem in the Corporations Act is the ‘good faith test’ in which the whistleblower’s motive 
is under scrutiny, while the committee consider motives irrelevant in whistleblowing cases. This test 
was “originally inserted as a safeguard against vexatious claims” (Parliamentary Joint Committee, 
2017: 74). The additional requirement that the whistleblower has reasonable grounds to suspect the 
wrongdoing occurred is considered a sufficient safeguard against false reports. Positive is also that 
revealing the identity of a whistleblower is an offense under the Corporations Act, which is 
unfortunately not the case in the Fair Work Act. 
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3.  BELGIUM  
 
Figure 10. Infographics Belgian federal and Flemish public sector whistleblowing arrangements81 
                                                     
81 We relied on 3 local respondents and the following documents: 
Audit Vlaanderen (2016). Jaarverslag van Audit Vlaanderen 2016. Auditcomité van de lokale besturen 
Auditcomité van de Vlaamse administratie. 
Belgisch Staatsblad (2013). Wet van 15 september 2013 betreffende de melding van een veronderstelde 
integriteitsschending in de federale administratieve overheden door haar personeelsleden. Gepubliceerd op 
04.10.2013. 
Belgisch Staatsblad (2014). Koninklijk besluit van 9 oktober 2014 tot uitvoering van artikel 3, § 2 van de wet van 
15 september 2013 betreffende de melding van een veronderstelde integriteitsschending in de federale 
administratieve overheden door haar personeelsleden. Gepubliceerd op 12.11.2014. 
Belgisch Staatsblad (2014). Huishoudelijk reglement van de Vlaamse Ombudsdienst. Gepubliceerd op 
14.08.2014. 
Federale Ombudsman (2016). Jaarverslag 2016 van de federale Ombudsman. 
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3.1. Cultural and legal context 
Blowing the whistle is considered difficult in Belgium. Currently, only Flemish and federal public 
employees are protected by a specific whistleblowing protection law (respectively since 2004 and 
2013); public employees have the duty to report criminal offenses (Criminal Proceedings, art. 29), and 
non-compliance can lead to a disciplinary sanction. Both within Flemish and federal government 
agencies, public managers are said to not encourage whistleblowing (e.g., speech Flemish Ombudsman 
in October 2016, and our interviews with employees of Flemish and federal whistleblowing agencies). 
Interviewees in whistleblowing agencies state that the number of public employees who blow the 
whistle is rather low, for which they have no clear explanation. As for the federal government, trade 
unions were not involved in drafting the whistleblowing protection law, but they were informed about 
it shortly after during a workshop by the Bureau. Many trade union representatives have successfully 
taken the role of trusted person. In the Flemish government, trade unions are involved when changes 
are made in the ethics code, but not often directly involved in specific whistleblowing cases. Whereas 
most trade union representatives appreciate the additional protection the whistleblowing protection law 
offers for employees who want to report wrongdoing, some are not yet convinced about the necessity 
of such a legal framework. In 2013, the Flemish whistleblowing protection law has been revised. 
Changes were based on experiences of the ombudsman, Audit Flanders and the integrity coordinator of 
the Flemish government with the implementation of the law. The federal law will probably be revised 
soon as well. 
3.2. Definition of whistleblowing and target groups 
Both the federal and Flemish whistleblowing law offer protection for public employees within the 
respective government agencies. Hence it does not include protection for employees of private 
organisations that implement public policy as a result of privatization. At the federal level, protection 
is in addition provided for employees who are involved in the investigation and employees who advise 
the whistleblower. The suggestion to apply the federal law to employees of the federal Police has been 
                                                     
Vlaamse Ombudsdienst (2011). Nota met aanbevelingen van de Vlaamse ombudsman over de 
klokkenluidersregeling. 
Vlaamse Ombudsdienst (2016). Vlaams ombudsman over klokkenluiden en spreekrecht van ambtenaren. 
Studiemiddag, georganiseerd naar aanleiding van de recente oprichting van het Huis voor Klokkenluiders, Den 
Haag. 
Vlaamse Ombudsdienst (2016). Jaarverslag van de Vlaamse Ombudsdienst 2016. 
Vlaamse Regering en Vlaamse Ombudsdienst (2014). Protocol tot regeling van de bescherming van 
klokkenluiders. 
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withdrawn. While local employees can report integrity violations to Audit Flanders (since 2014), they 
cannot report to the Flemish ombudsman, and can thus not be identified as genuine whistleblowers 
under the Flemish law. 
Both laws have a broad definition of whistleblowing. At the federal level, employees can report on 
breaches of laws and other regulations (which is considered too broad and therefore unworkable in 
practice); dangers to health, safety or environment; shortcomings of public service duty; and advice or 
command leading to an integrity violation (Federal Whistleblowing Law, art. 2, 3rd paragraph). Also 
the Flemish law covers a broad array of topics on which employees can blow the whistle, although less 
clearly described than in the federal law, including negligence, abuses and offenses within the 
department one is employed (Decree of Ombudsman, art. 3, 2nd paragraph). The interviewees state that 
a broad definition of whistleblowing – thereby following both a legalistic approach (including violation 
of laws, decrees and regulations) and a value-based approach (including integrity violations as 
endangering health, safety of persons and environment) (Vande Walle & Hubeau, 2017: 242) – is 
preferable over a narrow definition, because it 1) lowers the threshold for reporting, 2) shows the 
importance of various types of integrity violations, and 3) allows employees of the ombudsman’s office 
to make their own interpretation of the type of investigations they prefer to investigate. At both levels, 
bullying and discrimination are not included in the whistleblowing protection legislation, but regulated 
in separate regulations. 
3.3. Whistleblowing agencies: tasks and institutional characteristics 
Both at the Flemish and federal government level, several agencies are involved in advisory, 
investigatory and policy tasks concerning whistleblowing (protection). This part will describe for both 
government levels, the specific tasks and institutional characteristics of these agencies, and if the 
information is available the type and number of cases they deal with. In addition, the most important 
challenges these agencies face will be identified. 
3.3.1. Whistleblowing agencies in the Flemish government 
In the Flemish government, the Ombudsman has a central role in the identification and protection of 
whistleblowers and the investigation of wrongdoing they report. However, other agencies also play an 
important role (although not always formally regulated) in advising and supporting (potential) 
whistleblowers, investigating wrongdoing and formulating policy recommendations to departments. 
This sometimes leads to coordination problems between these various agencies (notwithstanding 
cooperation attempts in information-sharing and referral of case files), and employees not always being 
familiar with the role of each actor in the process. 
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Flemish Ombudsman 
The Flemish Ombudsman is the formal actor in whistleblowing protection and investigation, which 
seems to be a logical option given its independence, only being accountable to the Flemish parliament. 
While in practice Audit Flanders has a more important role in the investigation of wrongdoing reported 
by Flemish employees than the Ombudsman (as will be described below), this agency cannot offer 
protection for reporters as the Ombudsman can. The formal procedure is that Flemish public employees 
report internally first – either to their supervisor or to Audit Flanders if reporting to their supervisor is 
considered too difficult – and if no sufficient action is taken by the supervisor, they can report externally 
to the Flemish Ombudsman that can grant them a formal whistleblower status and offer protection. 
Some potential whistleblowers are in this phase advised to not become a whistleblower. On average the 
agency yearly receives four to six employee reports, of which on average two whistleblowers are 
protected (in total 20 whistleblowers were protected between 2006 and October 2016). If the protection 
procedure is not used, the Ombudsman can initiate a mediation procedure, or refer the employee to 
court or to other Flemish departments for conflict resolution and/or psychosocial care. Given that the 
Ombudsman’s central goal is reconciliation between employer and employee, which is considered the 
best protection for the employee on the long term, the identity of the whistleblower is often made known 
to the involved department (with the consent of the reporter)82 (Vande Walle & Hubeau, 2017). 
The Ombudsman can conduct an investigation of wrongdoing, and has determined criteria on the basis 
of which the agency starts such an investigation, like the probability of reconciliation (which it can 
assess based on years of experience with whistleblowing and citizen complaint investigations) and 
extent to which the wrongdoing is more than an incident or personal issue.83 The agency can also 
investigate possible retaliation whistleblowers experience. These two types of investigations are 
conducted simultaneously and intertwined. Investigations are done by 12 employees who are 
specialized in wrongdoing investigations, but less than one FTE is particularly used for whistleblowing 
cases. The other 300-400 cases are based on the 8.700 citizen reports the Ombudsman receives yearly. 
The investigators’ legal competences include access to documents and information, request information 
of employees which must be provided, and request assistance of experts (Flemish Ombudsman law, art. 
15). The Ombudsman can request the assistance of Audit Flanders, an agency with 17 years of 
experience in forensic auditing (see below). 
                                                     
82 Only since 2013 the Ombudsman can decide to keep the name of the whistleblower confidential for the head of 
department in which the investigation is conducted. This, however, complicates attempts for mediation between 
employer and employee. 
83 See: http://www.vlaamseombudsdienst.be/ombs/nl/dienst/onze_werkwijze.html  
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The Ombudsman informs the whistleblower if the case is considered inadmissible or unfounded. In the 
case of a judicial investigation, the Ombudsman only conducts a brief investigation in order to protect 
the involved employee. If wrongdoing is discovered, the Ombudsman can formulate recommendations 
to department heads, which may include requests to redraw wrongful measures taken against 
whistleblowers and requests to implement integrity policy measures. Non-compliance may lead to 
Ministers being informed. 
Integrity coordinator 
The integrity coordinator is often84 the first person potential whistleblowers in the Flemish government 
turn to for advice, to report wrongdoing (15 reports a year) or to request information about the 
whistleblowing law and procedure (20 information requests a year). In conversations with potential 
whistleblowers, this person emphasizes her position (e.g., no professional confidentiality), and explains 
how the whistleblowing procedure operates in practice to manage the reporter’s expectations (e.g., long 
procedure, which not always results in improved working conditions). Then she refers occupational 
health and well-being issues to the Department of Prevention and Protection and integrity concerns to 
Audit Flanders. Although this role as a contact person is important for potential whistleblowers, the 
central task of the coordinator is drafting policy recommendations concerning preventive ethics 
management, primarily for the Flemish government, but more and more also for local government 
departments (although that is officially not part of her role). In this role, the integrity coordinator 
participates in the Virtual Bureau Integrity85, founded in 2012, with members from for example Audit 
Flanders, Diversity Department, and the Department of Prevention and Protection. While the 
Ombudsman is no member of this integrity-hub initiative, the Bureau can refer cases to the Ombudsman. 
                                                     
84 Some potential whistleblowers report to Audit Flanders or the Flemish Ombudsman without consulting the 
integrity coordinator. 
85 More information: https://overheid.vlaanderen.be/virtueel-bureau-integriteit 
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Audit Flanders 
Audit Flanders is (since 200186) the internal audit agency for Flemish and (since 2014) local government 
departments. It is part of the Ministry of Chancellery and Government, but does not have to give account 
to Ministers87, and is thus quite independent from the departments it investigates, which are part of other 
ministries. Audit Flanders has 45 employees of whom nine forensic auditors who are experienced in 
and trained to conduct investigations of wrongdoing. Most audits are planned on the basis of risk 
analyses (80%), while a smaller part is incident or complaint driven (20%), e.g., based on employee 
reports. Their legal competences include access to all relevant information and documents (both hard 
copy and electronically); access to buildings, rooms and installations in which Flemish or local 
government tasks are performed; request information from all personnel members which must be 
provided. They deal with 20-30 reports from Flemish employees a year and about 50 from local 
employees. As for Flemish employees, these reporters are either formally identified and protected 
whistleblowers (in the case the Ombudsman has requested the assistance of Audit Flanders) or not. 
After a pre-investigation in which Audit Flanders assesses the reliability of the information obtained 
during an intake with the reporter and other sources that can be consulted, Audit Flanders may conduct 
a forensic audit. During the investigation, strict measures of confidentiality are taken (e.g., only the 
investigator knows the reporter’s identity, no information about the reporter is mentioned in the audit 
report), to make sure that the employee remains anonymous within his department and the Flemish 
government. In the exceptional case that the identity of the reporter is already known, Audit Flanders 
will advise the employee to contact the Ombudsman to request the whistleblowing statute. Anonymous 
reports are also dealt with, although most of these reports are not sufficiently documented to start a 
forensic audit. If wrongdoing is discovered, Audit Flanders formulates recommendations for the 
departments in which it occurred as part of the audit report. Although the internal audit agency cannot 
strictly enforce these recommendations, they are most often taken seriously by managers of these 
departments because the audit report about Flemish departments is also sent to their Minister and 
Minister-President, and compliance with these recommendations is taken into account in the evaluation 
procedure of managers within Flemish departments. 
  
                                                     
86 The Agency Audit Flanders was officially established in 2014, but this agency was preceded by the Agency of 
Internal Audit of the Flemish Administration, which was founded in 2001. Most auditors within Audit Flanders 
have approximately 15 years of audit experience. 
87 Because of logistic and budget reasons, Audit Flanders is in administrative terms part of the Ministry of 
Chancellery and Government, but only has to give account to two audit committees (one for the Flemish 
government and one for the local government), that for the most part consists of independent experts. 
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Other relevant actors in Flemish government 
Other actors that play a role in advising or protecting whistleblowers in the Flemish government are the 
following: 
 Contact persons integrity in every department who inform potential reporters about procedures 
and agencies involved. In 2017, a professionalization trajectory has started to make them more 
familiar with integrity initiatives and the whistleblowing procedure. 
 Reporting channel ‘Spreekbuis’88 where employees can ask information about or report 
concerns on well-being at work and integrity89, after which questions are dispatched to the 
correct department. This reporting channel receives on average 90-100 calls (including 40 
information requests and 50 reports of wrongdoing). 
 Employee Assistance Program, which offers psychosocial assistance to all employees of the 
Flemish government, and thus not specifically for whistleblowers. 
 Agency of government personnel90, which is since 2015 responsible for all HR topics including 
integrity management (e.g., ad hoc policy advice, organisation workshops and training). 
3.3.2. Whistleblowing agencies in the federal government 
At the federal level, two agencies play an important role in dealing with whistleblowing cases, being 
the federal Ombudsman and the Bureau for Public Service Ethics and Deontology. In 2016 a draft Royal 
Decree has been approved to install a Federal Internal Audit (FIA) agency for the entire federal 
government in Belgium, which also exists at the Flemish government (see above). Although the FIA is 
already operational, it does not deal with whistleblowing cases yet. 
Federal Ombudsman 
Like in the Flemish government, internal reporting (to supervisor or trusted person) is the preferred first 
step for whistleblowers, but whistleblowers can also immediately report wrongdoing externally to the 
Center of Integrity, which is a department of the federal Ombudsman, an independent agency which is 
only accountable to Parliament. The formal procedure is that reporters submit a pre-advice request to 
the Ombudsman (some of whom have already discussed it with a trusted person) containing indications 
that an integrity violation occurred or will probably soon occur. In practice, a formal pre-advice request 
                                                     
88 More information: https://overheid.vlaanderen.be/spreekbuis  
89 An interviewee explained that ‘Spreekbuis’ is more experienced in dealing with well-being at work issues than 
in concerns about integrity. 
90 More information: https://overheid.vlaanderen.be/agentschap-overheidspersoneel 
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is often preceded by a reporter’s informal request for advice or information about the whistleblowing 
procedure. When a formal pre-advice request results in a negative advice, the case will be considered 
inadmissible and no investigation will be initiated by the Ombudsman. When the advice is positive, the 
Centre of Integrity (CINT) of the Ombudsman is obligated to investigate the wrongdoing. CINT 
employs three investigators whose competences include the following: request information from all 
departments which are obliged to provide it; observation; interviews with witnesses; analysis of digital 
media. If criminal offense are reported or discovered (such as corruption), the case file is referred to the 
police. Results of the investigation and (policy) recommendations – which can be formulated even if 
no wrongdoing was found – are reported in the annual report of Ombudsman and communicated to the 
agency. Although compliance with these recommendations cannot be legally enforced, departments 
generally comply with the Ombudsman’s advice because of the follow-up by the Ombudsman, and 
Ministers being informed. 
In addition to the wrongdoing investigation, the Ombudsman can conduct a retaliation investigation, in 
which the burden of proof is on the defendant. We found no indications that any such investigation has 
already been done by the federal Ombudsman. 
In 2016, the CINT dealt with 31 cases, including 10 information requests. Of the 21 reports of 
wrongdoing, 16 have resulted in a formal pre-advice request (11 of which were considered 
inadmissible). Compared to previous years, the number of information requests has decreased (probably 
because other sources of information, like trusted persons, are considered more effective), and a serious 
increase of pre-advice requests. The Centre has conducted eight investigations in 2016 of which six 
were finalized (in four wrongdoing was discovered), which is relatively high compared to previous 
years (two investigations in 2015 and none in 2014). 
The information task, the pre-advice and the investigative tasks of CINT are conducted by the same 
people, which entail the risk of conflict of interest. However, because the advisory task (which only 
concerns the informal or formal pre-advice) ends when an investigation starts – and both tasks are thus 
not performed simultaneously – the risk is considered minimal. Moreover, most advice is given by 
trusted persons and the Bureau for Public Service Ethics and Deontology, which will be discussed 
below. 
Bureau for Public Service Ethics and Deontology 
Before reporting to the federal Ombudsman, federal employees can also request advice and information 
at the Federal Bureau for Public Service Ethics and Deontology, which is a department of three 
employees in the Federal Service of Policy and Support. When informal advice is requested, the Bureau 
explains the pros and cons of reporting, expected success, and refers bullying or discrimination concerns 
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to other reporting channels. This is important to determine whether the reporter is sure about his decision 
to be a whistleblower and to check whether other solutions are possible or necessary. In the informal 
phase, a potential reporter is sometimes referred to the prevention advisor for psychosocial assistance. 
The main goal of the Bureau is the prevention of integrity violations, which they aim to achieve by the 
following activities: 
 Organising workshops, trainings (e.g., for trusted persons) and seminars on integrity 
management in federal departments; 
 Assisting trusted persons (e.g., network meetings); 
 Functioning as a knowledge centre by collecting good practices of ethics management and 
informing departments about it; 
 Providing policy advice to the federal government based on developments abroad (e.g., OECD, 
UN, CoE) and to specific departments (often in the Federal Service of Finances). 
3.4. Whistleblower protection and incentives 
3.4.1. Flemish whistleblower protection 
Flemish government employees are protected when they have obtained the whistleblower status of the 
Flemish Ombudsman. During the protection period (which ends two years after the investigative report 
is published), the whistleblower can only be subjected to a disciplinary sanction or another measure if 
these are not related to the reporting of the wrongdoing. Ongoing disciplinary procedures are suspended 
until the Ombudsman has determined that there is no relationship with the act of reporting.91 If the 
reporter has convinced the Ombudsman that such measures, like threat of dismissal or not receiving a 
bonus or promotion, were related to the whistleblowing, the Ombudsman will conduct a retaliation 
investigation in which the burden of proof is on the employer. If the Ombudsman establishes a relation 
between the measure and the act of reporting, he can request the department head to withdraw the 
measure. Employees can also be voluntarily transferred to another department, which sounds promising 
but not always easy to implement in practice (given the specificity of task description and expertise of 
Flemish employees). Obviously, this protection is merely a judicial safety net, which is only necessary 
when the identity of the reporter is known. Audit Flanders argues that reporters’ best protection is their 
confidentiality in their department, which is the main reason for the far reaching confidentiality 
measures it takes towards reporters. The agency therefore operates according to the principle ‘The 
                                                     
91 See: https://overheid.vlaanderen.be/klokkenluidersregeling 
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message is more important than the messenger’. As explained above, both the Ombudsman and Audit 
Flanders can formulate recommendations to prevent future wrongdoing, which cannot be enforced but 
are generally complied with because Ministers are informed about these recommendations. 
3.4.2. Federal whistleblower protection 
The federal whistleblower law provides employees who have reported wrongdoing to the federal 
Ombudsman protection against retaliatory actions linked to the act of whistleblowing, if their report has 
been considered admissible. Retaliatory actions are defined very precisely in the law, but this list is not 
exhaustive: 
 (threat of) dismissal, not extending a temporary contract or denying expected tenure; 
 (not granting the permission for) translocation; 
 disciplinary measure; 
 measure of internal order; 
 denying pay raise; 
 denying chances of promotion; 
 denying facilities other employees have; 
 not granting leaf; 
 negative evaluation.  
During the protection period, the reporter can bring charges against the federal department at the 
Ombudsman. The burden on proof is on the defendant, implying that the involved department must give 
proof that the actions were not linked to the act of whistleblowing. The protection period starts at the 
pre-advice request, and ends two years after the investigation has been finalized. During this period, the 
identity of the reporter is held confidentially, unless the reporter agrees that it is an ‘open report’. 
Because this period is considered too short in practice, it will probably be changed in the revised law. 
Although the protection looks quite good on paper, it is not clear whether it also offers protection in 
practice. No information could be found about the existence of retaliatory actions, because no such 
investigation has already been conducted. This obviously does not necessarily mean that federal 
whistleblowers are never the victim of retaliation.  
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4.  FRANCE  
 
Figure 11. Infographics whistleblowing arrangements in France92 
  
                                                     
92 We relied on 3 local respondents and the following documents: 
Conseil d’Etat (2016). Le droit d’alerte: signaler, traiter, protéger. Les études du Conseil d’Etat. Conseil d’Etat. 
DG Growth (2017). Estimating the economic benefits of whistleblower protection in public procurement. 
European Commission Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs. 
Loi relative à la transparence, à la lutte contre la corruption et à la modernisation de la vie économiques. Loi nr 
2016-1691, 9 décembre 2016. 
Proposition de loi organique relative à la compétence du Défenseur des Droits pour l’orientation et la protection 
des lanceurs d’alerte. Texte adopté nr 831, Assemblée Nationale, 8 novembre 2016. 
Wolfe, S., Worth, M., Dreyfus, S. & Brown, A.J. (2015). Breaking the silence. Strengths & weaknesses in G20 
whistleblower protection laws. Blueprint for Free Speech / University of Melbourne / Griffith University / 
Transparency International Australia. 
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4.1. Cultural and legal context 
The attitude in France – at least of its policy makers – with regard to whistleblowing seems to have 
changed dramatically over the past two decades. When the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed in the USA, 
requiring all subsidiaries of companies publicly noted in the USA to have ‘confidential, anonymous 
hotlines’, the French CNIL (national agency for privacy and data protection) was vehemently against 
anonymous whistleblowing.  
However, in 2004 a very limited whistleblower protection provision was included in the anti-corruption 
legislation. The following years, similar provisions with limited scope were added to other pieces of 
legislation in response to scandals in different sectors. This meant that by 2014, France’s whistleblower 
protection was scattered across many different pieces of legislation, each narrow in scope for specific 
sectors or specific types of wrongdoing (e.g., science, environment, health, corruption). 
The Luxleaks case, in which a French citizen Alain Deltour is the whistleblower, galvanised the 
momentum for a legislative make-over in France on whistleblowing. Three NGOs (Transparency 
International France, Fondation Sciences Citoyennes, and Anticor) were driving forces behind this 
make-over. Based on the Luxleaks and other major whistleblower cases in France, these NGOs drafted 
a law proposal that – had it been in force when the whistleblowing happened – would have protected 
the whistleblowers in those high-profile cases. Their law proposal was not upheld, but elements were 
taken over in the bill that was eventually successful. 
The Sapin II whistleblower legislation was passed in Parliament on 8 November 2016. With Sapin II, 
whistleblower protection is concentrated into one piece of legislation with a broad scope. It is 
nevertheless still ‘early days’ to see how effective the implementation of the new legislation is. 
4.2. Definition of whistleblowing and target groups 
According to the legislation, a whistleblower is a physical person that discloses or reports, in a 
disinterested manner, 1) a crime or misdemeanour, 2) a gross and evident failure to comply with duly 
ratified treaties or any measure adopted by an international organisation, 3) a violation of a law or 
regulation, 4) or a severe threat or damage to the public interest, of which he or she became personally 
aware. 
The intention was for the whistleblowing legislation to cover both public and private sector, and to 
maintain a very broad scope as to types of working relationships it covered. According to the letter of 
the law it even applies to those who do not have any working relationship to the organisation they blow 
the whistle on. 
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4.3. Whistleblowing agencies: tasks and institutional characteristics 
The provision of help and advice to whistleblowers is incorporated into the law that established the 
ombudsperson – Défenseur des Droits – and expands the mandate of the ombudsperson to also include 
the investigation of retaliation against whistleblowers, and a ‘mission d’orientation’ which entails 
advising whistleblowers on which agency or regulator to raise their concern with. However, the 
executive decree implementing these new tasks for the ombudsperson had not been signed when at the 
time of writing this report (July 2018). 
In France, the ombudsperson was established in 2008 and reports to Parliament. It is publicly funded. 
Its budget is €27 million per year. No additional funding will be allocated for the additional tasks in 
relation to whistleblowing, whilst the expected cost of these tasks is €2.8 million per year. Four FTE 
would be dedicated to these whistleblowing related tasks: 1 senior functionary, two lawyers, and one 
assistant. It is expected the ombudsperson will manage 400 incoming cases per year. 
Since 2008, the ombudsperson has a mandate for four pillars of issues: citizen/state interactions, 
deontology of army and police, children rights, and discrimination. The ombudsperson did not want to 
add a fifth pillar to that. Hence, tasks in relation to whistleblowing are inscribed into the discrimination 
/ unequal treatment pillar, in order to maintain the impartiality of the ombudsperson. However, the 
ombudsperson is entitled to side with someone in front of the court. 
We noted earlier that it is ‘early days’ to assert the effectiveness of the new policy. No doubt the NGOs 
that drove the momentum will remain vigilant as to the functioning of the ombudsperson as well as 
regulators under the new scheme. These NGOs continue to provide advice and support for 
whistleblower, albeit on an ad hoc basis. 
4.4. Whistleblowing protection and incentives 
The Sapin II whistleblower legislation was passed in Parliament on 8 November 2016. In December 
2016 the Constitutional Court overruled one aspect, namely the financial support for whistleblowers. 
Nevertheless, the legislation does entail a number of strong elements. One of these is that organisations 
of more than 50 employees are required to have internal whistleblowing arrangements. There is robust 
confidentiality protection for whistleblowers in the sense that breaches of such confidentiality carry a 
sanction. Retaliation against a whistleblower also carries a sanction (personal liability). 
There are also a number of limitations to the scope of protection. The legislation prescribes a 3-tiered 
route to qualify for protection: internal, regulator, public. Note that there is also a ‘good faith’ 
requirement – disclosures have to be made in a disinterested manner. 
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The ombudsperson has no binding sanctioning nor subpoena powers. It can, however, investigate based 
on requests to receive all information or relevant documents, and conduct on-site verifications. It can 
work to resolve a conflict by mutual agreement, by making recommendations, or through mediation. 
The ombudsperson can also file a brief in support of a civil or criminal proceeding, request disciplinary 
action against an office, or recommend that sanctions be taken against a wrongdoer. It can publish its 
report and recommendations. Although the courts are not obliged to follow the ombudsperson’s 
recommendations, the ombudsperson has a strong reputation. Its opinion is deemed as important. 
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5.  IRELAND  
 
Figure 12. Infographics whistleblowing arrangements in Ireland93 
5.1. Cultural and legal context 
According to a recent survey (2017) the attitude of employers towards whistleblowing is extremely 
positive: 95% agrees it is in the interest of an organisation or industry sector for people to speak up, and 
                                                     
93 We relied on 1 local respondent and the following documents: 
Employment Rights Ireland (2017). Employees getting interim relief orders under the Protected Disclosures Act 
2014. Accessed on 03-07-2018t: https://employmentrightsireland.com/category/whistleblowing. 
Doherty, M., & Ryan, D. (2016). Whistleblowing: National Report for Ireland. In Whistleblowing-A Comparative 
Study (pp. 181-186). Springer. 
Protected Disclosures Act 2014. Act of the Oireachtas 14-2014. 
Transparency International Ireland (2017). Speak Up report 2017. TI Ireland. 
Vandekerckhove, W. (2006). Whistleblowing and organizational social responsibility: A global assessment. 
Ashgate. 
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64% still encourage this where disclosure might harm the reputation of their organisation. Nevertheless, 
it took Ireland 16 years to enact whistleblowing legislation. Law proposals have been on and off the 
table since whistleblowing legislation was passed in the UK. The initial proposals mirrored the approach 
of the UK’s Public Interest Disclosure Act. Subsequently, a more scattered approach was explored with 
proposals to include whistleblowing provisions in laws relating to specific sectors or types of 
wrongdoing. But it was Transparency International Ireland that created a political momentum for a 
unified and broad piece of whistleblowing legislation around a fraud scandal in the police force. This 
legislation was passed in 2014. It does take up elements of the UK PIDA (e.g., three tiers, and a list of 
‘prescribed persons’ at the regulatory tier), but is far more progressive in terms of burden of proof and 
scope of working relations covered. 
5.2. Definition of whistleblowing and target groups 
The legislation covers both public and private sector, and any kind of working relationship. An 
interesting feature of the legislation is that it prescribes who would be regarded as ‘employer’ for 
various kind of working relationships (e.g., agency workers or subcontracted workers). 
Whistleblower disclosures are protected when they are about: 1) failure to comply with a legal 
obligation, 2) miscarriage of justice, 3) danger to health and safety of individual, 4) environmental 
damage, 5) unlawful or improper use of funds or resources of a public body, 6) oppressive, 
discriminatory or grossly negligent act or omission by or on behalf of a public body, or gross 
mismanagement, 7) cover-up of the previous. 
5.3. Whistleblowing agencies: tasks and institutional characteristics 
The Irish whistleblowing legislation does not create a new whistleblowing agency, nor does it give 
specific mandates in relation to whistleblowing to an existing one. It does provide a list of ‘prescribed 
persons’ as second tier recipients. These and other public bodies are required to publish the number of 
protected disclosures made to them, as well as the actions taken in response to these disclosures, in their 
annual report. 
Whistleblower protection is to be sought through court. Prescribed persons are mandated to receive 
whistleblower concern and investigate the alleged wrongdoing. There is no information available as to 
how pro-active these regulators have become with regard to whistleblowing since 2014. 
Transparency International Ireland performs watchdog function on the effectiveness of the 
implementation of the legislation. It has also created two ‘spin-off’ organisations to provide specific 
services in relation to whistleblowing: the Transparency Legal Advice Centre (TLAC) and 
Integrity@Work. 
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TLAC provides advice about the whsitleblowing legislation as well as specific legal advice for 
whistleblowers who intend to take their case further (30 hours of free legal advice per whistleblower). 
TLAC has legal privilege. TLAC’s core funding is provided by Transparency International Ireland, and 
receives additional funding from the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform (DPER). Further 
funds have been granted by the Public Interest Law Support Fund. 
Integrity@Work provides training and advice to organisations on how to operate internal 
whistleblowing arrangements, and provides advice to whistleblowers on how best to raise concerns 
internally, as well as when and how to blow the whistle outside their organisation. Integrity@Work also 
takes up an advocacy role by monitoring whistleblower experiences. It does not do mediation. 
Integrity@Work runs on a membership scheme model. Depending on their size, member organisations 
pay €500 - €5.000 per annum. In the start-up phase, Integrity@Work also received a grant from the 
Ministry of Public Expenditure and Reform. Its current budget is €500.000, but it would need a €1 
million per year budget to remain sustainable. 
TLAC managed 45 whistleblower cases in 2016. The financial regulator (Central Bank of Ireland) 
managed 49 cases in 2015, 50 in 2016, and 40 in the first five months of 2017. 
5.4. Whistleblowing protection and incentives 
Public bodies are required to have internal whistleblowing arrangements. Protection has to be sought 
through court, and the legislation includes specific provisions to make interim relief a realistic 
possibility. The law stipulates that disclosures will be regarded as protected disclosures under the 
legislation unless proven differently. Hence, the reversal of burden of proof is explicit and applies not 
only to retaliation, but also to appropriateness of whistleblowing recipient, type of wrongdoing, and 
public interest. The legislation prescribes a three tiered model. A ‘reasonable belief’ test applies to all 
considerations. 
The law foresees protection against dismissal and penalisation, and provides immunity from civil 
liability. Penalisation includes: 
 suspension, lay-off or dismissal; 
 demotion or loss of opportunity for promotion; 
 transfer of duties, change of location of place work, reduction in wages or change in 
working hours; 
 the imposition or administering of any discipline, reprimand or other penalty (including a 
financial penalty); 
 unfair treatment; 
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 coercion, intimidation or harassment; 
 discrimination, disadvantage or unfair treatment; 
 injury, damage or loss; 
 threat of reprisal. 
The legislation is currently undergoing a review process, as foreseen in the legislation. Meanwhile, a 
landmark police whistleblowing case is in the courts. 
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6.  ISRAEL  
 
Figure 13. Infographics whistleblowing arrangements in Israel94 
  
                                                     
94 We relied on 1 local respondent and the website of The State Comptroller and Ombudsman of Israel. In 
particular: 
http://www.mevaker.gov.il/En/About/PublishingImages/FactsandFigures.jpg 
http://www.mevaker.gov.il/En/About/Pages/officeStructure.aspx 
http://www.mevaker.gov.il/En/Ombudsman/NTZAbout/Pages/NTZDefense.aspx 
http://www.mevaker.gov.il/En/Ombudsman/Pages/NTZhandlingcomplaints.aspx 
Also on: 
State Comptroller Law. Knesset 5718-1958 [Consolidated Version] 
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6.1. Cultural and legal context 
It would appear that the public in Israel is generally aware of whistleblowing, as cases as well as the 
mandated whistleblowing agency are regularly in the press. It is also the impression of our respondent 
that lawyers know about the law and the ombudsperson. 
In 1981, the State Comptroller Law was amended, granting authority to the Ombudsman to protect 
persons who had exposed acts of corruption. In 2014, the Ombudsman’s authority was broadened, 
allowing him/her, in addition, to protect persons who had notified about a serious breach of law or a 
serious violation of proper administration in their place of employment, as well as persons who had 
assisted a whistleblower. 
Some protections of whistleblowers in the public and private sector were inscribed into labour law in 
1997, i.e., Protection of Employees (Exposure of Offenses, of Unethical Conduct and of Improper 
Administration) Law. In July 2008, Parliament passed the Protection of Workers (Disclosure of 
Offenses and Harm to Integrity or to Proper Administration) Law. This legislation covers the public 
sector, and amends sections 45A – 45C of the State Comptroller Law to mandate the State Comptroller 
and Ombudsman for investigating retaliation against whistleblowers.  
6.2. Definition of whistleblowing and target groups 
The public sector law covers whistleblowing about 1) corruption, 2) serious breach of law, and 3) 
serious violation of proper administration. It covers public sector employees, including those at 
municipality level. 
The private sector legislation covers employees who report to authorities wrongdoing under the 
responsibility of their employer that is either 1) a violation of the law, 2) unethical conduct, and 3) 
improper administration. 
6.3. Whistleblowing agencies: tasks and institutional characteristics 
6.3.1. Private sector 
For private sector whistleblower protection, regional labour courts have jurisdiction. They can award 
compensation for dismissal or issue an injunction against dismissal. We were not able to obtain data on 
the effectiveness of this legislation or institutional performance. 
6.3.2. Public sector 
For public sector whistleblowing, the 1981 amendment of the State Comptroller law gave a mandate to 
the State Comptroller and the Ombudsman to function as a whistleblowing agency. In Israel, the 
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Ombudsman is part of the State Comptroller. The head of the agency (The State Comptroller and 
Ombudsman) is appointed by Parliament and can only be impeached by a 75% majority. Together they 
perform a number of tasks related to whistleblowing. Sometimes State Comptroller officials investigate 
the alleged wrongdoing. However, they cannot file criminal complaints themselves. Section 14c of the 
State Comptroller Law states: “Where a suspected criminal act has been uncovered during an audit, the 
Comptroller shall bring the matter to the knowledge of the Attorney General; a suspected violation of 
civil service disciplinary regulations may likewise be referred to the Attorney General; the Attorney 
General shall notify the Comptroller and the Committee, within six months after the matter was brought 
before him, of the manner in which he has dealt with the subject”. Once a matter has been referred to 
the Attorney General, the Comptroller’s investigation ceases. 
The Ombudsman officials investigate retaliation against whistleblowers and provide protection. In 
practice, often a meeting with the whistleblower will be carried out by people from the Ombudsman 
and the State Comptroller at the same time. There is a far reaching and easy information sharing between 
the Ombudsman and the State Comptroller. No protocols are installed for this. Sometimes the State 
Comptroller officials refer those who give them information and suffer from retaliation to the 
Ombudsman. 
Giving advice to whistleblowers is not part of the tasks of the Ombudsman or the State Comptroller. 
However, they do respond to questions and give information on risks and available channels. The 
prevention tasks of these agencies consist of awareness raising via information dissemination 
campaigns. 
The State Comptroller and Ombudsman would want to broaden its authority in two respects. First, they 
would like to be able to be more pro-active in terms of protecting gate-keepers who perform 
whistleblowing related activities as part of their job roles. Currently, special protection is provided for 
internal auditors carrying out their duties, but no special protection is provided for other gate-keepers 
such as treasurers or legal advisors. The idea is to provide protection for gate-keepers who were 
victimized as a result of their fulfilling their functions, not because they were whistleblowers. Second, 
they deem that being able to make use of a personal liability of the person retaliating against a 
whistleblower would strengthen the work of the State Comptroller and Ombudsman. 
Recently the Ombudsman is developing a more holistic approach to whistleblower protection, i.e., a 
psychologist has been appointed to give support to whistleblowers and their families. The Ombudsman 
has also initiated an amendment to the Legal Aid Law, which would enable whistleblowers to receive 
legal aid without the requirement of establishing financial need. 
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6.4. Whistleblowing protection and incentives 
We were not able to obtain data on how the regional labour courts perform in terms of offering private 
sector whistleblower protection. With regard to public sector whistleblower protection provided by the 
Ombudsman, 51 protection orders were made between 2013 and 2016. In 2016, 65 cases were 
completed. Of these 65 cases, 36 could not be investigated due to lack of authority (alleged wrongdoing 
occurred in a non-audited body), or because legal proceeding were ongoing. In a total of 29 cases 
investigations were carried out, and in 22 of these relief was granted either through a protection order 
or through mediation. 
The Ombudsman can issue an order to protect a whistleblower. Protection orders are binding and its 
breach may be a criminal or disciplinary offense. 
Under the legislation, a condition for protection is following the proper procedure, i.e., one needs special 
circumstances to qualify for protection whilst not following the proper procedure. However, ‘proper 
procedures’ does not necessarily mean that concerns need to be raised within one’s organization first. 
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7.  NORWAY  
 
Figure 14. Infographics whistleblowing arrangements in Norway95 
7.1. Cultural and legal context 
In Norway, there is a strong protection of freedom of speech, both in the Constitution and the Working 
Environment Act (WEA). The WEA contains specific sections on whistleblowing since 2007, which 
have recently been put together in one chapter. Currently a legislative committee is discussing 
recommendations to revise the WEA. The members represent very different interests, and include 
                                                     
95 We relied on 1 local respondent, a number of published scientific articles (as shown in the reference list), and 
the following documents: 
Blueprint for free speech. Norway – Whistleblowing Protection. Accessed on 22-01-18: 
https://blueprintforfreespeech.net/document/norway 
The Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority (2017). Working Environment Act. English translation of 
‘arbeidsmiljØven’.  
World Law Group (2016). Global Guide to Whistleblowing Programs 2016 (Chapter on Norway). 
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labour union representatives, employers, lawyers, and a professor in organisational psychology, which 
illustrates the recognition that different disciplines are needed to install a balanced whistleblowing 
procedure. The direct cause for the installation of this committee was a number of big whistleblowing 
cases in the Norwegian Police, which showed important weaknesses in the legislative framework and 
particularly in how whistleblowers are protected in practice. Research by the Fafo Institute of Labour 
and Social Research in Oslo (since 2010) shows that whistleblowing has become more difficult. In three 
large surveys they found that whistleblowers receive more negative reactions and are more often the 
victim of bullying than non-reporters, that there is a decrease of the willingness to report because of 
fear of reprisals, and that reporting has become less effective (BjØrkelo, 2017; Fafo, 2016). Their 
findings are, however, inconsistent. While some quantitative self-reports show that “most employees 
are not retaliated against and are effective” (and that ‘only’ one in four is retaliated against), and 
qualitative in-depth research shows less promising results, like “the impact of job loss, the stigma of 
association of even being seen as a friend or an associate of a current or previous employee that has 
reported about wrongdoing at work” (BjØrkelo, 2017: 8). In practice, an interviewee explains, more 
serious retaliation seems to occur in the public compared to the private sector, but no research to 
substantiate that claim is available yet. A possible reason could be that public sector organisations have 
more resources to work against whistleblowers, while in the private sector there is no time for retaliation 
and ‘buying silence’ may be a common practice. 
At the same time, Norway is known as an egalitarian country with strong unions and a structured labour 
market model (BjØrkelo, 2017: 10), in which organisational justice and work ethic and loyalty are 
considered very important (Skiveness & Trygstad, 2017; Lewis & Trygstad, 2009) and work-related 
issues can in general be discussed openly. Nevertheless, recent studies have shown that many 
Norwegian employees have (on their employer’s request) signed an agreement which restricts their 
options to publicly express opinions about their employer, which in some cases even violate section 
100 of the Constitution (Trygstad et al., 2017). A summarizing report of Fafo (2016) explains the tension 
between the use of terms, such as ‘muzzle’ and ‘culture of fear’, in connection to specific parts of the 
Norwegian labour market and the freedom of speech “which has formally never been greater”. 
While labour unions have a strong position in Norway, their involvement and expertise in 
whistleblowing varies. Trygstad et al. (2017: 31) argue that they are “normally advocates of an open 
culture in order to safeguard co-decision and a healthy working environment.” They can represent 
whistleblowers, receive reports and protect reporters from retaliation (Trygstad et al., 2017). Some 
labour unions, such as within the police, are very well organised and have a high level of competence 
concerning whistleblowing matters, but not all unions have focused upon it or are sufficiently prepared 
for it because they lack resources and competences (particularly in some industries in the private sector). 
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Nevertheless, research in Norway shows that employee representatives and those who are represented 
by them can more effectively blow the whistle and have a lower risk of being retaliated than reporters 
who are not (Skiveness & Trygstad, 2017). Labour unions are thus quite positive about WEA protection 
for employees. Employers, on the other hand, and many employers’ representatives are against it 
(Trygstad, 2017). In their view, it not only goes against “the democratic tradition that characterized 
Norwegian life” (Trygstad et al., 2017: 22), but it is also “at odds with two key principles: the 
managerial prerogative and the duty of loyalty” (Trygstad et al., 2017: 22). 
7.2. Definition of whistleblowing and target groups 
The WEA protects current (thus not former) employees96 in the public and private sector (and since 
recently also temporary and subcontracted workers) who blow the whistle internally or externally (even 
to the media) about ‘censurable conditions’, which include “situations that are of a certain severity, inter 
alia, legal offenses such as corruption and other types of financial crime, breaches of the company’s 
ethic codes, hazardous working conditions, discrimination and harassment”97, but also “negative 
culture, corruption, illegality and unethical or harmful incidents” (Lewis & Trygstad, 2009: 382). Given 
that censurable conditions should be in the general interest, protection is not meant for the expression 
of “personal ideas and experiences, feelings and thoughts that are not of general interest [or] situations 
where an employee disagrees with the employer’s decisions” (World Law Group, 2016: 125). The scope 
of the whistleblowing law is thus very broad, but the precise definition of ‘censurable conditions’ (e.g., 
whether or not the general interest is at stake) is considered unclear in practice. Therefore the legislative 
committee is considering to suggest a public interest test for whistleblowing. To be granted protection, 
whistleblowers, have to follow the ‘appropriate procedure’, which according to the Preparatory Papers 
implies that the whistleblower first reports internally, unless this is considered unworkable like in the 
case of a criminal or serious event and the fear of retaliation or destruction of evidence (Lewis & 
Trygstad, 2009). Employers need to encourage reporting of censurable conditions by installing 
procedures for notification, processing and follow-up of notifications (WEA). 
                                                     
96 An employee is according to the WEA anyone who performs work in the service of another (WEA). Moreover, 
the following persons who are not employees are regarded as employees in the law: “students at educational or 
research institutes; national servicemen; persons performing civilian national service and Civil Defence 
servicemen; inmates in correctional institutions; patients in health institutions, rehabilitation institutions and the 
like; persons who for training purposes or in connection with work-oriented measures are places in undertakings 
without being employees; persons who without being employees participate in labour market schemes” (WEA), 
which gives the law a very wide scope. Interns and former employees are, however, not included in the legislation. 
Neither are employees in shipping, hunting, and fishing or military aviation. 
97 World Law Group (2016): 125. 
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7.3. Whistleblowing agencies: tasks and institutional characteristics 
Although there are some good examples in Norway of how the private sector deals with whistleblowers 
– in terms of providing safe, anonymous internal whistleblowing channels – there is no agency that 
coordinates the implementation of the whistleblowing legislation. There is neither a central agency 
where whistleblowers are advised about the decision to report or can obtain legal support. There is also 
no central agency that investigates wrongdoing that is reported. The only two institutions that are 
available for whistleblowers are courts, where protection against reprisal can be claimed, and a 
psychosocial care clinic, funded by the Ministry of Health, that since 2012 treats whistleblowers who 
have suffered retaliation. There are no figures available for the number of whistleblowers who have 
gone to court. The clinic has already helped more than 200 whistleblowers in the past six years. 
Nevertheless chances are it will be closed down. While the official reason is money-related, an 
interviewee explains that another reason could be that the government may feel uncomfortable to have 
such a clinic, because it seems to be a symptom of a culture that is against whistleblowers and freedom 
of speech. 
The legislative committee considers to advise the involvement of two different agencies for advisory 
and investigatory tasks. The Labour Inspection could be given a formal role in whistleblowing, given 
its experience in dealing with employer-employee disputes. In that case, an interviewee argues, the 
agency should be given more tools for mediation and for encouraging employers to fulfill the 
requirements concerning internal whistleblowing in the law. For the investigation of wrongdoing in the 
public sector, the committee is discussing the possibility to making the Ombudsman responsible for 
dealing with whistleblower cases in addition to citizen complaints. Given its focus on administrative 
investigations, the Ombudsman would have to obtain specific investigatory expertise. 
7.4. Whistleblower protection and incentives 
In Norway, retaliation against whistleblowers is prohibited by law. This applies to all types of 
whistleblowing (both internally and externally, including going public). Whistleblowers can go to court 
in the case of perceived retaliation. Because of a divided burden of proof, the employee needs to prove 
that there was an act of retaliation, while the employer needs to prove that the action against the 
employee was not linked to whistleblowing. The English translation of the WEA formulates it as such: 
“If the employee submits information that gives reason that retaliation in breach of the first or second 
sentence has taken place, it shall be assumed that such retaliation has taken place unless the employer 
or hirer substantiates otherwise,” which shows that this principle is very much in favor of 
whistleblowers’ interests. When retaliation has been established, compensation can be granted by the 
court, if it is considered reasonable, “irrespective of the fault of the employer” (Trygstad et al., 2017: 
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21). The legislative committee considers two important revisions in this respect. First, it will probably 
advise a burden of proof that lies entirely on the employer, because documenting the act of retaliation 
is easy in some cases, such as job loss, but not in other, like harassment or bullying because there may 
be no witnesses available. For this reason, it is often considered too difficult for whistleblowers to win 
a case in court (BjØrkelo, 2017). Second, given the long duration of these court procedures, which are 
particularly hard for whistleblowers, the committee is considering to advise other resolution 
mechanisms besides court. 
In addition to court protection, the confidentiality clause that has been added to the WEA recently for 
“any person who performs work or services for the body receiving such notification” (while before the 
duty of confidentiality only applied to the Labour Inspection) can be considered a protective measure 
for whistleblowers. 
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8.  REPUBLIC OF KOREA  
 
Figure 15. Infographics whistleblowing arrangements in Republic of Korea98 
8.1. Cultural and legal context 
The Republic of Korea has been intensifying its anti-corruption efforts since the end of the 1990s, in an 
attempt to break the influence of the chaebol – diversified conglomerates that maintained close 
                                                     
98 We relied on 1 local respondent and the following documents: 
Act on the prevention of corruption and the establishment and management of the anti-corruption and civil rights 
commission. Act nr 12844, 19 November 2014. 
Protection of public interest reporters act. Act nr 13443, 24 July 2015. 
ACRC (2017). ACRC Annual report 2016. Anti-Corruption & Civil Rights Commission. 
Sang-Hun, C. (2016). South Korea’s whistle-blowers sound off at their own risk. New York Times. Accessed on 
03-07-2018: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/09/business/international/south-korea-whistle-blower-
corruption.html 
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relationships with politicians. During the 1990s there were more than 30 mediatised whistleblowing 
cases from different sectors including the military, police, private schools, Bank of Korea, aviation, 
government contracts, etc. A survey with a small sample of public officials carried out in 1999 (before 
whistleblowing legislation was enacted) showed that although many felt that whistleblowing created 
mistrust within an organisation, the majority nevertheless indicated they would blow the whistle if they 
uncovered corruption.  
Legislation related to the protection of whistleblowing dates back to 2001, but there have been a number 
of changes since. Currently two pieces of legislation are important: for the public sector this is the Act 
on the Prevention of Corruption and the Establishment of the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights 
Commission (ACRC) (Act 12844 initially passed in 2001, amended a number of times, most recent 
amendment in 2014), and for the private sector the Protection of Public Interest Reporters Act (Act 
13443 initially passed in 2011, amended in 2015). 
8.2. Definition of whistleblowing and target groups 
The private sector whistleblowing legislation covers anyone who makes a report to an investigative 
agency, the ACRC, or anyone else deemed necessary to prevent or stop the wrongdoing, about conducts 
detrimental to 1) the health and safety of the people, 2) the environment,  and 3) the interests of 
consumers and fair competition. 
The legislation for the public sector covers anyone who reports an act of corruption to ACRC about: 1) 
an act of any public official abusing his/her position or authority or violating statutes in connection with 
his/her duties to seek gains for himself/herself or any third party, 2) an act of inflicting damages on the 
property of any public institution in violation of statutes, in the process of executing the budget of the 
relevant public institution, acquiring, managing, or disposing of the property of the relevant public 
institution, or entering into and executing a contract to which the relevant public institution is a part, 
and 3) the act of coercing, urging, proposing and inducing any act referred to previously or covering it 
up. 
8.3. Whistleblowing agencies: tasks and institutional characteristics 
8.3.1. ACRC 
The ACRC is mandated as the whistleblowing agency through the two mentioned pieces of legislation 
(Acts 12844 and 13443). The ACRC is established under the prime minister, and also comprises of 25 
local ombudsmen.  
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The ACRC is mandated to receive concerns, making recommendations and do follow-up, mediate 
conflicts. It is also mandated to carry out prevention and awareness raising and training with regard to 
anti-corruption and whistleblowing. In practice the ACRC does not provide advice but is mainly 
preoccupied with triaging the received whistleblower concerns and referring these to the appropriate 
regulators for investigation. These regulators must send their findings back to the ACRC, which then 
makes a recommendation. 
There is a perception that the ACRC uses its mandate too narrowly, and generally lacks power. The 
ACRC lacks statutory authority to directly investigate corruption and retaliation that a whistleblower 
reported. It refers these reports to the agencies designated by the law for investigation. The ACRC is 
perceived as bureaucratic and slow. Although there is a time limit of 60 days between the receipt of a 
whistleblower concern and a recommendation, very often reasons are found to prolong that. 
Nevertheless, according to the law the ACRC can request documents, interview people, and carry out 
on-site verifications. It can also request cooperation of administrative agencies (e.g., the National 
Human Rights Commission or corporations) that aim to remedy any violation of civil rights and 
enhancement of social justice and public interests. 
8.3.2. NGOs 
A number of NGOs function as watchdog vis-a-vis the ACRC and regulators, and also provide services 
to whistleblowers on a professional basis. The two most important NGOs are the People’s Solidarity 
for Participatory Democracy and the Horuragi Foundation. They coordinate information sharing among 
whistleblowers, organise social events with whistleblowers and their families, and provide financial aid 
(living expenses to whistleblowers). These two NGOs also provide legal aid to whistleblowers (through 
three and five lawyers respectively, who work on a voluntary basis). 
8.4. Whistleblowing protection and incentives 
Under the public sector legislation, the ACRC received 3.758 reports in 2016. Between 2002 and 2016 
it received 40.517 reports. It had closed 40.366 by the end of 2016. Of these, 1.891 cases were referred 
to investigative agencies (4.7%).  
Of the 1.891 cases that were sent for investigation, findings were received for 1.470 cases, which led to 
1.053 cases where acts of corruption were confirmed (71.6%). Of the 1.891 cases sent to regulators, a 
bit more than half came from whistleblowers (i.e., public sector workers). Of the whistleblower reports, 
74.2% led to confirmed corruption offences, allowing the recovery of 82.1% (KWR 625 billion) of the 
total recoverable amount. 
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Under the private sector legislation, the ACRC received 2.611 reports in 2016: 937 health, 377 safety, 
149 consumer interests, 69 fair competition, 847 other. Around 62% are referred for investigation. 
Whistleblowers can request the ACRC to investigate retaliation. The ACRC can make a decision on 
reinstatement, cancellation of retaliatory decisions, and damages to be paid to the whistleblower. There 
is a fine for not complying which such orders. There is a relief fund to compensate whistleblowers for 
the costs that they made. 
In terms of protection under the public sector legislation, between 2008 and 2016 the ACRC received 
130 requests for guarantee of employment. In 43 cases (33%) an employment guarantee was given. A 
total of KWR 35.5 million was imposed in penalties on 8 cases in which whistleblower protection 
regulations had been violated. There were also 19 requests for physical protection, and 16 requests with 
regard to breach of confidentiality. 
Under the private sector legislation, between 2011 and 2016 a total of 87 requests for whistleblower 
protection had been made to the ACRC. By 2016, 80 cases had been closed and 7 were ongoing. For 
the year 2016 this means: 12 asked for protective measures (5 were approved), 2 asked for physical 
protection (1 was approved), 4 asked for protection of confidentiality (1 was approved), and 2 asked for 
prohibition of disadvantageous measures. 
Apart from a relief fund, the ACRC also provides financial rewards. Between 2012 and 2016 a total of 
6.088 cases were managed: 614 were dismissed, 1.479 were concluded without reward, and 3.995 cases 
with reward. The total amount paid in rewards was KWR 2.63 billion. Estimated benefits incurred from 
these cases was KWR 13.9 billion. 
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9.  SERBI A  
 
Figure 16. Infographics whistleblowing arrangements in Serbia99 
9.1. Cultural and legal context 
The Serbian government adopted the Whistleblower Protection Act (WBPA) in 2014, that became 
applicable in June 2015. It was drafted by a multidisciplinary working group, with members of the 
                                                     
99 We relied on 2 local respondents and the following documents: 
Jahic, D. & Stojanovic, M. (2017). Justice Delayed – Justice Denied? Accessed on 22-01-18: https://see-
whistleblowing.org/justice-delayed-justice-denied 
English translation WBPA (2014). Law on the Protection of Whistleblowers. 
Schonherr (2015). Serbia: Long-anticipated Act on Protection of Whistleblowers is finally adopted. Accessed on 
22-01-18: https://www.schoenherr.eu/publications/publications-detail/serbia-long-anticipated-act-on-protection-
of-whistleblowers-is-finally-adopted 
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judiciary, NGOs (from Serbia and abroad), governmental institutions, trade unions, and whistleblowers. 
It is consistent with international best practices (Devine, 2016), given its broad scope and many different 
aspects of protection it provides. Protection is granted for internal and external reporting, which can be 
done simultaneously, and external reporting also includes reports to the public (e.g., media).  
However, implementation of the WBPA is challenging, because in Serbia, an interviewee explained, 
citizens tend to have a general mistrust towards government. People are not used to seeking protection 
from public institutions.100 This can partly be explained by the judicial system having been controlled 
by the executive in the past; the system seemed to focus on protecting the state from citizens instead of 
citizens from the state. Although a separation of power has been institutionalized, citizens still need to 
learn to trust the courts. Initiatives like the WBPA and articles published by the NGO Pistaljka – which 
means ‘The whistle’ in Serbian – (see below) about its implementation are said to have increased 
citizens’ trust. Also towards labour unions there seems to be a general mistrust, probably because these 
were likewise influenced by the executive in the past, and because their role was never to protect 
employees. Although they were involved in drafting the law, an interviewee explains that labour unions 
not having a role in the implementation of the law is a missed opportunity to reestablish trust of citizens 
in the Serbian government. Pistaljka works on restoring the power of trade unions in Serbia. 
9.2. Definition of whistleblowing and target groups 
The WBPA provides protection for whistleblowers who are employed in the public and private sector. 
Employment is defined broadly, including full time employment, work outside employment, 
volunteering, official duty and factual work performed for an employer. The protection is, in addition, 
also granted to the following individuals who have been exposed to adverse action, 1) whistleblowers’ 
affiliates, 2) individuals who were mistakenly marked as whistleblowers, 3) individuals who have 
disclosed information while performing official duties, and 4) individuals who have requested to be 
provided with the information that has been disclosed. The type of wrongdoing that can be reported is 
also quite broad (albeit not as broad as in Norway where for example negative culture can also be 
reported, see above), including the infringement of legislation, violation of human rights, exercise of 
public authority in contravention of the purpose it was granted, danger to life, public health, safety, and 
the environment, or disclosures with the aim to prevent large-scale damage. 
  
                                                     
100 See for example: https://see-whistleblowing.org/justice-delayed-justice-denied 
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9.3. Whistleblowing agencies: tasks and institutional characteristics 
With the installation of the WBPA in Serbia, no specific whistleblowing agency has been established. 
An interviewee explains that by referring to the austerity policy. The implementation of the law was 
not supposed to cost any extra money for the Ministry of Justice. This policy also explains why the right 
of psychosocial assistance could not be included in the law. The main actors involved in whistleblowing 
cases are courts, the NGO Pistaljka and other agencies which are to a smaller extent involved in 
whistleblowing cases. Each of these will be briefly described below. 
9.3.1. Courts 
Whistleblowers can go to court in the case of alleged retaliation. Although courts can investigate both 
the wrongdoing and the reprisal, they focus on the latter. In theory, courts have to deal with these cases 
within eight days, but that is not considered feasible in practice. On average a case is dealt with in 20-
25 days, which is considered acceptable. Since the installation of the law, 443 whistleblowing cases 
have been dealt with in Serbian courts, as registered by the Supreme Court. Court statistics show that 
the number of cases in basic and high courts has dropped in 2017101, which an interviewee explains by 
some whistleblowing cases being labelled as general labour disputes. Among these cases, there were 
two cases in which persons associated with whistleblowers were protected, being a spouse of a 
whistleblower and a friend/colleague of a whistleblower) and one case in which a nurse who asked for 
information about a whistleblowing case was protected after she experienced retaliation. The 
expectation is that the number of cases will increase because more and more lawyers tend to give their 
clients the advice to file a whistleblowing retaliation suit to court. 
9.3.2. Pistaljka 
Implementation of the law has been given an important boost by initiatives of Pistaljka, several 
interviewees explain. Pistaljka is an NGO that started seven years ago by journalists who blew the 
whistle because the government was controlling newspapers. This NGO – which has been granted 
funding from several Western countries (including the Netherlands and the USA), the European Union, 
and to a smaller degree from Serbia – has an important role in giving advice to whistleblowers, 
investigating wrongdoing, prevention and training. Focus of Pistaljka is on giving advice to 
whistleblowers. The seven lawyers of Pistaljka provide free legal advice and represent whistleblowers 
in court. Individuals can call the helpline of Pistaljka if they consider to file a law suit or have done so. 
The lawyers often have long conversations (4-5 hours) with whistleblowers to understand what they 
                                                     
101 See: https://see-whistleblowing.org/justice-delayed-justice-denied 
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want to achieve by blowing the whistle, and to gain their trust which is considered very important. The 
NGO employs seven investigative journalists who investigate wrongdoing on the basis of tips from 
whistleblowers or other sources of information about alleged wrongdoing in organisations. To not 
expose the identity of the whistleblower, they start their investigation on the basis of a general 
information request in the respective organisation. If wrongdoing is discovered, they publish articles 
about it. An interviewee explains that if in particular cases their investigatory and advisory tasks conflict 
(e.g., if the public prosecutor does not want information given to lawyers being published), the agency 
gives priority to its advisory task, because finding the perpetrator is considered more important than 
publishing articles. 
Pistaljka also has an important role in training lawyers and judges to deal with whistleblowing cases, 
which was shown to be necessary after start-up problems in the beginning (e.g., judges who did not 
understand the idea of reversed burden of proof). Judges even need a certificate to treat such cases, 
which they receive after having been trained by this NGO. The commitment of the president of the 
Supreme Court in these trainings is, according to an interviewee, very important for their success. These 
trainings have helped to overcome initial resistance among judges to take whistleblowing cases and 
start-up problems with strange rulings due to a lack of legislative knowledge and experience with 
whistleblowing cases among judges. The prevention task of Pistaljka furthermore includes giving ad 
hoc advice to employers who asked them questions about the WBPA, but the agency is considering to 
increase its role in prevention by advising employers in ethics management and being a knowledge 
center on whistleblowing. 
9.3.3. Other agencies involved in whistleblowing 
The Serbian anti-corruption agency has a limited role in the investigation of wrongdoing reported by 
full-time employees in the public sector, but they only have a narrow task, dealing with corruption cases 
only. Under an earlier by-law, this agency was to provide some protection for these whistleblowers, but 
it did not work well in practice, mainly because there were no legal instruments for guaranteeing 
protection and the lack of communication by the agency to whistleblowers about its tasks. Moreover, 
the law considered unconstitutional and therefore abolished. The agency did not want to be involved in 
the working group drafting the new law. 
The Labour Inspectorate in Serbia can fine employers for not having a whistleblowing policy, but has 
no role in investigating whistleblowing cases or providing advice. Nevertheless, an interviewee explains 
that it is worth exploring a larger role for the Labour Inspectorate in dealing with whistleblowing cases, 
because it is responsible for all employers in all sectors, and can more easily enforce measures than 
other agencies.  
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9.4. Whistleblower protection and incentives 
The WBPA defines ‘damaging action’ in a very broad way, implying any action or omission in relation 
to whistleblowers which violates or infringes the right of a whistleblower or persons entitled to 
protection as a whistleblower, or which puts such persons at a disadvantage. In addition, very specific 
areas are identified in which people could be disadvantaged as a result of whistleblowing or being 
associated with a whistleblowing, but this list is not exhaustive: 
 hiring procedure; 
 obtaining the status of an intern or volunteer; 
 work outside of formal employment; 
 education, training, or professional development; 
 promotion at work, being evaluated, obtaining or losing a professional title; 
  disciplinary measures and penalties; 
 working conditions; 
 termination of employment; 
 salary and other forms of remuneration; 
 share in the profits of the employer; 
 disbursement of bonuses or incentivizing severance payments; 
 allocation of duties or transfer to other positions; 
 failing to take measures to provide protection from harassment by other persons; 
 mandatory medical examinations or examinations to establish fitness for work. 
The burden of proof is on the defendant; a whistleblower only has to make it probable that retaliation 
is the result of whistleblowing, which is conform international best practices. Even though protection 
can only be provided after a law suit in court, there is attention for prevention as well, because 
employers can be given a fine if they don’t have an internal whistleblowing procedure. Moreover, the 
whistleblower’s identity is (as far as possible) protected during the court procedure as to prevent 
reprisals. Remedies for reprisals against whistleblower include reinstatement, as well as compensation 
for damages of honour, reputation and even endured fear. Experiences of whistleblowers are positive, 
and more and more they are being supported within their organisation after being reinstated. The option 
of interim relief, which implies that the current situation will remain the same until a case is decided 
(e.g., dismissed whistleblower can stay in his position) – also strengthens the protection of 
whistleblowers. An interviewee explains that “it stops the bleeding” for whistleblowers. In the first six 
months after installation of the law already 26 people were protected in this way. 
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However, some elements limit the offered protection. First, because the key element of the law is 
protection from retaliation and not investigation, the protection is only limited, because real protection 
implies that the perpetrators are found and stopped. Second, the overly wide definition of ‘classified 
information’ limits protection. If employers consider something classified, a whistleblower cannot 
report on it. An interviewee argues that ‘classified information’ should be narrowed to national security 
issues. 
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10.  UNITED KING DOM  
 
Figure 17. Infographics whistleblowing arrangements in United Kingdom102 
  
                                                     
102 We relied on 2 local respondents and the following documents: 
CQC (2017). Annual report and accounts 2016/17. Care Quality Commission. 
FCA (2015). Whistleblowing in deposit-takers, PRA-designated investment firms and insurers. Policy Statement 
PS15/24. Financial Conduct Authority. 
FCA (2017). Annual report and accounts 2016/17. Financial Conduct Authority. 
NAO (2015). The role of prescribed persons. Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General. National Audit 
Office.  
National Guardian (2017). Southport and Ormskirk Hospital NHS Trust. A case review of speaking up processes, 
policies and culture. National Guardian’s Office. 
PCAW (2015). Is the law protecting whistleblowers? Public Concern at Work. 
PCAW (2013). Whistleblowing - The inside story. Public Concern at Work / University of Greenwich. 
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10.1. Cultural and legal context 
Research carried out by University of Greenwich in 2012 found that the public’s attitudes towards 
whistleblowing were comparable to those of Australia. Public Concern at Work’s biannual survey in 
2015 saw a 7% drop in negative outcomes for whistleblowers. They also found 81% of the population 
willing to raise a concern (slightly downward trend) and 59% had actually raised a concern (also slightly 
downward trend). The awareness of the whistleblowing legislation was 33% (slightly upward trend). 
The most well-known whistleblower cases in the UK involve the National Health Service, or the 
financial services sector. 
The UK Parliament passed the Public Interest Disclosure Act in 1998. This whistleblowing legislation 
was implemented through the Employment Relations Act in 1999. In 2013 it was amended to remove 
a ‘good faith’ test, and substitute this for a ‘public interest test’. This test was introduced to prevent the 
whistleblowing legislation to be used for personal grievances about one’s own employment contract. In 
2017, in Chesterton Global Limited -v- Nurmohamed, the Court of Appeal sided with the Employment 
Tribunal and the Employment Appeal Tribunal. This is considered a landmark case with regard to the 
new ‘public interest test’. The Court of Appeal ruled that N, an office manager of an estate agent, in his 
disclosure of C’s deliberate manipulation of his account to justify decisions over pay, to the detriment 
of himself and of more than 100 other office managers, had indeed acted with the reasonable belief that 
this disclosure was in the public interest. The Court of Appeal did, however, not agree with the argument 
made earlier that a disclosure is automatically in the public interest when more than one person is 
harmed. Instead, the Court of Appeal considers that four factors are important: 1) number of affected 
employees, 2) nature of the interest affected (directly vs. indirectly affected, and important interest vs. 
trivial wrongdoing), 3) nature of the wrongdoing (deliberate vs. inadvertently), and 4) identity of the 
wrongdoer (size and prominence of the employer). 
Nevertheless, the law remains focused on retaliation only. In fact, PIDA can only compensate a worker 
for retaliation, rather than proactively stopping it at source. 
10.2. Definition of whistleblowing and target groups 
Whistleblowing is the disclosure of information about: 1) criminal offence, 2) failure to comply with 
legal obligation, 3) miscarriage of justice, 4) health and safety of individuals, 5) environmental damage, 
and 6) cover-up of previous. 
The legislation covers both public and private sector workers (wider than employees). Within the 
National Health Service, student nurses are also covered by PIDA. 
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There are no requirements for organisations to have internal whistleblowing policies, except for 
organisations regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority and organisations within the National 
Health Service. The law does not provide for sanctions against those who retaliate, nor for breaches of 
confidentiality. 
10.3. Whistleblowing agencies: tasks and institutional characteristics 
The law does not create a dedicated whistleblowing agency. It does provide for a list of prescribed 
persons as second tier recipients (mainly regulators, but MPs were added to the list in 2013). The law 
uses the 3-tiered model and requires the whistleblowers to have good reasons to jump levels, but in 
some cases courts have ruled that whistleblowing to a media outlet or a campaigning group was 
reasonable, and hence a protected disclosure. 
10.3.1. Employment Tribunals 
Protection must be sought through Employment Tribunals. However, these will only consider the 
concern about wrongdoing in a technical sense, i.e., to test whether it qualifies as a public interest 
disclosure, for the purpose of post detriment compensation. For whistleblowers who win their case in 
an Employment Tribunal, this does not mean that the wrongdoing they disclosed will be investigated 
or corrected. Investigation of the alleged wrongdoing is a matter for the regulators. In 2015 the National 
Audit Office did an audit of the bodies named as prescribed persons under PIDA. The results were 
appalling. Staff working for these ‘prescribed person’ bodies often were unaware they were mandated 
as a recipient of whistleblower concerns. As a result of this report, regulators have to publish the number 
of cases brought by whistleblowers in their annual reports. 
10.3.2. NGOs 
A number of NGOs provide advice and support for whistleblowers, as well as perform a watchdog 
function vis-a-vis regulators (especially in the health sector) and Employment Tribunals. Of those who 
do so on a professional basis, the longest standing one is Public Concern at Work (since 2003), which 
has legal privilege and gives free advice to whistleblowers with regard to raising concerns internally, 
when and how to blow the whistle externally, and PIDA. Public Concern at Work also advises 
organisations on internal whistleblowing arrangements, provides training. Public Concern at Work is 
funded through contracts with employers and professional bodies, who receive training and promotion 
packages to announce Public Concern at Work internally as advisors to employees who want to raise a 
concern. Public Concern at Work finds that whistleblowers seek advice too late, when they already start 
to experience reprisals. A relatively new NGO is WhistleblowersUK, who provide advice and psycho-
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social support to whistleblowers. WhistleblowersUK has considerably professionalized over the past 
few years, but still runs mainly on volunteering. 
10.3.3. Whistleblowing agency for NHS 
A whistleblowing agency specifically for the National Health Service (NHS) was created in 2016, in 
response to two subsequent review reports led by Sir Robert Francis about whistleblowing culture in 
the NHS. This agency is called the National Guardian for the NHS. In addition, each NHS Trust is 
required to have its own Speak-Up Guardian. The whistleblower community has huge expectations with 
regard to the National Guardian for the NHS, and many have already expressed their disappointment. 
However, the National Guardian sees its function as enhancing and monitoring whistleblowing culture 
(their preferred term is speak-up) in the NHS Trusts. It provides awareness raising and training, and 
supports inter-vision between Guardians at Trust level. It has also started to publish review reports of 
speak-up cultures in specific Trusts. These reports include recommendations and requirements with a 
set deadline. The National Guardian is appointed by the health minister and publicly financed through 
the Care Quality Commission (CQC), which is a regulator for the health sector. Some see this as a 
reason to question its independence. 
10.3.4. Regulators 
Regulators in general are often perceived to have their hand tied in the sense that they cannot offer 
protection, and rarely start an investigation based on whistleblower disclosures alone. This creates the 
impression that regulators are unresponsive. 
10.4. Whistleblowing protection and incentives 
Whistleblowers may receive compensation for damages through Employment Tribunals. There is 
currently no reward scheme for whistleblowers but the Financial Conduct Authority has announced a 
review of its position on this. 
On average, Public Concern at Work has interactions with 800 whistleblowers a year. The Care Quality 
Commission (health care sector regulator) received 7.433 whistleblower concerns in 2016, which is 
10% of all matters raised with that regulator. The Financial Conduct Authority received 900 
whistleblower concerns in 2016 (in 2014 a peak was noted of 1.340 concerns). Of these 1.5% 
contributed directly to immediate FCA action, 34% was of significant value, 55% was of possible value 
but not currently actionable. 
In terms of protection, of 2.969 ET judgements on whistleblower cases between 2011 and 2013, 1.107 
(37%) won their case. Of all PIDA claims disposed with the Employment Tribunal, around 70% are 
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withdrawn or settled before they are heard. Between 2013 and 2016 a fee had to be paid in order to 
bring a case at Employment Tribunal. This caused PIDA claims to fall by 73%. Since 2017 this is no 
longer the case. Research updating the figures on Employment Tribunal judgements on whistleblower 
cases is currently being carried out by the University of Greenwich. 
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11.  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
 
Figure 18. Infographics whistleblowing arrangements in USA103 
                                                     
103 We relied on 2 local respondents, published scientific articles (as shown in the reference list), and the following 
documents: 
Devine, T. (2009). Testimony of Thomas Devine. Government Accountability Project before the Subcommittee 
on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, on S. 372 The Whistleblower Protection 
Enhancement Act of 2009. 
Devine, T. (2016). International Best Practices for Whistleblower Policies. Government Accountability Project. 
Devine, T. (2017). Corrected testimony of Thomas Devine. Government Accountability Project before the House 
Oversight and Government Reform Committee, Subcommittee on Federal Workforce, U.S. Postal Service and the 
Census on Whistleblower protection since passage of the whistleblower protection enhancement Act. 
Dodd-Frank Act (2010). Subtitle B—Increasing Regulatory Enforcement and Remedies. Sec. 922. Whistleblower 
Protection. 
Government Accountability Project (2016). Why Whistleblowers Wait: Recommendations to Improve the Dodd-
Frank Law’s SEC Whistleblower Awards Program. 
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11.1. Cultural and legal context 
The past decades have seen an increase in acceptance of whistleblowing in the American society in 
general, as among managers in the public sector. An interviewee speaks of a cultural revolution, which 
has resulted in high political support for whistleblowers. It is, according to this interviewee, even 
considered political suicide to oppose whistleblowing. Whistleblowing protection legislation in the 
USA is fragmented, but inclusive. There is a patchwork of 50 laws for employees in the private sector 
and ten laws for federal public sector employees, and other specific regulations for states and local level 
public employees. This results in an incoherent and complex legal framework for which specialist 
lawyers are needed to represent whistleblowers. An interviewee explains that the positive side of this is 
that whistleblowers often have different agencies they can go to in the case of reprisal; they thus have 
different options to seek relief.  
While the protection offered in most laws looks good on paper, their success in practice has, according 
to Tom Devine of the whistleblower protection organisation Government Accountability Project (GAP) 
“failed to provide more than anecdotal success.”.104 Nevertheless, GAP also claims that whistleblowers 
have never had more impact than ever in the history of the USA, in domains like climate change, civil 
fraud in government contracting and the prevention of terrorist attacks after 9/11, etc. This study focuses 
on the WPEA or Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (2012) for federal public employees, 
which is an amendment of the WPA or Whistleblower Protection Act (1989), and the Dodd-Frank Act 
(2010) for everyone who reports to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). These laws were 
selected because of the comparability of the agencies implementing it with the Dutch Whistleblowers 
Authority. 
  
                                                     
Government Accountability Project (2012). House passes Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Ac (S. 743). 
Accessed on 22-01-18: https://www.whistleblower.org/press/house-passes-federal-whistleblower-protections-
wpea-s-743. 
Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (2016). Examining whistleblower rule compliance. 
OSC (2017). Annual report to Congress for fiscal year 2016. Office of Special Counsel. 
SEC (2017). Annual report to Congress. Whistleblower Program. Securities and Exchange Commission. 
SEC (2017). Agency Financial Report. Securities and Exchange Commission. 
104 Devine, T. (2017). Corrected testimony of Thomas Devine. Government Accountability Project before the 
House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, Subcommittee on Federal Workforce, U.S. Postal Service 
and the Census on Whistleblower protection since passage of the whistleblower protection enhancement Act: 23. 
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11.2. Definition of whistleblowing and target groups 
The WPEA protects all federal employees, former employees, and applicants for employment who 
claim that they have been subjected to personnel actions because they made whistleblowing disclosures. 
However, protection is absent or weak for intelligence agency employees, military, congress and 
employees in the judiciary. The Dodd-Frank act protects all individuals who report (possible) violations 
of federal securities laws to the SEC. 
The WPEA has a broad scope in terms of types of wrongdoing that can be reported, including (1) any 
violation of any law, rule, or regulation; or (2) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse 
of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety (section 102, WPEA). Under 
the WPEA, federal employees are protected if they report such types of wrongdoing to an agency 
supervisor (internal reporting: first tier), to the Office of Special Counsel and the Inspector General 
(external reporting: second tier), but also to other organisations like a congressional committee or the 
media105 (external reporting: third tier). 
Under the Dodd-Frank Act, protection is limited for reporting wrongdoing to the SEC that concerns 
possible violations of the federal securities laws. According to the website of the Office of the 
Whistleblower106 these violations for example include: 
 Ponzi scheme, Pyramid Scheme, or a High-Yield Investment Program; 
 Theft or misappropriation of funds or securities; 
 Manipulation of a security’s price or volume; 
 Insider trading; 
 Fraudulent or unregistered securities offering; 
 False or misleading statements about a company (including false or misleading SEC reports or 
financial statements); 
 Abusive naked short selling; 
 Bribery of, or improper payments to, foreign officials; 
 Fraudulent conduct associated with municipal securities transactions or public pension plans; 
 Other fraudulent conduct involving securities.  
                                                     
105 In the case of third tier reporting under the WPEA, the disclosure should not be “specifically prohibited by law 
and the information does not have to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign affairs” 
(https://www.nrc.gov/insp-gen/whistleblower.html) 
106 See: https://www.sec.gov/whistleblower/frequently-asked-questions#faq-2 
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11.3. Whistleblowing agencies: tasks and institutional characteristics 
Several agencies are in the USA involved in whistleblowing protection and investigation. This part first 
describes agencies that have an important role in the implementation of on the one hand the WPEA, 
being the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) and the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), and on 
the other the Dodd-Frank Act, being the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). Then the NGO 
Government Accountability Project (GAP) will be described, which has the overall mission to protect 
employees who blow the whistle. 
11.3.1. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) 
The OSC employs 155 FTE employees who are personnel management specialists, investigators or 
attorneys and has a budget of approx. 25.000.000 dollar a year. The agency is authorized to investigate 
and prosecute alleged reprisals against whistleblowers in the federal public sector. During this 
investigation federal employees must cooperate and provide testimony, information, and documents. 
Their agencies must make employees available to testify, on official time, and to provide information, 
which is protected from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, and will thus remain 
confidential.107 If necessary, the OSC may issue subpoenas for documents or the attendance and 
testimony of employees. During an investigation, the OSC may also require employees and others to 
testify under oath, sign written statements, or respond formally to written questions. Based on their 
investigation the agency can seek corrective action, which is an action that corrects what happened to 
the employee or applicant108, and monitor implementation of corrective action commitments. It can also 
take disciplinary action, which is an action that penalizes the federal official(s) who committed the 
reprisal109. Interestingly, most of these actions are taken in an informal, rather than a formal way. In 
                                                     
107 Only in a limited number of cases where the OSC determines that a violation has occurred, the OSC may 
include the information gathered in an investigation in a report to the investigated agency, the MSPB, or the Office 
of Personnel Management. 
108 “Corrective action typically means that OSC seeks to place an employee or applicant in the position he or she 
would have occupied if no wrongdoing occurred. For example, an employee suspended for prohibited reasons 
would receive his or her back pay and related benefits, with interest, and a clean record. Corrective action can also 
include attorneys’ fees, as well as other reasonable and foreseeable costs. The law requires that OSC give the 
federal agency the opportunity to correct a PPP before filing a complaint with the MSPB.” 
(https://osc.gov/Pages/ppp-ourprocess.aspx)  
109 “OSC also has the authority to request that the MSPB discipline federal officials who committed PPPs. The 
law allows the Special Counsel to decide which cases are most appropriate for disciplinary action. Penalties for 
committing a PPP include removal, reduction in grade (demotion), debarment from federal employment for up to 
five years, suspension, reprimand, a fine of up to $1,000, or some combination of these penalties. Federal officials 
accused of committing a PPP in a disciplinary case have certain rights which can be found at 5 C.F.R. Part 1201, 
Subpart D.” (https://osc.gov/Pages/ppp-ourprocess.aspx) 
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2016, the OSC has taken corrective actions against prohibited personnel practices in 216 cases (mostly 
informal), which included 174 whistleblower complaints. On average 5,5% of whistleblowers who file 
a complaint for alleged reprisal, obtain some corrective action, which seems rather low but is high 
compared to remedial agencies in the private sector and the military remedial agencies.110 Since 2011, 
the agency has taken 84 informal and 3 formal disciplinary actions. 
The OSC does not investigate the wrongdoing, but refers the report to the organisation that needs to 
conduct this investigation, which is the head of the department that is involved. This is, however, 
challenging in practice, because of lack of cooperation or even obstruction by these agencies, and 
passive resistance through long delays (while reports should be turned in within 60 days, these agencies 
take on average 387 days).111 The mediation unit of the OSC can also seek reconciliation between 
employee and employer, and has according to GAP been very successful in doing so with 80% success 
rate, compared to an average of 25-30% in private sector lawsuits.112 There is a ‘Chinese wall’ between 
the mediation unit and the investigative unit, implying that they are not allowed to discuss specific 
cases. 
The OSC also trains agencies in implementing the legislation and their responsibilities in it. While the 
agency’s trainings had a bad reputation in the past, given that “agency leaders [were taught] how to fire 
whistleblowers with impunity, even tutoring federal managers when necessary” (Devine, 1999: 534), it 
is now said to have “displayed unqualified commitment to the WPEA’s goals”.113 
11.3.2. Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) 
Federal public employees who believe they have experienced Prohibited Personnel Practices (PPP) have 
the right to appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), which is an independent government 
agency that functions like a court. It has authority to investigate allegations of PPP and determine 
whether corrective action is needed. Reprisal against whistleblowers is explicitly included in these 
                                                     
110 Devine, T. (2017). Corrected testimony of Thomas Devine. Government Accountability Project before the 
House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, Subcommittee on Federal Workforce, U.S. Postal Service 
and the Census on Whistleblower protection since passage of the whistleblower protection enhancement Act. 
111 Devine, T. (2017). Corrected testimony of Thomas Devine. Government Accountability Project before the 
House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, Subcommittee on Federal Workforce, U.S. Postal Service 
and the Census on Whistleblower protection since passage of the whistleblower protection enhancement Act. 
112 Devine, T. (2017). Corrected testimony of Thomas Devine. Government Accountability Project before the 
House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, Subcommittee on Federal Workforce, U.S. Postal Service 
and the Census on Whistleblower protection since passage of the whistleblower protection enhancement Act. 
113 Devine, T. (2017). Corrected testimony of Thomas Devine. Government Accountability Project before the 
House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, Subcommittee on Federal Workforce, U.S. Postal Service 
and the Census on Whistleblower protection since passage of the whistleblower protection enhancement Act: 6. 
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PPP’s.114 Federal public sector whistleblowers who experienced reprisals first have to seek corrective 
action from the OSC (see above), and if the OSC does not seek corrective action on their behalf, they 
can appeal to the Board. After acceptance of the case, an administrative judge will be appointed. Then 
the agency which is accused of the PPP is sent the request to explain its reason for taking the PPP and 
document it. When the MSPB has received this information, the parties are asked to file their pleadings, 
which is most often followed by one or more status hearings during which parties are encouraged to 
settle their dispute. If no settlement can be achieved, the administrative judge may decide to have a 
formal hearing after which the decision will be taken or can immediately take a decision based on the 
available information. If this initial decision is contested by one of the parties, a petition for review may 
be filed, after which three board members will hear the case and make a final decision.115 Based on the 
investigation, an administrative judge of the MSPB can take corrective action or disciplinary action 
against the individual who committed the PPP, ranging from reprimand to removal, debarment from 
federal employment for up to five years, or an assessment of a civil penalty up to 1.000 dollar. The OSC 
may also ask the MSPB to take correction or disciplinary action if it is unable to do so itself. It can thus 
be considered a punitive system, where there is no room for advising agencies to deal with 
whistleblowers differently. However, the MSPB has a Mediation Appeals Program (MAP) with trained 
mediators, which offers an alternative to the formal appeal procedure described above. Mediators 
facilitate a discussion between the parties and help them resolve the dispute and settle the case. In such 
cases, not the administrative judge but the parties control the result of the case.116 
Although several revisions have already been made to how the MSPB operates, it still receives severe 
criticism from the NGO GAP (see below), which both the interviewees confirmed. The administrative 
judges are said to show hostility towards the WPEA, which can be illustrated by the 95-98% rulings 
against whistleblowers, and to lack expertise. Further, MSPB judges are said to being prone to informal 
                                                     
114 “Any employee who has authority to take, direct others to take, recommend, or approve any personnel action, 
shall not, with respect to such authority […] take or fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to take, a personnel 
action with respect to any employee or applicant for employment because of any disclosure of information by an 
employee or applicant which the employee or applicant reasonably believes evidences a violation of any law, rule, 
or regulation, or gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific 
danger to public health or safety, if such disclosure is not specifically prohibited by law and if such information 
is not specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or the conduct 
of foreign affairs; or any disclosure to the Special Counsel, or to the Inspector General of an agency or another 
employee designated by the head of the agency to receive such disclosures, of information which the employee 
or applicant reasonably believes evidences a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or gross mismanagement, a 
gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.” 
(https://www.mspb.gov/ppp/ppp.htm) 
115 See: https://www.mspb.org/Procedures-once-an-MSPB-appeal-is-filed.html 
116 See: https://www.mspb.gov/appeals/mediationappeals.htm 
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political pressure. Cases are also often decided on technical procedural grounds, and not on substantive 
claims made by the parties, and because of long delays final decisions are only being taken after three 
to six years, during which whistleblowers are very vulnerable, especially those who have been fired 
because of whistleblowing and have no income during this period.117 
11.3.3. Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) 
The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) employs 4.794 FTE and implements the Dodd-Frank Act 
by screening and investigating tips about corruption and securities laws violations. If a whistleblower 
reports to the SEC, the Office of Market Intelligence first examines the tip to filter out high-quality 
information that warrant the investment of SEC resources (approx. 1.6 billion dollar a year). If an 
investigation is considered necessary, the complaint will be referred to either one of the eleven regional 
offices of the SEC or by a speciality unit.118 SEC investigative personnel can interview witnesses, 
examine brokerage records, review trading data, and may issue subpoenas. Additional evidence is 
collected by surveillance activities, and other sources, like media reports. The SEC can also work 
together with enforcement agencies in the USA and abroad in criminal cases. The findings of the 
investigation are presented to the Commission for review, after which it can be filed in federal court or 
lead to an administrative action. If these acts lead to over a million dollar fine, the whistleblower can 
claim a reward, which is paid by the Investor Protection Fund. However, often the ESC and involved 
agency reach a settlement to avoid trial. The SEC has received over 22.000 tips between 2011 and 2017, 
of which 4.400 in 2017 (which is an increase of nearly 50% since 2012). In the same period 160 million 
dollar award has been granted to 46 individuals (of which 50 million dollar to 12 individuals in 2017). 
Hence, not many whistleblowers actually receive a reward from the SEC, which may lead to 
disappointment and frustration. 
The SEC focuses on investigating wrongdoing, but sometimes also investigates alleged retaliation. The 
Office of the Whistleblower (OWB) monitors such complaints and the ESC can take enforcement acts 
against agencies who violate the anti-retaliation provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act (SEC, 2017). In total, 
the SEC has only taken three anti-retaliation enforcement actions and nine enforcement actions because 
                                                     
117 Devine, T. (2017). Corrected testimony of Thomas Devine. Government Accountability Project before the 
House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, Subcommittee on Federal Workforce, U.S. Postal Service 
and the Census on Whistleblower protection since passage of the whistleblower protection enhancement Act. 
118 See: https://www.sec.gov 
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employers prohibited employees to contact the SEC. Whistleblowers can also file a retaliation 
complaint in federal court.119 
The OWB has a hotline where whistleblowers or would-be whistleblowers, their attorneys or other 
citizens can ask information about the program.120 The hotline is operated by OWB attorneys and 
questions are answered within three business days. In 2017, the hotline received 3.200 phone calls, and 
since May 2011 over 18.600 phone calls have been made. Most calls relate to eligibility criteria for 
awards, confidentiality guarantees, investigative procedure and the appropriateness of the SEC to 
handle a specific tip (SEC, 2017). The OWB also tries to promote public awareness concerning 
whistleblowers, by means of their web page, media interviews, presentations, press releases and 
webinars. 
11.3.4. Government Accountability Project (GAP) 
The Government Accountability Project (GAP) is a non-profit, non-partisan public interest law firm, 
established in 1977 at the Institute for Policy Studies. It employs 23 staff members, including 
investigators, policy analysts, consultants, etc. The agency has an annual budget of approximately 3.1 
million dollar, mainly coming from 10.000 individual donors and foundations such as the CS Fund, the 
Open Society Foundations and Rockefeller Family Fund. It assists whistleblowers, investigates and 
exposes wrongdoing by writing reports about their investigations, and it operates as a knowledge centre 
for whistleblowing policy. Each of these tasks will be described briefly below. First, GAP gives 
informal and legal advice to whistleblowers, and represents them in court. Since 1977, GAP has helped 
whistleblowers in more than 8.000 cases in total. Because the agency cannot represent everyone with 
the current resources, GAP has to be selective about the kind of cases it takes. In many cases, GAP tries 
to find an agreement between employee and employer, because that is in the best interest of the 
whistleblower. Although GAP aims to find win-win solutions for all parties, it is not always considered 
to be independent and fair by employers, being perceived as an institution for whistleblowers. Second, 
the investigative journalists that GAP employs investigate the charges whistleblowers make. The results 
of these investigations are published in articles and reports that are published online. By doing so, the 
agency helps to expose wrongdoing by government agencies to the public. Third, GAP actively 
promotes government and corporate accountability by keeping oversight on agencies to determine 
whether law on paper is implemented in practice. Their studies are presented to congress, and their 
findings often lead to revisions in whistleblowing protection laws. GAP also provides training for 
                                                     
119 See: https://www.sec.gov/whistleblower/retaliation 
120 See: https://www.sec.gov  
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agencies involved in whistleblowing protection and policy advice to agencies about the implementation 
of the several whistleblower protection laws. 
11.4. Whistleblower protection and incentives 
Given the various revisions through the past decades, the WPEA offers strong protection for federal 
public sector employees who blow the whistle. Four strong points will be described briefly. First, as for 
burden of proof the whistleblower only needs to show that whistleblowing was a “contributing factor 
in the personnel action threatened, taken, or not taken” against him121, while the agency needs to 
demonstrate “by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same action in the absence 
of the whistleblowing”, which is more difficult to achieve than the former.122 Second, protection for 
whistleblowers is guaranteed by the option for both corrective action (in terms of for example 
reemployment with the agency, back pay for the months of unemployment, and compensatory damages 
for emotional distress), and disciplinary action against the reprising individual, which has according to 
an interviewee recently led to a paradigm shift among employers from ‘nothing to lose’ to ‘retaliation 
is risky’. Third, like most USA whistleblowing protection laws, the corrective action provisions in the 
WPEA follow the principle to ‘make whole’ damages, because it includes both direct processing and 
attorney costs, and compensation for emotional distress, lost bonuses or raises.123 Fourth, the WPEA 
offers protection of the whistleblower’s identity during investigations. Exceptions are administrative or 
court proceeding and information sharing between agencies for investigative purposes. 
The SEC can also take legal action against employers who have retaliated against whistleblowers, but 
only rarely does so as explained above. Whistleblowers can also go to court to seek double back pay 
(with interest) – which goes beyond the ‘make whole’ principle – reinstatement, reasonable attorneys’ 
fees, and reimbursement for certain costs in connection with the litigation. Additionally, the SEC 
prohibits actions that prevent individuals from reporting to the SEC. Whistleblowers are not only 
protected and facilitated in such ways to blow the whistle, but can also be rewarded for doing so. 
                                                     
121 “You [whistleblower] may demonstrate that whistleblowing was a contributing factor by showing that the 
official taking the action knew about the whistleblowing and that the action occurred within a time period such 
that a reasonable person would conclude that the whistleblowing was a contributing factor in the personnel action.” 
(https://www.mspb.gov) 
122 See: https://www.mspb.gov; Devine, T. (2017). Corrected testimony of Thomas Devine. Government 
Accountability Project before the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, Subcommittee on 
Federal Workforce, U.S. Postal Service and the Census on Whistleblower protection since passage of the 
whistleblower protection enhancement Act. 
123 Government Accountability Project (2016). Why Whistleblowers Wait: Recommendations to Improve the 
Dodd-Frank Law’s SEC Whistleblower Awards Program. 
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Monetary awards can be granted to whistleblowers who have voluntarily provided original information 
that has led to an enforcement action that exceeds 1 million dollar. The reward varies between 10-30% 
of the monetary sanctions collected by the SEC, and whistleblowers need to contact the SEC to make a 
reward request.124 The SEC has discretion to decide whether or not the whistleblower is entitled to 
receive a reward. 
Notwithstanding good protection on paper, whistleblowing protection is still challenging in the USA 
according to interviewees. First, GAP has exposed government agencies that give whistleblowing 
protection agencies the whistleblower treatment if they eagerly try to protect whistleblowers, which 
results in whistleblower protection agencies not being willing to protect whistleblowers as they should. 
Although the situation seems to have improved, it is important that the implementation of the 
whistleblowing protection legislation is monitored regularly. Second, solid legislative protection seems 
to give (potential) whistleblowers a false sense of safety, which leads to them being more vulnerable 
for reprisals than before. Warning potential whistleblowers for reprisals is thus important. Third, the 
solid legislation seems to have also led to “more aggressive, creative corporate tactics to silence 
whistleblowers”125, like unlawful gag orders that are difficult to tackle in practice or put employees 
under retaliatory investigation which is often followed by a prosecution referral, which are not 
considered PPPs under current legislation. Such measures are aimed at scaring employees into silence. 
Devine therefore concludes: “It is because whistleblowers rightly are viewed as greater threats to abuses 
of power than ever before, and therefore must be silenced in a manner that stops others from speaking 
out.”126  
                                                     
124 See: https://www.sec.gov 
125 Government Accountability Project (2016). Why Whistleblowers Wait: Recommendations to Improve the 
Dodd-Frank Law’s SEC Whistleblower Awards Program. 
126 Devine, T. (2017). Corrected testimony of Thomas Devine. Government Accountability Project before the 
House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, Subcommittee on Federal Workforce, U.S. Postal Service 
and the Census on Whistleblower protection since passage of the whistleblower protection enhancement Act: 13. 
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